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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore how microstate human interactions produce 
macro level self-organization and emergence in a supply disruption scenario, as well as 
discover factors and typical human behaviour that bring about disruptions. This study 
argues that the complex adaptive system’s view of complexity is most suited scholarly 
foundation for this research enquiry. Drawing on the dissipative structure based 
explanation of emergence and self-organization in a complex adaptive system, this 
thesis further argues that an energy gradient between the ongoing and designed system 
conditions, known as adaptive tension, causes supply chains to self-organize and 
emerge.  
This study adopts a critical realist ontology operationalized by a qualitative case 
research and grounded theory based analysis. The data was collected using repertory 
grid interviews of 22 supply chain executives from 21 firms. In all 167 cases of supply 
disruptions were investigated. 
Findings illustrate that agent behaviours like loss of trust, over ambitious pursuit, use of 
power and privilege, conspiring against best practices and heedless performance were 
contributing to disruption. Impacted by these behaviours, supply chains demonstrated 
impaired disruption management capabilities and increased disruption probability. It 
was also discovered that some of these system patterns and microstate agent behaviours 
pushed the supply chains to a zone of emergent complexity where these networks self-
organized and emerged into new structures or embraced changes in prevailing processes 
or goals. A conceptual model was developed to explain the transition from micro agent 
behaviour to system level self-organization and emergence. The model described 
alternate pathways of a supply chain under adaptive tension. 
The research makes three primary research contributions. Firstly, based upon the 
theoretical model, this research presents a conceptualization of supply chain emergence 
and self-organization from dissipative structures and adaptive tension based view of 
complexity. Secondly, it formally introduces and validates the role of behavioural and 
cognitive element of human actions in a supply chain scenario. Lastly, it affirms the 
complex adaptive system based conceptualization of supply chain networks. These 
contributions succeed in providing organizations with an explanation for observed 
deviations in their operations performance using a behavioural aspect of human agents. 
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One comes away from "Complexity" both intellectually excited by ideas and emotionally 
involved with the people struggling to formulate them. This is a deep tale of science in 
the making.” 
Douglas R. Hofstadter;  author of Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid 
1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The problem landscape  
Over recent years, a vibrant stream of supply chain research has focused on causes, 
consequences and mitigation strategies of supply chain disruptions (SCD) (Tang, 
2006b; Craighead et al., 2007; Wu, Blackhurst and O’grady, 2007; Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2009; Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Stecke and Kumar, 2009). Whilst 
contributions from the SCD research have credibly established the influence of a firm’s 
operational characteristics, supply chain strategy or its positioning in the extended 
supply network, on the risk and disruption performance of these supply chains 
(Thadakamaila, 2004; Meepetchdee and Shah, 2007; Zhao et al., 2011; Bode and 
Wagner, 2015); there remains a general lack of understanding about the bottom up 
aspect of the phenomenon. In particular, the existing supply chain risk and disruption 
research is yet to detail or formalize the influence of micro level individual agent 
behaviours, actions and interactions on the risk and disruption profile of supply chains.  
The core argument of this thesis is that micro level contributions have been under-
examined and in fact provide greater explanatory relevance to events of SCD. Existing 
supply chain literature lacks empirical investigation of agent’s contributions to system 
level macro supply chain outcomes such as events of disruption. In SCD settings, the 
micro to macro causation argument is neither adequately tested nor sufficiently 
grounded in any existing theory. This thesis argues that in order to gain a holistic 
understanding of the causes and consequences of SCD events, there is a need to look 
beyond the operational and structural decisions of a supply network into micro 
decisions and interactions transpiring at an agent level.  
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1.2 Motivation for the study  
The premise that micro agent interactions can have macro consequences is not a new 
abstraction in organizational studies. Reason (1997) argues that humans are at the centre 
of the design, operations and maintenance of organizational systems and their 
contribution to the system’s performance cannot be ignored.  
The field of neo-institutional theory also has repeatedly argued the importance of 
grounding explanations of macro level social or organizational phenomenon on micro 
level processes and mechanisms (George et al., 2006; DiMaggio, 2010). Recent 
advancement in behavioural supply chain research also acknowledges the same (Gino 
and Pisano, 2008; Tokar, 2010). Gino and Pisano (2008) argue that most of the existing 
normative models of supply chains, with their rational and complying human agent 
assumption, conflicts with operational realities. These normative representation of 
supply chain activities will continue to lack rationality and predictive accuracy unless 
behavioural aspects of human actor are included in these models (Gino and Pisano, 
2008; Tokar, 2010). Motivated by evidence and theoretical support in other literatures 
about the agent contribution to a phenomenon, this thesis argues that aspects of human 
behaviours, actions and interactions have a potential to influence the supply network 
and a study of it is a worthwhile endeavour to gain a better understanding of SCD 
events.  
1.3 Rationale  
This thesis adopts a complex systems view of supply chains and bounds its investigation 
of the SCD to this theoretical foundation. The complexity paradigm has been argued to 
be the most appropriate theoretical foundation to evaluate the impact of micro system 
components or micro agent behaviours on system level macro outcomes (Gell-Mann, 
1994; Dooley, 1996; Levin, 1998; Holland, 2006). The complexity paradigm argues that 
open systems maintained at a distance from equilibrium show traits of adaptation, self-
organization and emergence driven by microstate interactions among its participating 
agents (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Kauffman, 1993; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 
2006). Within the complexity domain, the studies that tend to focus on system level 
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emergent behaviours originating from the actions, interactions, and connectedness of 
multiple diverse system agents, are preferably tackled using the Complex Adaptive 
System (CAS) perspective (Kauffman, 1993; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 2006), a 
subset of the wider interdisciplinary field of complex systems. 
Supply chains have also been progressively argued to demonstrate complex system 
characteristics, typically the characteristics that are common to Complex Adaptive 
System (CAS) based conceptualization of complexity (Choi, Dooley and 
Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Datta, Christopher and Allen, 2007; Pathak 
et al., 2007; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009). In 
the existing complexity debate there are two popular conceptualizations of  CAS; one 
that emerged from thermodynamics and chemical kinematics and advocates the 
emergence of a complex system from the formation and dissolution of self-organizing 
dissipating structures generated from the existence of a critical level of 
potentials/gradients also known as adaptive tension (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; 
McKelvey, 1999b; Lichtenstein et al., 2007). While the other field that draws on 
advancements in complexity from the field of evolutionary biology and suggest that 
system’s tend to demonstrate self-organizing and co-evolutionary emergent behaviours 
as a result of schemas, internal models and agent mechanisms that shape agent 
interactions and force the system to move among multiple possible fitness landscapes 
(Kauffman, 1993). 
Most of the existing supply chain complexity researchers draw on the fitness landscape 
metaphor of complexity and argue system behaviours based upon internal models and 
schemas of the interacting supply chain agents (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 
2001; Surana et al., 2005; Datta, Christopher and Allen, 2007; Pathak et al., 2007; Nair, 
Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009). There are numerous 
supply networks studies that propose CAS as the most appropriate framework for a 
bottom up investigation of supply networks. These studies argue that aggregated micro 
interactions can influence macro level system outcomes and that evolution and self-
organization of supply networks is governed by a few dominant generative agent 
mechanisms produced by a collective influence of these micro agent behaviours, actions 
and interactions (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Datta, 
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Christopher and Allen, 2007; Pathak et al., 2007; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; 
Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009). Proponents of CAS in supply chains further argue 
that a study of these mechanisms can provide explanatory relevance to various complex 
and evolutionary supply chain phenomenon and behaviours; the approach is specially 
touted for being able to provide structurally realistic and more accurate representation of 
supply networks (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Datta, 
Christopher and Allen, 2007; Pathak et al., 2007; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; 
Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009).  
However, none of the existing studies provide the mechanism that can explain the 
transformation of micro level interactions into system level outcomes. Drawing on the 
dissipative systems theory of CAS, this thesis argues that the accumulation of adaptive 
tension is a crucial intermediary mechanism that links micro state agent interactions to 
system wide self-organization and emergence. This thesis avoids the bias of adopting 
one conceptualization of CAS over other and focuses on the core arguments of 
complexity that is in an open system, at a distance from equilibrium, a diverse array of 
microstate agent’s interactions can create adaptive tensions leading to self-organizing 
and emergent system behaviours at the edge of chaos. Using this framework of 
complexity, this thesis proposes that supply chains are a CAS that are under a constant 
flux and dynamic operating environment. Typically for events of SCD that are a 
departure from optimal operating conditions, it is expected to observe adaptive, self-
organizing emergent system behaviours. However, despite having a strong theoretical 
support for the argument (McKelvey, 1999b, 2004; Lichtenstein et al., 2007), in supply 
chain literature, and specially for SCD events, it has been challenging to demonstrate 
evolutionary and self-organizing behaviours originating from the microstate interaction 
of participating system components and agents. Where the complexity literature on 
leadership (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009), entrepreneurship (McKelvey, 2004) or 
new product development (Mccarthy et al., 2006) have come up with clear 
conceptualizations of adaptive tension, self-organization or emergence with respect to 
their field; these constructs have not yet been clearly defined for a supply chain 
scenario. 
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Considering this as an opportunity to contribute, this thesis sets out to present a supply 
chain centric conceptualization of adaptive tension generated by micro agent behaviours 
and interactions and in turn seeks to validate the occurrence of emergence and self-
organization in a SCD scenario. This thesis proposes that events of supply chain 
disruption (SCD) provide the best opportunity to study adaptive tension, self-
organization and emergence in supply chains as these are the circumstances where the 
system is perturbed from operational equilibrium and into the realm of chaos.  
This thesis also argues that the complex and highly interdependent nature of supply 
networks obscures an individual’s ability to discern mechanisms responsible for a 
phenomenon, and thus, despite having abundance of contextual and tacit knowledge, 
managers often find it hard to conceptualize, articulate or express their views on 
complex and unexplored supply chain issues. This thesis proposes to use a systematic 
interview technique of Repertory Grid (Rep Grids), with its theoretical foundation in 
psychology, that helps overcome these issues related to difficulty in understanding or 
articulation and provides an opportunity to discover deeper conceptualization and 
analysis of the phenomenon under discussion.   
1.4 Research outline and aims 
People are at the core of operations and supply chain processes. Organizations can gain 
from an improved awareness about the impact of aggregated actions of individuals on 
diverse operational aspects. The most pertinent question from a practitioner perspective 
is that how do individual actions, behaviours and interactions reflect on complex 
organizational outcomes. The aim of this research is to investigate the bottom up 
influence of micro agent interactions on macro supply chain outcomes.  While the ‘why’ 
aspect of the phenomenon will be of more importance and interest to academicians. The 
research question for this doctoral research is 
Research question 1: 
How do micro level agent behaviours, actions and interactions influence macro level 
self-organization and emergence in a supply chain disruption scenario?  
Research question 2: 
What are the factors and micro state agent behaviours that influence events of supply 
chain disruption? 
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This research question will be investigated using an appropriate research design, 
presented in next section. 
1.4.1 Approach and research design  
The ontological and epistemological position of this thesis can best be characterized as a 
version of critical realism that, in accordance with Bhaskar (1978), explores supply 
chain disruptions as open stratified systems with a laminated system of layered ontology 
for taxonomically defining or identifying the sites of engagement relevant to the 
phenomenon. Bhaskar (1978), suggests the existence of three domains to a 
phenomenon; a domain of ‘Empirical’ which involves the observed events and 
experiences of participants; a domain of actual which accounts for the ‘Actual’ events 
that transpired and finally the domain of ‘Real’ where reside the mechanisms and causal 
forces that bring about these changes in actual. From a complexity perspective this 
thesis argues that microstate behaviours, actions and interactions of agents, the observed 
self-organizing structures and observable patterns of system emergence are in the 
domain of empirical and actual, such that the participating agents can perceive and 
comment about them. While the development of causal gradients such as adaptive 
tension in the system maintained at a distance from equilibrium could be argued to be 
the mechanisms that bring about the changes observed in the domain of empirical and 
actual such as self-organization and system emergence. A detailed discussion of it is 
provided latter in the thesis.  
The research design adopts a qualitative research strategy which is operationalized 
using a Repertory Grid data collection tool. Analytical framework of the thesis is a 
critical realist version of grounded theory analysis, known as ‘Retroductive Grounded 
Theory’. Table 1 presents an overview of the research and relevant decisions informing 
the enquiry. 
1.5 Overview of findings and contribution  
A summary of research contributions is presented in this section. A detailed discussion 
of contributions is provided in the chapter of conclusion. 
Primary contributions 
 presents the conceptualization of supply chain emergence and self-organization 
from dissipative structures and adaptive tension based view of complexity. 
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 formalizes the agent perspective in SCD events and empirically validating it in a 
field based case study by presenting a set of agent behaviours contributing to the 
departure of supply chain from normal operating conditions and influencing 
network disruptions.  
 presents a model that can be used to explain the possible future pathways of a 
supply chain under crisis. 
 affirms the complex adaptive system based conceptualization of supply chain 
networks by validating the claim that agent schemas and internal mechanism 
have an explanatory relevance for systemic phenomenon. 
Secondary contributions 
 establish the role of behavioural and cognitive element of human actions in a 
supply chain scenario.  
 presents a conceptualization and explanation of agent behaviours leading to 
supply chain resilience and robustness and validates it by using qualitative case 
data. 
 presents a systematic data collection tool of Repertory Grids as a preferred 
technique to help respondents articulate and discover agent and agency aspect of 
a supply chain phenomenon. 
 presents the utility of having a critical realist research design for investigating 
complex system phenomenon, particularly the ones that require accounting for 
an agent perspective. It also proves the utility of abductive reasoning in supply 
chain theory building. 
  operationalise a modified version of grounded theory based inductive, 
qualitative analysis framework based upon Gioia methodology. 
Contribution to practice 
 provide organizations with an explanation for observed deviations in their 
operations performance using a behavioural aspect of human agents. Using the 
findings of the research, firms and managers will be able to look beyond meagre 
normative supply chain models and operation procedures into the aspect how 
these procedures are disposed in an operations environment. 
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 help organizations to draw interventions and strategies. Being aware of agent 
behaviours and schemas relevant to SCD, firms will be able to draw better 
interventions and more robust strategies to tackle events of disruption. 
Table 1: Research study overview 
Research Question 
Research question 1: 
How do micro level agent behaviours, actions and interactions influence macro level self-organization and 
emergence in a supply chain disruption scenario?  
Research question 2: 
What are the factors and micro state agent behaviours that influence events of supply chain disruption? 
  
Ontological Stance 
Critical Realism 
Research Design 
Research strategy: Qualitative; 
Sampling Criterion: Purposive sampling was used to control the degree of variety and similarity among selected 
cases to get a better control of theoretical categorization within cases; 
Sample: Rep Grid interview with 22 middle managers and senior managers from 21 different firms. The selected 
participants represented 15 different industrial sectors, varying degree of responsibility, and 6 to 27 years of 
work experience in both upstream and downstream networks; 
Unit of Analysis: Event of supply chain disruption. In all there were 167 cases of supply chain disruption were 
investigated; 
Unit of Data collection: An individual manager of a firm in a supply chain network; 
Data analysis technique: Retroductive Grounded theory using Gioia methodology for operationalising and 
representing Grounded theory findings. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
The core agenda for this research is to explore the influence of individual behaviours 
and interactions on macro level supply chain phenomenon. Subscribing to the theory of 
complex systems, this research looks for micro-macro transition from aspect of self-
organization and systemic emergence generated by the adaptive tension/gradient linked 
to individual agent behaviours actions and interactions. The objective of this enquiry 
requires developing an apt methodology to capture the agent’s contribution to SCD and 
to be able to connect the findings to the theoretical foundation of CAS.  
The above research objectives are accomplished using a three phase research enquiry.  
The Phase I consist of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that present a discussion of the relevant 
literature and a pilot study. The literature section examines the existing body of supply 
chain and complex system literature. Supply chain literature is used to identify the 
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organizational drivers of SCD and the proposed organizational response to manage or 
mitigate effects of a disruptive event. To gain an overarching view on drivers and 
contextual conditions contributing to an increased disruption probability, literature on 
supply chain risk and vulnerability were also included. To gain an understanding of the 
debates and arguments in literature around aspects of managing and mitigating effects 
of SCD. It was also deemed necessary to include the literature on supply chain 
resilience and robustness as these constructs reduce the probability or impact of 
disruptions and thus worth an investigation. The complexity and CAS literature 
provides with the necessary theoretical foundation to investigate the micro to macro 
transformational influence. It is in this phase that a preliminary research question is 
developed which is tested in a pilot study.  
The pilot study, presented in Chapter 3, was conducted to test the methodology and 
research design in a controlled environment. The chapter provides a detailed description 
of the data collection tool (Rep grids) and produces an exemplary mixed method data 
analysis based upon the Rep grid data from pilot interviews. Albeit of it being 
performed at a small scale, with three organizations, the pilot was still an empirical 
study on its own. The learnings from it were used to inform the main study. 
Reflecting upon the results from the pilot helped to improve the framing of the research 
enquiry, specifically the extent to which complexity as a perspective was being used. It 
was found necessary to revisit the conceptualization of complexity with regards to the 
phenomenon of interest. Complexity terms like dissipating structures, adaptive tension 
and critical value were included in the scope of the research. Data analysis aspect of the 
research was also evolved to provide higher weightage to the narratives.  
The Phase II of the research consist of Chapter 4 – Research Design and Chapter 5 – 
Findings. The Chapter 4 delves deeper into the aspects of ontological perspective, and 
methodology. The section on ontology summarises the arguments related to the 
philosophical perspective of a complexity based research enquiry and then provides a 
rational for using Critical Realism as the ontology of choice for this doctoral research. 
This is followed by a discussion of research strategy and analytical framework. The 
subsection of analysis recommends the use of retroductive grounded theory and 
provides details on its operationalization. 
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Chapter 5 presents a detailed discussion of the findings from Rep Grid Interviews. The 
interview data from 22 managers from 21 firms and 167 cases of supply chain 
disruption are ordered to represent agent behaviours, growing adaptive gradient in the 
organization and instances related to emergence or chaos. A discussion of cases that 
reflected resilience to disruption are also presented.  
The Phase III of the thesis tries to answer the why and how questions regarding the 
findings and tries to position it in the overall knowledge of this domain. In this phase 
there are two chapters, Chapter 6 – Discussion and Chapter 7 – Conclusion. The 
discussion chapter presents a model of micro to macro transformations in supply chain. 
This model looks at different pathways a system, under adaptive gradient, could 
traverse. The chapter on conclusion presents a synthesis of the thesis and a discussion of 
the contributions of this research. 
1.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces the phenomenon of interest and the motivation to undertake this 
research. It identifies that that existing supply chain literature is deficient on its 
accounting of agent contribution to the phenomenon of SCD. It also argues that micro to 
macro causation has been studied in various natural and organizational studies and the 
study is important for the progress of supply chain research. The chapter furthers the 
debate by introducing complex system perspective as the most appropriate scholarly 
foundation to study the transformation of micro state agent behaviours into emergent 
system wide outcomes. The chapter goes on to present an introductory discussion of the 
philosophical stance taken by this thesis and a short summary of the contributions. The 
chapter ends with a section on the structure of the thesis. 
The next two Chapters 2 and 3 present the first phase of this three-phase research 
enquiry. This first phase investigates the extant literature and conducts a pilot study to 
test the research framework in a controlled environment. Essentially this phase prepares 
the ground for conducting the main study. 
 
 11 
 
Phase I:  
Setting up the foundation of the study 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to gain an overarching view of the phenomenon of 
interest and other relevant literatures informing the research. The findings from this 
section will shape the structure of the pilot study and provide a relevant research 
question to for the pilot. 
The phenomenon of interest for this research enquiry is to study the influence of 
individual behaviours and interactions on macro level supply chain phenomenon and to 
recommend particular agent behaviours and mindsets that contribute to the occurrence 
of SCD. To set the scope of this research and to gain an overarching view of existing 
debates in SCD and the maturity of the domain with respect to agent contributions, a 
comprehensive review of supply chain literature was conducted. A review of the 
complex system theory was also undertaken to validate its usefulness in providing a 
theoretical foundation to the research enquiry, particularly with respect to the chosen 
context of SCD.   
The chapter begins with a discussion of a systematic literature review conducted on 
supply chain disruption. This is followed by a discussion of complex systems theory 
and its contributions in the study of supply chains.  
2.2  Supply chain disruptions  
Disasters and catastrophes are beyond human control. Every system, how so ever robust 
it may be, is destined to fail (Perrow, 1999; Christopher and Lee, 2004; Craighead et al., 
2007) and this will include the modern supply chain. Events of supply chain failure are 
termed as disruptions and it includes occurrences when desired quantity or quality of 
goods or service fails to reach a designated location.  
Supply chain disruptions (SCD) can have disastrous impact upon a firm’s performance. 
Frequent minor disruptions of material flow variations, also referred as disturbances 
(Greening and Rutherford, 2011) compel supply chain operatives to engage in constant 
firefighting, while the less frequent but catastrophic large scale disruptions can have 
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extreme consequences on the brand and shareholder value of a firm (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2003, 2005; Wagner and Bode, 2008; Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009).  
2.3 Objective of the review 
In the last decade supply chain disruption research has had many valuable contributions 
(Papadakis, 2003; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Craighead et al., 2007; Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2009; Stecke and Kumar, 2009). Researchers have broadly focused their 
arguments either into the network /structural drivers of disruption, dealing with the 
relative positioning of the focal firm on the extended array of network and relationships, 
or on strategic drivers of disruption originating from organizational strategies and 
initiatives that are adopted for achieving higher efficiency and control. However, 
current literature seems to have ignored the micro to macro impact of variables or in 
particular the literature seems to be deficient in accounting for the agency aspect of 
SCD. In order to gain a better understanding of the current literature on SCD and to be 
able to identify research areas with a potential to contribute, a systematic literature 
review of the domain is conducted. 
Since determinants of the phenomenon of SCD are often coinvestigated with related 
constructs like supply chain risk, vulnerability, resilience and robustness, this thesis 
proposes to retain a broad scope of the literature search and converge the findings at a 
later stage of the literature review. The review was conducted using the following 
research question; 
2.3.1 Research question for a systematic literature review 
Literature review question: What are the factors that influence the likelihood of a 
supply chain disruption? 
This will be investigated using the following two sub questions 
Q1 a: What are the drivers of supply chain risk, vulnerability and disruption? 
The causes contributing to the likelihood of a disruptive event are embedded in the 
inherent risk and vulnerabilities of a network and a study of these could help gain useful 
insights about factors triggering disruptive events. 
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Q1 b: What are the supply network strategies that influence the risk and vulnerability 
profile of a network? 
Organizations are aware of a disruption threat and thus use many safeguard strategies 
and tactics to reduce the likelihood of a disruptive event. This question will help 
understand the current approaches adopted by organizations to influence events of 
disruption. 
2.3.2 Rational for a systematic literature review 
There are many approaches to undertake a literature review, such as the traditional 
narrative literature review, but for the purpose of this thesis, a method of systematic 
literature review is selected to gain an overarching and holistic view of the field. 
Systematic literature review is a very rigorous scientific approach to select appropriate 
literature, evaluate its contribution, synthesise relevant findings and systematically 
report the results. As it is based on a clearly stated review protocol, the method succeeds 
in providing an audit trail of reviewers decisions on  procedures, methods and rationale 
for his inferences and conclusions  (Cook, Mulrow and Haynes, 1997; Tranfield, 
Denyer and Smart, 2003). In comparison with other literature review methodologies, the 
systematic literature review prioritizes evidence by both relevance and quality and thus 
succeeds to provide a very rigorous and encompassing account of the literature 
(Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003) . It is a good technique to acquire collective 
knowledge of a given phenomenon or field, its subfields and related constructs 
(Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). Based upon the framework suggested by Tranfield 
et al. (2003), the process to systematic literature review can be divided into four phases; 
planning, selecting, appraising and reporting. 
The next section presents a description of selected databases, keywords, search strings 
and details about the number of articles shortlisted for review. Articles were selected 
based upon their relevance to the research and the quality of contribution. 
2.3.3 Keyword 
There are three major themes that emerge from the review question; disruption, risk and 
vulnerability. A contrasting term to disruption and vulnerability is ‘resilience’, which is 
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also considered as a major theme for the literature search keywords. Along with these 
major themes, their relevant synonyms and antonyms are also added to the list of 
literature search keywords. Supply chain and its synonyms are included to provide the 
context to the search. Table 2 presents a list of the selected keywords. 
Table 2: Keywords for the literature search 
Theme Risk, Vulnerability Disruption Supply chain 
Keywords Synonyms:  Vulnerability, Network 
Failure, Disruption, Targeted attack 
 
Antonyms: Resilience Robustness, Risk 
Mitigation,  Disaster preparedness, 
attack tolerance, Network Survivability 
Disruption, disrupt, 
disrupted, disturbance, 
attack, fragility, breakage 
Supply Chain, logistics, 
supply network, supplier, 
buyer, procurement, 
Inter firm, inter organization 
The literature search was conducted using three electronic databases; Business Source 
Complete (EBSCO) and ABI Inform Global PROQUEST.  From the initial keyword 
search, the articles obtained after removing duplicates was 2077. These articles were put 
through a process of title screening, abstract screening, full text screening and then 
selection using the process of quality appraisal. The final list of articles so obtained is 
extracted for relevant data. Snow bowling technique was used to include a few more 
relevant articles. Table 3 gives details of the number of articles for each stage. 
Table 3: Number of articles review in each of the screening process 
Screening Criterion adopted on Number of articles screened 
Title 2077 
Abstracts 263 
Full Text 165 
Selected for inclusion 81 
Selected from Cross reference 15 
 
 
Total article reviewed 96 
2.4 Findings 
2.4.1 Theoretical foundations and method of analysis 
The Table 4 illustrates the theoretical foundations of the reviewed articles. Among the 
grounding theories the ‘graph theory’ perspective has been the guiding theory to most of 
the articles. These include Meepetchdee and Shah (2007); Nair and Vidal (2011); 
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Wagner and Neshat (2010); Yang et al. (2011) Second most cited theoretical foundation 
is of ‘systems theory’. This has been used by Peck (2005); Pettit et al. (2013); Zsidisin 
et al. (2005). A view on SCD from ‘High reliability theory’ or  ‘Normal accident 
theory’ is presented by Speier et al. (2011); Wagner and Neshat (2012). The theoretical 
foundation of ‘Resource dependency theory’ and ‘Social network theory’ has also found 
mentions.  Figure 1 presents a description of selected papers from the methodlogical 
aspect. 
Table 4: Theoretical Foundations of Articles 
Study  Theoretical Foundations 
(Göran Svensson, 2002a; Skipper and Hanna, 2009; Simchi-Levi et al., 2015; 
Park, Min and Min, 2016)  
Contingency Theory,  Channel 
Theory, 
(Svensson, 2002c) JIT, Marketing theory 
(Hallikas et al., 2004) Business Networks, Transaction 
Cost economics 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005)  Resource dependency theory 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) Industrial Risk Management 
(Kumar, Liu and Demirag, 2015; Clemons and Slotnick, 2016)  Enactment theory 
(Peck, 2005; Zsidisin, Melnyk and Ragatz, 2005; Pettit, Croxton and Fiksel, 
2013) 
Systems theory, Institutional 
theory 
(Choi and Krause, 2006) Buyer supplier relationship, 
supplier management, Complexity 
(Tomlin, 2006) Strategic management and supply 
chain management 
(Wagner and Bode, 2006) Normal accident theory 
(Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009) Supply chain Management and 
Interdisciplinary 
(Xiao and Yu, 2006; Meepetchdee and Shah, 2007; Wagner and Neshat, 2010; 
Nair and J. M. Vidal, 2011; Kim, Chen and Linderman, 2015) (  
Graph Theory 
(Yang et al., 2010) Social network analysis and Graph 
theory 
(Adenso-Diaz et al., 2012) Supply Chain  
(Goetschalckx et al., 2012) Systems engineering approach 
 (Wagner and Neshat, 2012; Marley, Ward and Hill, 2014) Normal Accident Theory and High-
Reliability Theory  
(Ivanov, Sokolov and Dolgui, 2014) 
 
Control theory 
(Cantor, Blackhurst and Cortes, 2014) Regulatory focus theory   
(Xiao and Qi, 2008; Friesz, Lee and Lin, 2011; Xiao, Yu and Gong, 2012; Chen 
and Xiao, 2015; Sarkar and Kumar, 2015)  
Game theory  
(Pal, Sana and Chaudhuri, 2012; Baghalian, Rezapour and Farahani, 2013; 
Chen and Xiao, 2015; Giri and Bardhan, 2015; Sawik, 2015)  
Economic theory 
(Golgeci and Ponomarov, 2013) 
 
Dynamic capability theory 
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Figure 1: Percentage of articles by method of analysis 
2.4.2 Defining supply chain vulnerability, resilience, robustness and 
reliability 
2.4.2.1 Supply chain vulnerability (SCV) 
Many long and severe supply chain disruptions from recent years have exposed the 
inherent risk embedded in modern supply chains. This has led to the evolution of supply 
chains vulnerability as an independent domain (Christopher and Lee, 2004).  
Despite two decades of SCV studies, the field is still fraught with conceptual 
disagreements regarding the formative elements of vulnerability and its operational 
definition (Wagner and Neshat, 2012). Among the early SCV researchers, Svensson , 
(Göran Svensson, 2000, 2002b, 2002d), is the most widely cited. The author argues that 
the concept of SCV is grounded within the risk and contingency planning literature and 
its definition can be approached in two dimensions; a disruption event and the resulting 
consequence. Svensson (2002a) goes on to defines SCV as  
“the construct of vulnerability consists of two components: disturbance and the 
negative consequence of disturbance. A disturbance is defined as a random quantitative 
or qualitative deviation from what is normal or expected. A negative consequence of 
disturbance refers to a deteriorated goal accomplishment in terms of economic costs, 
quantitative deviations such as increased cycle times and down times” 
(Svensson, 2002a: p. 15) 
The author further argues that this unexpected disruption event could have its origin 
within the supply chain or external to it and it is often caused by time and relationship 
dependencies in the chain.  
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Similar to Svensson (2002b, 2002c), in another pioneering cross sector SCV and SCRes 
research, at  the Cranfield University Centre for Logistics, Helen Peck, (Peck, 2005, 
2006), and co researchers have also grounded SCV in  traditional risk  and risk 
management literature. Peck (2006) relates vulnerability to something being at risk or 
having a likelihood or probability to be lost or damaged. This definition of vulnerability, 
used by Peck (2006, 2005), is adopted from the Collins English dictionary; as the 
authors deliberately chose to avoid the existing academic disagreement in defining the 
SCV construct. The disagreement in principle is about the question that what constitutes 
vulnerability? Is it the asset at risk or the factors/ drivers leading to a loss? This is 
evident from the SCV approach adopted by Pettit et al. (2010) and Juttner et al. (2003). 
Juttner et al. (2003) propose vulnerability to be; 
‘‘the propensity of risk sources and risk drivers to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, 
thus causing adverse supply chain consequences’’. 
(Juttner et al., 2003: p. 200)  
The definition is addressed from the perspective of risk drivers and not from the 
perspective of a disruptive event. The most important aspect of this definition is the 
recognition of the fact that vulnerability refers to losses that are beyond the existing risk 
mitigation strategies of the firm. This brings in the dimension of unknown and 
unplanned risk and likelihood of losses incurred due to such risks. A similar argument is 
presented by Pettit et al. (2010)  , the authors define SCV as 
“fundamental factors that makes an enterprise susceptible to disruptions” 
(Pettit et al., 2010: p. 6)  
Sheffi and Rice (2005) define SCV as the likelihood of disruption and severity of the 
consequences; while Wagner and Bode, (2006) relate it to probability of occurrence and 
the severity of disruption caused by it. 
Thus, we can conclude that the present SCV literature puts the construct of vulnerability 
in the domain of risk from unexpected unavoidable disruptive events. The leading SCV 
researchers view vulnerability as a three dimensional construct: the likelihood of a 
disruptive event, the resulting negative consequences due to it, such as loss or damage, 
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and the contributing drivers that outweigh the employed risk mitigation strategies of the 
firm.  
2.4.2.2 Supply chain resilience (SCRes) 
Contemporary supply chain risk and disruption research is moving from the domain of 
focal firm to the network level (Harland, Brenchley and Walker, 2003).  The network 
perspective of risk acknowledges the diffusive nature of risk and the inability of firms to 
be able to completely mitigate all its risks (Peck, 2006). This has prompted 
academicians to investigate these risks and resulting disruptions with another 
complementary dynamic network phenomenon called ‘Resilience’.  
Originating in multiple disciplines, the phenomena of supply chain resilience has 
evolved from many interdisciplinary literature (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). The 
literature of supply chain resilience finds its theoretical foundations in research streams 
like Network Theory, Graph theory, Systems Theory, and Institutional theory. In the 
supply chain literature Christopher and Peck (2004) and Sheffi and Rice (2005)   can be 
considered as pioneer contributors to the SCRes research domain. Reporting the 
findings from a UK Transport department funded research project on network resilience 
of UK’s economic activities, Christopher and Peck (2004) chose to use a dictionary 
definition of resilience conceptualized from the study of ecosystems. The authors 
argued supply chains to have a similarity with network of ecosystems; they defined 
resilience as 
“The ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable 
state after disruption.” 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004: p. 2)  
The authors further argued that flexibility and adaptive capacity of a resilient system, in 
order to reach to a new more desirable state, is the key dimension of the phenomenon. 
(Sheffi, 2005) compare a supply chain’s disruption resilience to the process of “shock 
absorption”, an analogy symbolically referring to the amount of abusive stress the 
supply levels can withstand. The authors define resilience to be the ability of a system 
to bounce back from an event of disruption. In other SCRes research, following these 
two studies, most of the academicians have approached resilience within the same 
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framework as Christopher and Peck (2004) or Sheffi and Rice (2005). The only 
difference is that some authors have stressed more upon the adaptive capacity of the 
system while others have focused on the capacity of the system to survive or recover. 
Table 5 presents some of the widely quoted definitions and authors from the SCRes 
research. 
Table 5: Resilience definitions 
Author Resilience definition 
(Christopher and 
Peck, 2004) 
“the ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable state 
after being disturbed 
 
(Sheffi and Rice, 
2005) 
“ A company’s resilience is function of its competitive position and the responsiveness of 
supply chain” 
 
(Tang, 2006b) “robust supply chain strategy would enable a firm to deploy the associated contingency plans 
efficiently and effectively when facing a disruption. Therefore, having a robust supply chain 
strategy could make a firm become more resilient. 
 
(Peck, 2006) “the ability of a system to return to its original or desired state after being disturbed” 
 
(Fiksel, 2006) “the capacity for an enterprise to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of turbulent change”  
 
(Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009)  
“the adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to 
disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining continuity of operations at the desired 
level of connectedness and control over structure and function” 
 
2.4.2.3 Supply chain robustness (SCRob)  
The concept of robust design is said to be first introduced in the 1960’s by Genuchi 
Taguchi for the purpose of robust experiment design (Mo and Harrison, 2005). 
Taguchie’s idea of robust experiment design suggests that every process has a design 
factor, that is controllable, and a noise factor that cannot be controlled. The objective of 
an efficient design is to make a system robust to the system’s noise and the same 
principle has been adopted in the design of robust supply chains. Defining supply chain 
robustness towards changing environmental and operational conditions, Goetschalckx et 
al. (2012) quote; 
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“The capability of the supply network to adapt to these changing conditions and execute 
its function efficiently under a variety of future conditions is called supply network 
robustness.” 
(Goetschalckx et al., 2012:p. 121)  
Thus, it can be concluded that SCRob concerns the network preserving its functionality, 
irrespective of disruptions. However, resilience and robustness definitions seems to 
have conceptual closeness and thus these constructs require additional clarification. 
On comparison of robustness with resilience, it can be observed that the definitions of 
both constructs have a conceptual similarity. The only difference is in the adaptive 
nature of resilience which is not an intrinsic property of a robust system. Adaptation 
signifies that the system can evolve into a new structure  (Christopher and Peck, 2004; 
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009), thus on getting exposed to a disruption a resilient 
system will transform or reconfigure into another structure while a robust system will 
work to preserve its original structure.  
2.4.3 Drivers of supply chain disruption, risk and vulnerability 
At a time where organizations are faced with a highly complex, interdependent and 
uncertain business environment, the pursuit of efficiency and efforts of over 
optimization have resulted in networks that are often extremely fragile and vulnerable to 
disruptions (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Harland et al., 2003; Hendricks and Singhal, 
2005; Tang, 2006a). A supply chain disruption is an event in the supply network in 
which one or more products fail to reach their planned supply chain nodes or destination 
in the designated quantity, designated quality or designated time. If the delay in the time 
is more than the safety stock available at the destination node and if no other corrective 
or contingency plan is available, then that node fails. This disruption event has a 
cascading nature as all products dependent upon the disrupted product, will inevitably 
also become disrupted.  Mulani and Hau (2002) argue that 40-60 % of supply chain 
managers’ time is spent on handling disruptions.  
The domain of supply chain disruption and vulnerability research is a fast evolving 
body of literature with many notable contributions. (Stecke and Kumar, 2009; Chopra 
and Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007; Papadakis, 2003). 
Table 6 presents a summary of the literature review findings.  We classify these studies  
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Table 6: Structure and strategic features of supply chain disruption 
Drivers Article details 
Structural drivers 
of disruption 
Tight coupling in supply chain nodes 
(Albino, Garavelli and Okogbaa, 1998; Peck, 2005; Wagner and Neshat, 2012) 
Complexity of network, lack of visibility and lack of predictive capacity 
(Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Blackhurst et al., 2005; Craighead et al., 2007; Stecke 
and Kumar, 2009; Wagner and Neshat, 2010, 2012; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
Connectedness and coherence of connectivity 
(Huang, Zhang and Zhang, 2010; T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
Supplier concentration or network density 
(Sheffi, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007; Huang, Zhang and Zhang, 2010; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
Supplier network structucture 
(Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Wagner and Neshat, 2010; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
Overall environment of supplier cluster ( Geographic, economic, political, social etc) 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Peck, 2005) 
Power relationships between supply chain actors 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005; Peck, 2005; Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010) 
Infrastructure node and link depedndecy 
(Peck, 2005, 2006; Wagner and Neshat, 2012) 
Strategic drivers 
of disruption 
Small supplier base 
(G Svensson, 2002; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Tang, 2006b; Wagner and 
Bode, 2006; Tang and Tomlin, 2008; Stecke and Kumar, 2009; Wagner and Neshat, 2010; 
Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
Global or far sourcing 
(G Svensson, 2002; Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Blackhurst et 
al., 2005; Wagner and Bode, 2006; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Stecke and Kumar, 2009; 
Wagner and Neshat, 2010) 
Specialized supplier or source criticality 
(Göran Svensson, 2002c; Peck, 2005; Wagner and Bode, 2006; T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 
2010; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
Lean and over optimization 
(Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Peck, 2005; Meepetchdee and Shah, 2007; Wagner and 
Neshat, 2010) 
Outsourcing and fragmented ownership 
(Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Peck, 2005; Stecke and Kumar, 2009) 
Time and sequencing constraints in the system 
(G Svensson, 2000; Blackhurst et al., 2005; Tomlin, 2006; T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
Stable world and controlable supply chain assumption 
(Peck, 2005, 2006) 
Resource limit of supplier base 
(T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
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into structural and strategic drivers of supply chain vulnerability and disruption. 
Structural drivers of disruption refer to the relative positioning of the focal firm in an 
extended array of network and relationships, while strategic drivers of disruption 
include the organizational strategies and initiatives that are adopted for achieving higher 
efficiency and control of the supply chain. 
2.4.3.1 Structural drivers 
Tight Coupling in Nodes 
The nature of coupling among the nodes also has an influence on SCV. It is argued that 
tightly coupled network structures are more vulnerable to disruption (Adenso‐ Diaz et 
al., 2012; Wagner and Neshat, 2012). Drawing a parallel between events of supply 
chain disruption and Normal accident Theory, Wagner and Bode (2006) argue that 
systems with tight coupling among network nodes are bound to fail. Infrastructure 
dependency: Many prominent supply chain disruptions from the last decade have 
provided sufficient validation to the claim that tight coupling leads to vulnerability 
(Sheffi, 2001; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010). However in 
most of these disruptions, like the terrorist attack of 9/11, Tsunami in Japan, hurricane 
Katarina, US West coast port strike or the volcanic ash over Europe, there was another 
prominent vulnerability factor that contributed to the severity of disruption. It was the 
coupling between infrastructure and supply chains. SCV researches have acknowledged 
these infrastructure dependencies to be a significant source of SCV (Peck, 2005, 2006; 
Wagner and Neshat, 2012). 
Supply Chain Complexity 
Supply chain complexity is attributed as one of the prominent structural vulnerability 
driver (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Datta, 
Christopher and Allen, 2007; Pathak et al., 2007; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; 
Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009).  A much detailed and elaborate discussion of 
supply chain complexity is provided in the next chapter. 
Supplier Concentration or Network Density  
Another prominent source of vulnerability is embedded in supplier concentration often 
measured in graph theory as network density (Craighead et al., 2007). Geographical 
 25 
proximity of suppliers can be very devastating for supply chains  (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). Craighead et al. (2007) were among the first researchers 
to provide a graph theory based empirical validation for the argument. Building on the 
framework of Craighead et al. (2007), Adenso‐ Diaz et al. (2012) also tested the 
network density for supply chain reliability. Using a simulation model, the authors 
validated that network density leads to a high supply chain vulnerability. 
Apart from these drivers, supply chain vulnerability and disruption literature mentions 
some more drivers of such as;  connectivity or the degree of interdependence and 
reliance upon critical sources or nodes (T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010), power 
relationship among network actors (Blackhurst et al., 2005; Peck, 2005; Zsidisin and 
Wagner, 2010). It can be conclude that the structural aspect of the supply chain has a 
significant bearing on supply chain vulnerability to disruption.  
2.4.3.2 Strategic drivers  
Small Supplier Base 
Strategically choosing to operate with a small supplier base or single sourcing, an 
extreme case of small supplier base, is considered to be a cost saving strategy as the cost 
of partnership and coordination are low (Tang, 2006b). However, this proves to be a 
prominent SCV driver. To argue the inherent vulnerability of this strategy, Stecke and 
Kumar (2009) mention the example of UPF Thompson, a small chassis manufacturer 
for Landrover, which became insolvent leading to a sudden and severe disruption in the 
Landrover supply chain.  
The rationale behind reducing supplier base is often motivated by efficiency initiatives 
and this leads to more integrated and vulnerable supply chains (Juttner, Peck and 
Christopher, 2003). Working with a single supplier or a very few suppliers might not 
always be a bad strategy; the issue is about aligning it with your companies 
procurement strategy (Sheffi and Rice, 2005). If a single supplier is chosen, then a firm 
should have a high collaboration and close working association with the supplier, 
otherwise it will prove to be a vulnerability driver (Sheffi and Rice, 2005). Wagner and 
Bode (2006) also acknowledge the argument of a few highly aligned suppliers, yet the 
authors argue high level of trust, close collaboration and joint working can only absorb 
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some risk, and as a strategy single sourcing or small supplier base will contribute 
towards supply chain vulnerability. Wagner and Neshat (2010) have also recognized 
supplier dependencies, arising out of a small supplier base or a single supplier, are 
major contributors to supply side vulnerability. The percentage of single sources within 
supply chain could act as an indicator of vulnerability (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). In 
their graph theory based simulation,  Adenso‐ Diaz et al. (2012) have empirically 
measured this vulnerability by a factor called ‘source criticality’, which for a supply 
chain refers to the average number of suppliers for each product. The results of the 
Adenso‐ Diaz et al. (2012) simulation are indicative that small supplier base as a 
strategy indeed leads to vulnerability.’ 
Specialized Suppliers 
A very unique product in a supply chain could be a cause of disruption concern (G 
Svensson, 2000; T. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010). Pettit et al. (2010) cite the 
example from the year 2007 of the earthquake damage caused to Riken Corp, a 
specialized piston ring manufacturer of Toyota, resulting in shutdown of 12 Toyota 
production lines and delay in production of 55000 vehicles. A unique product or 
supplier creates a source criticality and severe supplier dependency (Adenso‐ Diaz et 
al., 2012). Wagner and Bode (2006) have also recognized supplier dependency to be a 
key vulnerability driver. 
Global Sourcing 
Global sourcing as a cost reduction approach indeed has quite a few advantages but on 
the down side the strategy increases the likelihood of a disruption (Juttner, Peck and 
Christopher, 2003; Christopher and Lee, 2004; Blackhurst et al., 2005). Negative supply 
chain consequences like supply chain complexity and lack of network visibility could 
be attributed to the strategy of global sourcing (Blackhurst et al., 2005). Due to the 
global stretch of supply chains, the product flow and changing dynamic capacity in 
remote locations becomes difficult to track (Blackhurst et al., 2005).  Globalization also 
poses problems in clearly understanding and predicting the system wide impacts of 
disruption (Blackhurst et al., 2005). Global supply chains are argued to be slow and less 
responsive, a characteristic often referred as ‘supply chain inertia’ (Juttner, Peck and 
Christopher, 2003).  Another downside of global sourcing is that network uncertainties 
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become more pronounced, escalating the likelihood of disruption (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008a, 2008b). Thus, it can be concluded that global operations expose firms to more 
complex, uncertain and hard to predict risks, making the network susceptible to 
disruption. 
Lean and Over Efficiency Initiative 
 Lean and over efficient supply chains are more fragile and less equipped to handle 
disruptions (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010). SCV researchers 
argue that cost effective lean strategies like offshoring, outsourcing, Just in time (JIT) 
etc are based upon the assumption of a stable world with high integrity and accuracy of 
data sharing; which in reality puts enormous pressure on supply chains making them 
prone to disruption (Wagner and Bode, 2006; Craighead et al., 2007; Zsidisin and 
Wagner, 2010).  
Literature also indicates some other drivers like outsourcing that may give rise to a 
notion of fragmented ownership and lack of willingness among supply chain actors to 
own responsibility for problems (Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003; Peck, 2005; 
Stecke and Kumar, 2009). Vulnerability is also found to manifest out of strict time 
constraints in processes like the Just in Time(JIT) or Just in Sequence(JIS) 
manufacturing. 
2.4.4 Structural strategies to influence risk, vulnerability, disruption and 
resilience profile of supply chains 
The domain of supply chain topology and network perspective builds on graph theory 
based resilience and attack tolerance research of real world complex networks 
(Thadakamaila, 2004; Nair and J. M. Vidal, 2011). Graph theory based network 
characteristics like clustering coefficient, maximum distance between two node, size of 
the largest connected cluster, average path length etc are now been researched from a 
supply chain disruption and resilience perspective (Wagner and Neshat, 2010; Nair and 
J. M. Vidal, 2011; Adenso‐ Diaz et al., 2012). There could be managerial interventions 
designed to influence aspects of structural resilience. Table 7 presents these strategies.  
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In a supply chain context, the graph theory constructs like nodes and links would refer 
to supply chain actors and their connections respectively (Craighead et al., 2007). 
However, definition of a supply chain actor will vary according to the unit of analysis; it 
can signify a buyer or customer or a specific location or warehouse. Regarding 
behaviour of actors, Kleindorfer and Saad (2009) also argue that resilience and 
robustness of the supply chain will be strongly affected by the weakest link of the 
network. The authors quote that 
“One weak partner in the supply chain can prove disastrous for all participants” 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2009: p. 56) 
Table 7: Structural strategies 
 Proposed modification Empirical studies Theoretical or 
conceptual studies 
Reducing 
occurrence 
probability 
Manage  weak nodes /links  (Kleindorfer and Saad, 
2009; Oke and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009) 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Tang, 2006b) 
Design low network density (Craighead et al., 2007; Nair 
and J. M. Vidal, 2011) 
(Greening and 
Rutherford, 2011) 
Intelligent structural positioning of safety 
stock 
 
 (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Tang, 2006b) 
Reduce node criticality, network 
complexity, cluster complexity 
(Craighead et al., 2007; 
Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
 
Reducing 
disruption 
impact 
Better connectedness among network 
nodes with fewer network structural 
holes dependent and strong  ties 
 
 (Greening and 
Rutherford, 2011) 
Reducing 
recovery time 
Predictive analysis of disruption 
propagation in the network 
 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005; T. J. 
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 
2010) 
 
 supply chain reconfiguration (Blackhurst et al., 2005; T. J. 
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 
2010)  
 
 
There is another set of structural strategies that have directly evolved from graph theory 
based definitions and measures of a network. These include reducing network density, 
reducing node criticality, reducing network complexity and managing structural holes 
and weak/strong ties in a network. Craighead et al. (2007) are among the first 
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academicians to empirically test these strategies followed by Nair and Vidal (2011). In a 
recent study by Adenso‐ Diaz et al. (2012), the authors have extended the work of 
Craighead et al. (2007) by adding more topological dimensions to the research.  
Evaluating the moderating effect of supply chain structure on the severity of disruption 
Craighead et al. (2007) propose that higher the network density, node criticality and 
network complexity, the higher the network will be susceptible to sever disruptions. 
Craighead et al. (2007) also defines and quantifies these terms like network density, 
network complexity and node criticality. Defining network density authors quote 
“when nodes within a supply chain are clustered closely together, as may be measured 
by the average inter-node distance, the particular supply chain can be described as 
being dense “ 
(Craighead et al., 2007:p. 139)  
The author argues that firms are more concern about regional clusters getting affected 
by disruptions rather than a single supplier getting affected.  
Nair and Vidal (2011) conducted an agent based simulation to investigate the robustness 
of some standard network topologies. Using scale free network topology and random 
network topology, Nair and Vidal (2011) reached a conclusion that supply chain with 
nodes having longer average path length between them re less robust. The authors argue 
that the measure of average path length characterises the spread of the network by 
calculating the average of distance between any two nodes. The authors claim that 
supply chains with shorter average path length will be more responsive and hence more 
resilient. This argument supports the premise that dense networks are less robust (Nair 
and J. M. Vidal, 2011). 
Thus we can infer that structural aspects of resilience and robustness are very crucial 
strategies. Although the agent contribution to structural drivers has been recognized yet 
not much emphasis on the perspective has been laid. 
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2.4.5 Operational strategies for influencing resilience  
Under the theme of operational modifications, I have included polices which can be 
operationalized at local level without altering much of the business structure. Table 8 
presents these. 
The four most cited operational strategies for influencing resilience are improve 
visibility, better collaboration and control, development of contingency cell and safety 
stock. 
Table 8: Operational strategies 
 Proposed modification Empirical studies Theoretical or 
conceptual studies 
Reducing 
occurrence 
probability 
Better network visibility 
 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005; T. J. Pettit, Fiksel 
and Croxton, 2010; Jüttner and Maklan, 
2011) 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 
2009) 
Better control and 
collaboration 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2009; Oke and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009; T. J. Pettit, Fiksel 
and Croxton, 2010; Jüttner and Maklan, 
2011) 
 
Monitoring and warning 
capability for threats ( 
weather, economic, political 
or terrorist) 
 
(Craighead et al., 2007; Stecke and Kumar, 
2009) 
 
Strengthen security of 
facilities and communication 
 (Stecke and Kumar, 2009; T. J. Pettit, 
Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
 
Reducing 
disruption 
impact 
Quick detection and 
response to disruption 
 
(Stecke and Kumar, 2009) (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Tang, 2006b) 
Safety stock or buffer 
 
(Peck, 2005; Stecke and Kumar, 2009; 
Jüttner and Maklan, 2011) 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Sheffi and 
Rice, 2005) 
Reducing 
recovery time 
An independent recovery 
and contingency  
cell/function  
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2009; Oke and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Colicchia, Dallari 
and Melacini, 2010; T. J. Pettit, Fiksel and 
Croxton, 2010; Jüttner and Maklan, 2011)  
(Tang, 2006b) 
 
In their empirical study Blackhurst et al. (2005) found that supply chain visibility is a 
crucial concern for businesses. Based upon their study, the authors argue that visibility 
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can significantly lower the detection and response time to a network disruption. The 
authors further argue that visibility can positively influence the reduction of number of 
disruptions and also reduce the severity of their impact. 
To reduce supply uncertainty, Stecke and Kumar (2009) recommend having a good 
visibility of suppliers’ operations and a firm’s transport operations. The authors found 
that advance disruption warning capability is improved by supply chain visibility. 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) relate the sharing of demand information across the network 
as a part of visibility.  
In an empirical study Pettit et al. (2010) argued that to manage global supply chains 
with high number of nodes and connections, visibility will be an essential capability. 
The authors define visibility as 
“Knowledge of the status of operating assets and the environment” 
(Pettit et al., 2010: p. 12)  
In the authors view, formative elements of supply chain visibility are gathering business 
intelligence, IT systems, knowledge or visibility about asset or people and effective 
information exchange among network actors. 
In another empirical research  Jüttner and Maklan (2011) site various authors to arrive 
to a conclusion that enhanced visibility will positively influence resilience.  
The other operational strategies that have gathered academician’s attention are better 
overall collaboration among supply chain actors and formation of an independent 
contingency response cell within a firm. 
In the supply chain context, the concept of collaboration is closely associated with 
visibility. It is argued that collaboration can only be successful if network actors are 
willing to share sensitive information (Faisal, Banwet and Shankar, 2006). Jüttner and 
Maklan (2011) argue that as a part of collaborative working, a joint contingency and 
disruption plan developed with the suppliers can improve resilience. For their empirical 
work, Jüttner and Maklan (2011) have conceptualized collaboration in terms of the 
dimension of joint decision making among firms. Grounding it in literature, the authors 
suggest judging the quality, strength and closeness of collaboration by degree of tactical 
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decision making among two supply chain actors such that whether it is at operational 
level or at strategic level. Quoting the effectiveness of collaboration as a strategy, 
Jüttner and Maklan (2011) say 
“Our findings from the case studies seem to suggest that in a crisis situation, the 
positive collaboration impact on the smooth supply chain functioning predominates.” 
(Jüttner and Maklan, 2011: p. 254)  
Oke and Gopalakrishnan (2009) also proposed that planning and collaboration can 
influence high probability risks. 
Thus, we can say that among operational strategies, visibility and collaboration are 
proposed to be the most efficient to tackle disruptions and strengthen supply chain 
resilience or robustness.  It can be argued that visibility and collaboration cannot be 
achieved without having a supporting human agent, but none of these studies talk about 
the human contribution to visibility or collaborative working 
2.4.6 Strategic approach for influencing resilience 
The policies discussed under the category of strategic modification are broad firm level 
initiatives that often require a companywide implementation. Table 9 presents a list of 
articles recommending these strategies. 
Among the strategic initiatives, the construct of ‘flexibility’ is the highest cited 
resilience strategy. In its literal sense, flexibility corresponds to an ability of a material 
to bend easily without fracturing or breaking (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). Similarly, 
supply chain flexibility can be defined as an ability of the supply chain to absorb a risk 
event without breaking (Skipper and Hanna, 2009). Sheffi and Rice (2005) consider 
flexibility as an adaptive organic capability of organizations, which can sense and 
respond to threats.  Juttner et al. (2003) define flexibility to be opposite of ‘Inertia’. The 
authors view inertia as a term that signifies lack of responsiveness of a supply chain. 
Some supply chain strategies that may contribute to flexibility are postponement, 
multiple sourcing and localised sourcing (Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003).  Sheffi 
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and Rice (2005) propose flexibility to be practiced in five dimensions: suppliers, 
conversion process, systems, distribution channel and corporate culture. 
Table 9: Strategic approach 
 Proposed 
modification 
Empirical studies Theoretical or 
conceptual studies 
Reducing 
occurrence 
probability 
Flexibility  in 
capacity 
 
(Tomlin, 2006; Tang and Tomlin, 2008; 
Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Oke and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Stecke and Kumar, 2009; 
T. J. Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010; Zsidisin and 
Wagner, 2010; Jüttner and Maklan, 2011) 
 (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Sheffi and Rice, 
2005; Tang, 2006b; 
Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009) 
Create agile and 
responsive supply 
chain 
(Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Jüttner and 
Maklan, 2011) 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
Multi sourcing 
strategy 
 
 (Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Stecke and 
Kumar, 2009; Jüttner and Maklan, 2011; Adenso‐
Diaz et al., 2012)  
(Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
Supplier alliance 
and support 
network 
 (Tang, 2006a) 
Reduction of 
product mix 
(Albino, Garavelli and Okogbaa, 1998)  
Reducing 
disruption 
impact 
Redundant 
capacity 
 
 (Peck, 2005; Stecke and Kumar, 2009; T. J. 
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010; Jüttner and 
Maklan, 2011; Adenso‐Diaz et al., 2012) 
 
 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
Decentralized 
approach 
 (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011) (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004) 
Reduce lead time (Albino, Garavelli and Okogbaa, 1998) (Tang, 2006a) 
Provide a slack in 
form of time 
 (Peck, 2005)  
Reducing 
recovery time 
Risk sharing 
among supply 
chain actors 
(Jüttner and Maklan, 2011)  (Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009) 
  
Using a very simple set of assumptions Tang and Tomlin (2008) identified and 
empirically tested these five flexibility strategies for mitigating supply chain risk. These 
were; flexibility in suppliers via multiple suppliers, flexible supply contracts, flexible 
manufacturing, flexible product strategy via postponement and flexible pricing. The 
authors have demonstrated that using multiple suppliers does provide cost saving. 
Regarding flexible manufacturing, the authors have presented an argument against the 
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general conceptual recommendations of improving flexible manufacturing. The 
mathematical model used by Tang and Tomlin (2008) suggests that even at low level of 
manufacturing flexibility, a firm can lower its process risks. The authors quote 
“Therefore, to reduce process risks, it is sufficient to operate a manufacturing system 
with limited flexibility. This illustrates the power of process flexibility via flexible 
manufacturing process.” 
(Tang and Tomlin, 2008:p. 20) 
Some other agility definitions include flexibility to be a subset of it. Consistent with this 
argument, Jüttner and Maklan (2011) propose that agility signifies a combination of 
both flexibility and velocity. In line with Jüttner and Maklan (2011), Braunscheidel and 
Suresh (2009) also consider flexibility to be a vital dimension of agility. Besides 
flexibility, Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) suggest many other aspects of agility such 
as inter and intra organizational integration, cross functional alignment, alignment with 
key suppliers and buyers.  Regarding agility and flexibility Narasimhan et al. (2006) 
quote; 
“Agility involves flexibilities of several sorts, and includes the capability to do 
unplanned, new activities in response to unforeseen shifts in market demands or unique 
customer requests” 
(Narasimhan et al., 2006:p. 443)  
To improve robustness and resilience, the literature suggests many other strategic 
modifications such as decentralized decision making approach, risk sharing among 
network partners and redundant capacity. However, humans remain to be at the core of 
implementing these strategies and if they are not willing to decentralize decision 
making or embrace process and design flexibility, then the initiative will fail to realize 
its intended objectives. Despite this fact, all of these research papers adopt the most 
contagious assumption, a complying and rational human agent. 
The field of complex system research is known for its conceptualization and inclusion 
of the agent and agency perspectives in macro level phenomenon. The next section 
presents a discussion of complexity and its tenets.  
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2.5 Complex systems: A review 
Before conducting a study of microstate agent behaviours connected with events of 
SCD, it is necessary to define the underlying theoretical foundation governing micro to 
macro transformations. Within the natural science and social sciences literature, 
Complex system theory is argued to be most effective theoretical foundation to study 
agent driven micro to macro system transitions. This thesis proposes to use complex 
system theory to understand the microstate agent interactions related to events of SCD.   
Following sections present a discussion of the genesis of complexity, its formative 
elements and its usage in the current supply chain literature.  
2.5.1 The genesis of complex system thinking 
Humans have always been surrounded by many natural and artificial systems with 
extraordinary complexity like eco systems, immune systems, communication networks, 
infrastructure networks, the internet , stock markets or the global economy (Cohen and 
Axelrod, 1984; Amaral and Ottino, 2004; Holland, 2006; Newman, 2011).  Modelling 
of these systems or generating predictive capabilities about them has proved to be 
challenging as these systems are impermeable to conventional reductionist approaches. 
A growing field of interdisciplinary studies, ‘Complex Systems Theory’, represents a 
cluster of ideas that provides concepts, principles and tools to interrogate such systems 
that demonstrate dynamic, disorderly or unexpected behaviours (Newman, 2011). 
The genesis of complex system thinking can be attributed to four intellectual 
movements that collectively laid its foundation. These were Catastrophe theory, Chaos 
theory, Cybernetics and System’s theory (Anderson, 1999). Drawing on the knowledge 
of feedback control devices from the Second World War era, Cybernetics and System’s 
view argued the relevance of feedback loops for governing systems with inherent 
complexity, thus rejecting a top down reductionist view of control and coordination 
(Ashby, 1956; Bertalanffy, 1972). Catastrophe theory contributed to the domain by 
demonstrating the possibility to use small changes or perturbations in systems to explain 
large shifts in a system’s equilibrium (Zeeman, 1977) . Contribution of chaos theory to 
the field of complexity is that the theory of Chaos brought into focus the aspect of 
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deterministic order in dynamical systems that appeared to have random behaviours 
(Thiétart and Forgues, 1995).  
Formative elements of Complex system thinking such as; relevance of feedback control 
loops, system away from equilibrium at an edge of chaos, and possibility to explain 
dynamical and random looking system patterns, can all be traced back to the above four. 
2.5.2 Characteristics of complex systems 
Prominent complexity researchers, Holland and Sigmund (1995); Kauffman, (1993) 
argue that there are some characteristics common to all complex systems. These 
characteristics are: high degree of interconnectedness and interdependency among 
components; existence of feedback loops among subsystems; difficult to study the 
system in isolation; exhibition of emergent behaviours where the systems outcome 
manifest out of small scale interactions among its subsystems; nonlinear and dynamical 
response; sensitivity to initial conditions and a seemingly unpredictable response ( 
Holland and Sigmund, 1995; Kauffman, 1993; Ramalingam et al., 2008; Varga et al., 
2009). These systems are often argued to be at the edge of chaos, self-organizing and 
co-evolutionary (Varga et al., 2009). 
Within the many proposed conceptualizations of complexity, there is one particular 
form of complexity that finds its utility to argue systems dominated by agent or agency 
related interactions. In these systems, a rich array of interactions among diverse system 
agents has been found to produce dynamic, co-evolutionary, self-organizing and 
emergent behaviours. This kind of complex systems are dealt under the umbrella term 
of ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’ (CAS). Since supply chains are systems with diverse 
array of human agents involved in multitude of dynamical and parallel interactions, a 
CAS view is particularly relevant to interrogate supply chains. The next section 
provides a discussion of CAS and its utility to study supply chain phenomenon. 
2.5.3 Complex adaptive systems 
Many, but not all, complex systems demonstrate the characteristic of agent adaptation 
and such complex systems are referred as complex adaptive systems (CAS) (Newman, 
2011). CAS view of complexity is most suited to investigate and compare the actions 
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and interactions of agents, individual groups, species, or their strategies against their 
competitors (Gell-Mann, 2002; Holland, 2006; Newman, 2011).  Typical characteristics 
of a CAS are threefold.  First, they have a large number of diverse agents with a high 
degree of connectedness and evolving pattern of nonlinear interactions (Holland, 2006). 
The agents of a CAS seek to maximise their fitness through an evolutionary and self-
organizing behaviour (Gell-Mann, 1994; Dooley, 1996; Newman, 2011). Second, to be 
able to respond to their environment, to various stimulus and environmental conditions, 
these agents develop fluid mental models or schemas (Gell-Mann, 1994, 2002; Dooley, 
1996). Third, the agent diversity is a result of continuous adaptation which never lets 
the system stabilize instead it takes the system towards perpetual novelty or in other 
words these systems exhibit evolutionary characteristics (Holland, 2006). 
Complex adaptive system view can provide explanatory relevance to the self–organized 
co evolution of many peculiar stochastic micro events concerning agents such as 
molecules, genes, neurons, particles, organizations or individuals , into emergent 
structures (McKelvey, 1999b).   
The key objective of an agent within a complex system is to maximise its fitness and the 
fitness function of an agent in a complex aggregate is determined by many global and 
local factors, including the mental models or schemas maintained by each individual 
agent. Often synonymously used by complexity researchers, terms schemas, mental 
models, agent internal mechanisms or mind frames are terms that convey the same 
meaning in the field of complexity science. These are the lowermost fundamental unit 
that influences an agent’s interactions and in turn provide emergent and self-organizing 
capabilities to the system at a macro level. The next section presents the view of 
complexity researchers on agents and their schemas/ mental models/ internal 
mechanisms. 
2.5.4 Mechanism and schemas in a CAS and its status in supply chain 
research 
Holland (1993) argues that a less obvious however a very important aspect of a CAS is 
the set of internal rules or models that an agent uses to predict the outcomes of their 
actions. Driven by local and global stimuli the agents develop,  update and modify these 
rules, also referred as agent schemas (Gell-Mann, 1994; Dooley, 1996)  and use them to 
interpret reality or respond to a stimuli (Gell-Mann, 1994; Dooley, 1996). In a supply 
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chain context (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001) were the first to point out that 
an aggregation of several such  nonlinear agent schemas and mental models can 
aggregate into internal mechanisms leading to complex supply chain behaviours. 
Following up on the argument some other supply chain complexity researchers 
investigated the role of agents and agency in a supply chain context. A few notable 
contributions among these are; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi (2009) that dealt with 
aspects of cooperation and opportunism among network firms; Datta, Christopher and 
Allen (2007) that looked at internal decision making and supply chain resilience; and 
Varga et al. (2009) that evaluated the evolutionary aspects of supply chains.  
Theoretical relevance of agent schemas in determining the evolutionary behaviour of a 
complex supply network has been relatively well argued, however SCD research is yet 
to identify relevant agent schemas and mechanism that exist in an operations setting. 
This research aims to extend our understanding of supply chain agent schemas and 
mechanisms associated with the phenomenon of SCD. The next section looks at supply 
chain complexity literature. Since the context of this study is disruptions, the maturity of 
supply chain complexity literature will be evaluated from perspective of SCD studies.  
2.5.5 Supply chain networks as CAS 
One can argue that a supply chain network is a CAS of dynamic elements where in a 
real time, due to an interaction between agents, the network topology evolves in a 
nonlinear and heterogeneous fashion (Surana et al., 2005; Varga et al., 2009). These 
typical characteristics of a CAS, a nonlinear behaviour, parallelism modularity, 
adaptation and self-organization, can be argued to be reflected in many business 
networks, typically in organizational supply chains (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 
2001; Surana et al., 2005; Nilsson and Darley, 2006). Recent advancements in supply 
chain complexity research confirm this CAS view on supply chains (Choi, Dooley and 
Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Pathak, Dilts and Biswas, 2007; Varga et 
al., 2009)   
Nilsson and Darley (2006) argue that the complexity in a supply chain network arises 
out of agent’s interaction in the network. The authors view these interactions to be 
reactive and often leading to deliberately proactive behaviour affecting other entities or 
subsystems in the network environment, giving rise to complex behaviour of the 
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network. Surana et al. (2005) attribute the complexity in supply network to vast span of 
a supply network over several tiers with bi-level hierarchy and heterogeneity in the 
network. Surana et al. (2005) further suggest that nonlinear network behaviour emerges 
out of the complex nature of interactions between various supply chain agents such as 
customers, supply chain executives, truck drivers, etc. Surana et al. (2005) recognise 
that although these agents are autonomus individuals with their individual targets and 
goals, yet on aspects of collective performance goals these agents act in a highly 
interdependent manner resulting in a co-evolutionary behaviour. The authors quote:  
"at present, networks are largely controlled by humans, the complexity, diversity and 
geographic distribution of the networks make it necessary for networks to maintain 
themselves in a sort of evolutionary sense" 
(Surana et al., 2005:p. 4243)  
Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001) argue that the escalation of micro agent 
interactions into emergent and self-organizing supply chain outcomes is dependent upon 
the internal mechanism of agents which include; agent internal models or schemas, 
dimensionality of agent behaviours, self-organizing and emergent properties of the 
relationships and the degree of network connectivity. The authors present this in a 
model to demonstrate underlying dynamics of supply chain as complex adaptive 
system; figure 2. The authors view agent schemas as norms, beliefs, values etc; while 
dimensionality is degree of freedom or kinds of behaviours that an agent can 
demonstrate. The authors argue that these behaviours or agent’s dimensionality could be 
altered by system aspects like managerial interventions, rule regulations or institutional 
pressure. 
 
Figure 2: Underlying dynamics of supply chains as CAS 
Adopted from: (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001:pp 353)  
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2.6 Summary and implications 
This chapter presented a discussion of supply chain disruption literature, complexity 
and the overlap of complexity and supply chain literatures. This section summarises the 
prominent debates of this chapter and presents its implications for the next phase. 
The findings from systematic literature review of SCD literature provided with many 
useful insights. It is evident that aspects of network structure and supply chain strategy 
have gathered most contributions from disruption researchers while agent’s contribution 
to events of SCD has not yet been exclusively researched. Although, some author/s have 
either made a passing reference to the necessity of considering agent interactions or the 
human aspect, yet none of them have made an independent enquiry of this proposition.  
Some debates in the domain of human antecedents to SCD draw attention towards the 
aspect that organizational risk measures are often biased by managerial perceptions 
leading to inefficient and inaccurate accounting of risk (Blackhurst et al. 2005). It is also 
argued that firms with more employees are more susceptible to disruption (Wagner and 
Neshat, 2012);suggesting that a correlation exists between number or quality of human 
interactions and susceptibility to disruption. Cantor et al. (2014) argue that an 
individual’s regulatory focus can also have a negative impact on supple chain decisions. 
This argument brings down the disruption debate to the level of an individual’s mindset 
or mental schema that may define his/her regulatory focus towards tasks. Other aspects 
that define an individual’s demeanour have also been found to be correlated to 
likelihood of disruption such as; cultural biases, social preferences and leadership styles 
(Dowty and Wallace 2010), compliance behaviour ((Hung, Ro and Tangpong, 2009). 
Possibility of intentional human act leading to disruption has also been suggested in the 
literature such as; theft, terrorism and deliberate contamination (Speier et al. 2011). 
Whilst these studies highlight the importance of agent behaviour in supply chain 
disruption, a comprehensive understanding of how micro level agent behaviours 
translate into macro level system outcome like an event of disruption is elusive.  
Thus, it can be concluded that existing research of supply chain management does not 
sufficiently explain the role of agent behaviour in bringing about supply chain 
disruptions and there is a need to consider alternative paradigms. Among the available 
alternatives, complexity theory is advantageously positioned to argue the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions about the amplification of micro level actions into macro level effects. 
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CAS view of complexity has been used in numerous domains to model and explain 
emergent and self-organizing macro structures based upon micro agent interactions or 
simply bottom up causation. The argument of a complexity driven explanation of micro 
to macro causation and the spontaneous emergence of co-evolutionary self-organizing 
macro structures has also been embraced by a small body of supply chain complexity 
research. Accepting supply chains as CAS, this body of growing supply chain research 
argues that agent schemas, mindsets behaviours and actions are at the core of supply 
chain phenomenon and that emergent network structures can be explained by the 
aggregation of these micro interactions. However, the proposition has not yet been 
empirically verified, particularly for SCD scenario. 
This doctoral research abides by the burgeoning debates in the field of supply chain 
complexity and intends to investigate the micro to macro aspect of the disruption 
phenomenon. To gain a preliminary insight about the phenomenon and to develop a 
robust research design, this doctoral research proposes to conduct a pilot study to study 
the phenomenon in a small scale and controlled environment. Based upon the findings 
from the literature review, this doctoral research proposes a preliminary research 
question for the pilot study; 
“What are the contributing causal mechanisms to the phenomenon of supply chain 
disruption?” 
The next chapter presents a discussion of the pilot and implications of its findings for 
the future phases of this doctoral pursuit 
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3 PILOT STUDY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the outcomes of a pilot study that was conducted to test the 
effectiveness of the research protocol and to gain preliminary insights about aggregated 
system patterns emerging from micro agent interactions connected to events of SCD. Despite 
a limited scope, this pilot study still stands out as an independent empirical work in its own 
right. The outcomes of the pilot were presented in two prominent international peer reviewed 
conferences. The valuable feedbacks received from these helped change the future phases of 
this research. 
The preliminary research question developed on the basis of the literature survey was; 
“What are the contributing causal mechanisms to the phenomenon of supply chain 
disruption?” 
The research question reflects the broader objective of the enquiry to ascertain agent 
behaviours that on aggregation could result in macro system outcomes. The next section 
presents a brief discussion of the methodology followed by a discussion of key findings from 
this pilot study. 
3.2 The pilot 
A pilot study provides a researcher with an opportunity to interact with his research in a 
controlled manner and helps the researcher refine the methodology (Yin, 2009). The decision 
to conduct a preliminary pilot study was undertaken to test the validity of the data collection 
instrument and to gain preliminary understanding of the phenomenon. The next section 
presents details of the research design and key findings for this empirical pilot study. 
3.2.1 Research design for the pilot study  
3.2.1.1 Sample strategy 
Since the pilot was conducted at an early stage of the doctoral process to gain an overarching 
view of the phenomenon, thus only the people from top managerial position of procurement 
and supply chain functions were considered for data collection. This idea is consistent with 
the purposive or judgemental sampling technique (Glaser, Barney, 1967). In order to 
understand that what profile of organizational respondents will be most likely to lend the 
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most valuable perspective to the phenomenon under investigation, intentionally a broad 
spectrum in the profile of respondents was considered; such as industrial sectors, hierarchical 
level in organization, years of supply chain and procurement experience etc. A formal 
criterion was drafted for selection of respondents. This was 
(i) The firms selected for the pilot should have as diverse characteristics as possible 
in terms of ownership, size and sector of their operations. 
(ii) The respondents should have diverse organizational and supply chain experience. 
(iii) Efforts to be made to have respondents form different level of organizational 
hierarchy and organization function. 
Ease of access to the respondents was also a very important consideration.  Based upon the 
laid down criterion, three firms were selected for the pilot study. Table 10. presents details of 
the sample 
Table 10: Description of the sample for the pilot study 
Identification 
code 
Description Industrial 
sector 
Division Position of 
Interviewer 
Mgt level & 
Experience 
(yrs) 
Firm1 Global food 
manufacturing , 
processing and 
conglomeration firm.   
Chocolates   Procurement and 
supply chain 
Head Procurement 
and Supply chain 
Senior(20) 
Firm2 Public sector aerospace 
manufacturer 
Aviation Vendor 
development and 
Procurement 
Manager 
Procurement and 
vendor 
development 
Middle (11) 
Firm3 Countries’ leading Food 
processing and 
manufacturing 
Canned food 
and 
beverages 
Procurement Procurement head Senior (14) 
The respondents from these three firms provided details for 31 cases of supply chain 
disruption and yielded close to 150 mins of recorded interview data. 
3.2.1.2 Data collection  
The choice of data collection instrument was guided by two key aspects pertinent to this 
research enquiry. Firstly; complex and highly interdependent nature of supply networks 
makes it very difficult for the people involved in it to be able to identify or isolate various 
causal mechanisms responsible for a phenomenon. Secondly; despite having abundance of 
contextual and tacit knowledge, managers often find it hard to conceptualize, articulate or 
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express their views on complex and unexplored issues.  From these arguments it was evident 
that a very intuitive data collection tool was required to support the objectives of this pilot 
study. The data collection instrument recommended for this pilot study was Repertory Grids 
(Rep Grids). The next section provides a discussion of Rep Grids. 
3.2.1.3 Repertory grid technique 
Conventional interview methods are not sufficient to investigate organizational mechanisms. 
Causal mechanisms are underlying constructs that require to associate deeper meaning with 
the phenomenon and  also require linking individual observations to collective process 
(Anderson, 2006). It is relatively well argued that conventional interview processes are not fit 
to investigate fields with such attributes (Rogers and Ryals, 2007) like associating implied or 
deeper understanding of observations. However, there is an alternative structured interview 
technique, ‘Repertory Grids’ (Rep Grid), that  is suited for study of mechanisms. Rep grids 
are useful in developing theory particularly for fields where there is dearth of extent literature 
(Hair, Rose and Clark, 2009) or for fields that are undefined, exploratory and difficult to 
articulate or conceptualize (Rogers and Ryals, 2007; Goffin et al., 2012). The Repertory grid 
technique stimulates the respondents to compare and contrast elements, such as past events 
and decisions, to identify underlying constructs.  
Rep grids as a tool was devised by an American Mathematician and Psychologist George 
Kelly to investigate his ‘Theory of Personal Construct’ (Kelly, 1955). The theory of personal 
construct is founded on the assumption that every individual, based upon his past 
experiences, maintains a personal theoretical framework of cognition or a personal construct 
system that s/he uses to make sense of world around her/him. An individual uses this personal 
construct system to control and predict his/her environment (Bradshaw et al., 1993). It helps 
the individual to formulate intuitive expectations or hypothesis about future events and 
informs his/her actions and decisions. However, not all intuitions or hypothesis prove to be 
correct and outcomes of these instances are used by the individuals to create new constructs 
or amend existing ones. This process of self-discovery continues in cyclic order of 
formulating, testing and amending one’s personal theoretical framework of cognition or 
personal construct system. In an organizational setting it can be argued that intuitive 
expectations of managers and decision makers are linked to their past work experiences or 
their personal constructs. Rep grids as an instrument could effectively explore these 
mechanisms as constructs.   
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3.2.1.4 Rep grids: elements of comparison, constructs and linkages 
Rep grid is a systematic interviewing tool that prompts the respondents to compare and 
contrast events and experiences. Rep Grid provides a systematic method to elicit constructs 
and explore relationship among them. Unlike other interview techniques where a respondent 
presents a lengthy account of events, the method of comparison and contrasting enables 
respondents to look beyond the surface level phenomenon into deeper levels of associations 
and linkage among constructs.  
The structure of the grid is divided into two dimensions of rows and columns The columns 
presents a listing of alternative events, system states, people or other entities, called 
‘Elements’. While the rows list bipolar ‘Constructs’ that provide the dimension of distinction 
among elements. 
Constructs 
Kelly (1955) suggests that individuals create and maintain a system of dichotomous 
constructs that help them interpret their interactions and experiences of their universe. 
Constructs have a bipolar dimension of distinction that individuals make about people, events 
or things. For example in a supply chain context, a distinction among various Tier one 
suppliers could be made using bipolar constructs like; Reliable-Unreliable, Rigid-Flexible, 
Supportive–Unsupportive etc. 
In the Rep grid interview process, elicitation of the constructs is a significant step and a very 
important piece of information. Based upon the number of elements offered to the respondent 
for contrasting and the technique used for questioning, there are three approaches of eliciting 
constructs; Triads, Dyads and Full context (Jankowicz, 2005). Table 11 presents a sample of 
construct eliciting questioning technique associated with each of the approaches. 
Table 11: Sample questions associated with each type of Construct eliciting technique  
Construct Eliciting 
Approach 
Number of Elements offered for 
contrasting 
The questions asked from the respondents 
Triad 3 
How are two of these elements similar but different 
from a third? 
Dyad 2 How do these two elements differ from each other? 
Full context all 
How do any of these elements differ from any of the 
other? 
Adopted from: (Hair et al., 2009:p. 54) 
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Among these three approaches, Triads approach was selected for this study as it is one of the 
most commonly used technique (Jankowicz, 2005). 
Elements  
Kelly (1955)  defines Elements as “ Things or events which are abstracted by a construct” 
(Kelly, 1955,  p137). These represent the objects / things to be investigated or the context to 
which the constructs are applied (Rogers and Ryals, 2007). In a supply chain context it could 
be a list of suppliers, customers, products, events, strategies, decisions etc. 
For the purpose of this study events of supply chain disruption were chosen as Elements. 
These are the phenomenon of interest in the research study.  
The Grid 
The grid is a systematic way of documenting the process of a Rep Grid Interview. A set of 
selected and agreed upon Elements are listed in the columns and then the interviewee is 
presented with a set of three elements to compare and contrast for similarities and 
distinctions. The respondent is stimulated further by using probing questions like ‘Why’, 
‘How’ etc to elicit constructs and their bipolar opposites. The discovered constructs and their 
bipolar opposite are written down in the first and last column of a row. Then using a Likert 
scale the respondent is asked to rank all elements between the construct and its bipolar 
opposite.  
3.2.2 Analysis 
For every instance of supply chain disruption, the Rep Grid data provides an insight about the 
respondent’s cognition of individual agent and system behaviours. The Rep Grids were 
analysed to discover patterns of similarity. These similar or dominant patterns were then used 
to conjecture schemas relevant to the phenomenon of disruption. The analysis was carried out 
in two stages: the first stage used quantitative techniques to group constructs of Rep Grids; 
the second stage used a qualitative approach to conceive schemas relevant to these grouped 
constructs. 
The quantitative stage of the analysis used the Principal component analysis (PCA), with a 
varimax rotation, to identify groupings among constructs. The assumption of uncorrelated 
factors was used to choose varimax rotation. The qualitative data analysis followed the 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) framework of data coding.  The interview data was subjected to 
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three stages of coding; open, axial and selective coding, following recommendations of Miles 
and Huberman (1984); Strauss and Corbin (1990); Yin (2009). 
3.2.3 Findings of the pilot study 
3.2.3.1 Quantitative findings 
The Rep Grids (table 12,13 and 14) provide a details of disruption events, as columns in the 
grid, and subsequent constructs emerging as rows. A liker scale of 1 to 5 is used to 
demonstrate the weightage of a construct in influencing a given disruption event. Table 15 
presents a collated list of all the 30 constructs and their bipolar opposites (separated by ‘–
‘symbol).from the three cases, reflecting the respondents’ cognition about supply chain 
disruption events they had encountered in the past. These constructs are mentioned in the 
exact way and order in which they were communicated by the experts. Among these 
constructs one construct, construct of Incorrect Supplier Assessment, was mentioned by all 
the respondents while, ‘Complex Product Design’ and issues around internal conflict were 
common to the two large scale manufacturers. In the table 15, the common constructs are 
highlighted by bold text. 
With the objective of finding statistically significant grouping of constructs a principal 
component analysis (PCA) and cluster analysis was performed on each Rep Grid. The 
motivation for a PCA was to discover dominant construct groupings by selecting Eigen value 
greater than one. Table 16 provides a summary of the PCA results and a description of a 
aggregated meaning expressed by the latent variable grouping. 
In the table 16 it can be seen that for Firm 1 and Firm 2, close to 60% of the variance is being 
explained by first two components. For these Rep Grids, in which 60 % of the variance was 
explained by two components, an additional, two component PCA plot was plotted to 
visually express the groupings. These two component plots are presented in figure 3. In 
Figure 3, overlaying dotted ovals are used to highlight the closely associated construct 
groupings. 
Among the latent variables creatively conceived to represent the findings of PCA, there are 
three constructs that require an additional discussion. These are heedless performance, lack of 
sense making and normalization of deviance. 
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Table 12: Rep Grid of firm 1 with disruption events in columns and constructs with their 5 point Likert scale ranking in rows 
Disruption event Laminate 
Rejection on 
line 
Short fall 
butter 
scotch 
Laminate 
Start up 
Glucose 
lumping 
Cashew 
shortfall 
Jar 
rejection 
(E) 
Hair 
contamination 
Cartoon 
short fall 
 
Sugar 
rejection 
Corrugate 
box  
 
Construct   
(Ranking 5) 
          Construct Opposite 
(Ranking 1) 
Product stock out 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 4 Unusable stock 
coordination 
communication and 
collaboration error 
3 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 2 2  Not a Coordination 
error 
Transport / handling  issue 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 Not a transport / 
handling issue 
Incorrect assessment of 
supplier’s capability 
5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 Correct assessment 
of supplier 
capability 
Complex  product design  5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 Not a  design 
problem 
Late involvement of 
procurement in design or 
production planning  
5 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 Not related to 
procurement 
involvement 
Work culture / personality 
conflict 
3 1 4 1 4 4 4 3 2 2 Not a personality or 
work culture issue 
Quick fix  1 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 Robust fix 
New product 
development /site 
expansion stage failure 
3 4 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 Regular product 
failure 
Lack of understanding of 
extended network lead 
times 
3 4 3 1 1 4 2 4 2 3 Clear understanding 
of network lead 
times 
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Table 13: Rep Grid of firm 2 with disruption events in columns and constructs with their 5 point Likert scale ranking in rows 
Disruption event 
Skin panel 
disruption 
TRS 
disruption 
Cage free 
wheel 
disruption 
Bottom 
stretch 
Dyna 
Tech 
(E) 
Supporter 
tube 
Legend 
disruption 
Frame 
9 
MGB 
 
Construct                  
(Ranking 5) 
         Construct Opposite   (Ranking 1) 
Incorrect Vendor 
competence assessment 
3 2 1 1 1 5 3 1 4 Vendor assessment was correct 
Single tier product 5 1 5 2 5 5 1 5 5 Multiple tier product 
Lack of internal 
competency 
5 4 5 1 5 3 1 5 5 Internal competency existed but 
internal conflict 
Single part  4 4 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 assembly 
Complex procedure  job 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 4 5 easy job 
Established Outsourcing 
processes 
5 1 5 1 5 5 1 5 5 Unestablished outsourcing processes. 
Was recently out sourced ( Tacit 
knowledge not shared) 
 Contract Breach 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 No Contract Breach 
Technical knowledge not 
shared 
1 3 4 5 1 3 4 1 4 Was shared but still component failed 
Supplier misunderstood 
contract and penalty 
clause  
5 1 5 2 1 4 2 3 2 Contract understanding was not a 
problem 
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Table 14: Rep Grid of firm 3 with disruption events in columns and constructs with their 5 point Likert scale ranking in rows 
Disruption event 
Packaging 
quality 
disruption 
Packaging 
shortfall in 
expansion 
Utility 
supply 
issues 
Bureaucratic or 
political 
interventions 
Port 
strike 
Machine 
spares 
New product 
launch disruption 
due to design 
issues 
New flavour 
quantity 
issues 
Unorganised 
sector 
procurements 
 
Construct                  
(Ranking 5) 
         Opposite   
(Ranking 1) 
Sole Supplier  5 3 5 5 2 5 5 4 1 Multiple 
suppliers 
Unexpected 
Supplier Behaviour  
5 3 4 3 1 5 5 5 2 Expected  
Abuse Of 
Bargaining Power 
By Supplier  
5 1 4 1 1 5 1 2 5 No abuse  
Non Substitutable 
product  
5 2 5 1 5 5 4 5 2 Product 
Substitutable 
Government And 
Policy Issue  
1 1 5 5 4 1 1 2 3 Not Related To 
Government 
Low Cost of 
Negotiation  
3 4 2 2 5 1 1 5 1 High Cost 
Low Influence Of 
Product Price  
1 4 5 5 5 1 2 5 1 High Influence 
Of Price 
Relevance Of 
Supplier Flexibility  
4 5 5 5 1 5 5 2 4 Flexibility 
irrelevant 
Incorrect Supplier 
Capability 
Assessment  
5 5 5 4 1 2 5 4 5 Correct 
Assessment 
Process Or 
Procedure Fault  
1 5 5 5 5 1 1 3 3 Product Fault 
Dyadic 
Relationship  
5 5 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 Non Dyadic 
relationship 
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Table 15: Constructs from Rep grid interviews 
Construct Firm1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
C1  Stock Out – Unusable Stock Incorrect Supplier Assessment 
– Correct  
Sole Supplier – Multiple Suppliers 
C2 Collaboration Error – Collaboration 
Ok 
Single Tier – Multiple Tier Unexpected Supplier Behaviour – 
Expected 
C3 Miss Handling – Ok Handling Internal Competency L ow – 
High 
Abuse Of Bargaining Power By 
Supplier – No Abuse 
C4 Incorrect Supplier Assessment – 
Correct Assessment 
A single part  - a part made of 
assembly of components 
Non Substitutable product – 
Product Substitutable 
C5 Complex Product Design – Not A 
Design Issue 
Complex Procedure or Part – 
Easy Job 
Government And Policy Issue – 
Not Related To Government 
C6 Late Involvement Of Procurement – 
Not Related 
Outsourcing Process 
Established – Unestablished 
Low Cost of Negotiation – High 
Cost 
C7 Work Culture And Personality 
Conflicts – Not A Conflict Issue 
Contract Breach – No Breach Low Influence Of Product Price – 
High Influence Of Price 
C8 Quick fix Solution – Robust Fix Technical Knowledge Not 
Shared – Shared 
Relevance Of Supplier Flexibility – 
Flexibility Irrelevant 
C9  Failure Of New Product – Failure Of 
Regular Products 
Supplier Failed Due To Penalty 
Clause – No Such Issue 
Incorrect Supplier Capability 
Assessment – Correct Assessment 
C10 Unclear About Extended Network 
Lead Time – Clear About Lead Time 
 Process Or Procedure Fault – 
Product Fault 
C11   Dyadic Relationship – Non Dyadic 
Relationship 
 
Table 16: Percentage variance summary of the results for Principal component analysis of each 
grid 
 
  Principal component number, a latent variable name given to it and  results of  % variance 
explained 
  1 2 3 4 Cumulative 
% variance 
Firm 
1 
Construct tags 
and % Variance 
explained 
(C4, C5, C6) 
33.885 
(C2, C8, C9) 
26.031 
(C3, C7) 
16.811 
(C10) 
15.196 
90.92 
 Aggregated 
meaning of the 
latent variable 
Heedless 
performance 
 
Lack of sense 
making 
 
Normalization of 
deviance 
 
Procurement 
Myopia 
 
 
Firm 
2 
Construct tags 
and % Variance 
explained 
C2, C4, C6) 
30.338 
(C3, C5, C8) 
29.483 
(C1, C7, C9) 
20.809 
 80.63 
 Aggregated 
meaning of the 
latent variable 
Low Network 
dependency 
products 
 
Heedless 
performance 
 
Low commitment 
towards suppliers 
well being 
 
  
Firm 
3 
Construct tags 
and  % Variance 
explained 
C5, C7, C10 
24.609 
C4, C6, C8, C9 
21.777 
C1, C2 
20.425 
C3, C11 
17.156 
83.97 
 Aggregated 
meaning of the 
latent variable 
Unfavourable 
policy issues 
 
Inflexible 
product or 
supplier 
 
Single source 
 
Differential in 
power relationship 
between the firm 
and suppliers 
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 Figure 3: Two component analysis 
(a) Firm 1 
 
 
(b) Firm 2 
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For Firm 1 the principal component one relates to three constructs; complex product 
design, late involvement of procurement and wrong supplier assessment. It could be 
argued that for contexts where product design is simpler, it is highly likely that the 
fragility of the design to procurement process would not have been exposed, since 
despite late involvement of procurement, the product would have been successfully 
delivered. However, for more complex products, it could lead to disruption if 
procurement is not involved earlier.  
 A similar pattern is observed in component two of Firm 2 where technical knowledge is 
not shared with suppliers and in the case of complex products this could lead to 
disruption. This habitual routine or internal mechanism of ‘Heedless Performance’ 
exposed by the act of not sharing technical knowledge is highly detrimental for a firm’s 
performance.  
The second PCA component of Firm 1 accounts for constructs C2, C8 and C9 that are 
collaboration error, quick fix solution and failure of new products respectively. The 
construct C8, quick fix, was found to be negatively correlated to the other two, 
suggesting that despite adopting a robust approach the disruptions did happen for new 
products and also that the instance of collaboration errors were closely correlated to 
these disruptions. This construct grouping reflects three arguments; Firstly, a false belief 
of supply chain actors regarding the robustness of their supply chain design, secondly a 
product supply chain that is neither stabilized nor operationally matured and lastly the 
inter organizational collaboration is thought to be a contributing factor to such 
disruptions. 
Here collaboration error is used as a blanket term for conceptualising multiple cross 
functional issues encountered in new product supply chains. This component grouping 
reflects that supply chain actors failed to conceptualize what could go wrong with their 
new product launch (as they thought the supply chain to be robust) and on hindsight 
they argue it to be a lack of collaboration. In other words the stake holders related to a 
new product launch failed to make sense of the problems or issues that may be 
associated with a supply chain design that they thought was robust; there was ‘Lack of 
Sense-making’. This failure of making sense of a situation relates closely to the 
construct of sense making proposed by Weick and Roberts (1993). The aspect of sense 
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making argues that the reliability of an operation is strengthened by the ability of the 
people, related to it, to successfully conceptualize what can go wrong and to evaluate 
viable options (Denyer, Tranfield and van Aken, 2008). It is the ability of people to 
associate meaning to their experiences and plan for possible contingencies (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). 
The third PCA component of Firm 1, consisting of constructs C3 and C7, mishandling 
and work culture respectively. In the context of Firm 1, supply chain agents habitually 
disregard product handling procedures; it is the prevailing work culture. The act of 
habitually following a deviant process is similar to the construct of ‘Normalization of 
Deviance’ proposed by Vaughan (1996). Normalization of deviance refers to the 
attitude of people becoming accustomed to behaviours, events, practices and processes 
that they normally would have considered wrong or deviant from their own perspective 
(Vaughan, 1996).  
The quantitative analysis of the data suggests that there are some dominant patterns 
connected to the events of supply chain disruption. Naming of the latent variables as per 
the PCA grouping was carried out intuitively by looking at the components and 
constructs, however a deeper and more critical analysis of these constructs is undertaken 
next using qualitative analysis of the data.  
3.2.3.2 Qualitative findings 
Qualitative data analysis was conducted to attach a context to the constructs and provide 
meaningful explanation to the statistical analysis results. The depth and richness of data 
was enhanced by critically examining each participant’s experience relevant to 
individual instances of disruption. The central tenet to this process was to code the 
respondent’s explanations using the Strauss and Corbin (1998) framework of data 
coding.  
The process of coding adopted the following steps; (i) Open coding was used to identify 
three aspects of disruption: firstly, the agents associated with disruption; secondly the 
supply chain tasks or processes (related to the phenomenon of SCD) performed by these 
agents; and thirdly the behaviours and actions of these individual agents contributing 
towards SCD. (ii) Axial coding is then used to identify causal relationships by 
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identifying the observed patterns or outcomes relevant to the phenomenon and by 
establishing the causal conditions and context of the phenomenon such as the agent 
beliefs, norms, and values governing his/her action or behaviour. These beliefs and 
norms are governed by the agent’s personal construct system. (iii) Selective coding is 
then used to provide an overarching view of processes by conjecturing the internal 
mechanism that will hold explanatory relevance to the observed patterns and agent 
behaviours amplifying into macro outcomes This can be done by either adopting a 
known mechanism from any other relevant literature domain or creatively conceiving a 
new one if no known mechanism could explain the phenomenon. Table 17 presents 
details of open and axial code and the exemplary quotes from the interview that helped 
formulate these. Table 18 presents the processes and agent actions associated with the 
phenomenon of SCD.  
Among the list of agents found to be contributing to the phenomenon of disruption, the 
mention of ‘Quality function’ of the organization and the individual truck drivers or 
logistics provider came as a surprise. With regards to the involvement of Quality 
function, firm 1 respondent said that  
“The quality people if do not go an audit the supplier in the right time, then the 
problems with the supplier, that should have been revealed earlier, would be evident 
later”  
The respondent shared that on most occasions, strict project timelines and contrary pulls 
and pressures within the organizational functions, prevents procurement from 
developing a robust supplier. The delays in undertaking of assessments and instances of 
incorrect supplier assessments are both significant contributors to disruptions, especially 
for new product launches. Firm 2 and 3 also had disruptions associated with issues of 
incorrect supplier assessment and all of these were connected with the organization’s 
quality function. Similarly issues relating to mishandling of goods were found to be 
connected to transport agents, specifically to the individual truck drivers. In Firm 1, the 
truck driver agent was found responsible for two significant disruptions, one relating to 
contamination of sugar and other related to damage of corrugated boxes due to 
moisture. Firm 3 also had issues with the transport agent, particularly due to transport 
strikes.
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Table 17: Illustrative quotation from the interviews and related open and axial codes formulated using them 
 
Excerpt from Interview Open Coding Axial Coding  
Possible Mechanisms  
not knowing the ramp up of the production 
material anticipation of the future requirement 
material requirement not in line with production ramp up  
not working hand in hand close enough  
look into the future and project those requirements. 
lack of forward visibility of demand not translating into material ordering 
functions working in isolation and not realizing the impact of one on the other. 
planning error  
departments not working closely enough  
planning team was not aware  
plan of the ramp up demand was not visible,  
manufacturing had planned a ramp up but the planning team was not aware 
some case it could be a personality conflict  
So it is never what you envisage it to be or what you conceive it to be, you are not able to execute  
Lack of inter functional communication, 
collaboration, alignment and integration. 
Inability to interrelate their actions within the 
system 
Lack of trust and sharing of information 
Personality conflicts 
Heedful interrelating 
of actions 
 
from the supplier to our factory, there was a lack of understanding of what all can go wrong 
The monsoon was just starting and they were not aware that the rainfall will happen 
he did not put enough rigour, that monsoon will come 
lack of proper understanding and putting those mechanism in place 
they have no proactive mechanism 
making sure that everything is rightly done 
the lead time in the entire supply chain and constantly thinking about what can go wrong in any project 
what all went wrong, which can go as a learning in the next project 
Lack of operational sensitivity and 
commitment to process resilience. 
Lack of engagement with the right ways of 
doing things 
Lack of proactive analysis of surroundings to 
determine what can go wrong 
Attention 
 
technology issue Lack of through thinking regarding the Mindfulness 
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was using an old machines  
machine had to be changed 
supplier had issues with working capital 
idea was to develop it and we will be able to manage 
weightage given to proximity was much higher than understanding the overall supplier’s infrastructure 
went with a more reasonable supplier 
we thought that capability will not be such a big issue 
you ask the supplier that I need this material and the supplier says, boss my lead time is 90 days, because I 
have to put a material in this which I have to import from somewhere else. I cannot deliver you this material 
in 60 days 
and suddenly you realize that the lead time required by the supplier, to buy his products, have not been 
factored anywhere 
you never told me that you needed the material that soon.  
ability to understand the lead time in the entire supply chain and constantly thinking about what can go 
wrong in any project 
reliability of the supplier selection 
False belief of thinking that things will 
improve over time 
False belief of supplier’s capability to fulfil 
volume and specification requirements. 
 
there is actually a document which defines the roll of procurement during specification development 
It clearly states that if you are in procurement then what you are expected to do during the development 
phase 
then you can’t blame R&D or supplier 
It is clearly listed that get involved at these places and this is the value that you need to add to the process 
No No ..(mild laugh of sarcasm), you create a document with an intent that this is the way to do it but 
So it is never what you envisage it to be or what you conceive it to be, you are not able to execute  
The quality people if do not go an audit the supplier in the right time, and then the problems with the 
supplier, that should have been revealed earlier, would be evident later on. 
mistakes that you do in one project, you are not able to replicates those learning on other projects. It 
happens most time that post project failure learnings are not captured appropriately 
The benefit of hindsight learning gets lost out 
people don’t want to hear bad news, so what all can go wrong discussion is seldom done 
Ignoring written procedures 
Accepting a non-conformity of standard 
process as an organizational norm 
Framing their own standards for doing things 
Disregarding or consciously ignoring the 
possibility to learn from mistakes. 
Normalization of 
Deviance  
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Table 18: Processes associated with instances of supply disruption 
Open code 
category 
Examples from data collection 
Task / processes 
associated with 
the 
phenomenon of 
SCD 
The process of production planning and product ordering  
Suppler selection 
Material handling by logistic and transport firms.  
The process of new product development (Its indicative of coordination between R&D and 
Procurement functions) 
The process of capturing usable insights from events of failure 
Supplier development and management 
Knowledge sharing 
Process of contract negotiation 
The process of buyer and supplier negotiation 
The process of Government and policy interventions 
Process of dealing with market mechanism of price changes 
Agents 
behaviour and 
actions 
Agents not sharing or updating production/sales plan 
Agents not following procedures 
Agents choosing not to coordinate or work together with other departments or functions 
Agent behaviour of not putting  enough rigour or commitment towards avoiding disruption or 
agents choosing not to follow set procedures 
Agents not thinking or preparing for things that can go wrong or about possible scenarios of 
disruption. 
Agents failing to capture the learnings and insights from past events of failure. 
Agents overlooking crucial supplier selection parameter for giving weightage to operational 
ease 
Agents unwillingness to discuss about failures or scenarios of disruption. 
Agents not sharing knowledge or supporting other agents. 
Agents not challenging outdated and detrimental procedures and routines. 
Opportunistic behaviour by agents 
Agents changing design and product specification without discussing with all the internal and 
external stakeholders such as internal organizational functions and suppliers. 
3.2.4 Discussion of pilot study findings 
3.2.4.1 Microstate agent behaviours and schemas 
The principle argument for this research was that there are some observable system 
patterns specifically of supply chain disruption that are collectively influenced by agent 
schemas. The coding of qualitative data was conducted to discover these system 
patterns linked to the phenomenon of SCD. This was done in parallel with the 
quantitative coding applying the convergent parallel mixed method process (Creswell, 
2013). The Axial coding of qualitative interview data, Table 17 and 18, provides 
descriptions of system patterns and agent’s (beliefs, norms and values) associated with 
the phenomenon, which help to explain the quantitative components. These agent 
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beliefs and values connect to observed system patterns can provide valuable insight into 
the reasons for complex systems behaviours.  
Based upon the results of open and axial data coding, the internal mechanism/ schemas 
of agents were conjectured. To conjecture these internal mechanisms either a known 
mechanism from any other related literature domain was adopted or a new one was 
creatively conceived. The agent’s internal mechanisms that were found to hold 
explanatory relevance to the agent actions and the observed system behaviour are; 
heedless performance, lack of sense making and normalization of deviance. Table 19 
presents details of these internal mechanism / schemas. A discussion and rationale for 
choosing these mechanisms is provided below. 
The identified agent mechanisms have their origin in the domain of High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO) (Denyer, Tranfield and van Aken, 2008). HROs are similar to 
supply chains, as both are systems of agents and processes that exist to maintain a 
continuous and reliable flow of material and information in complex environments. 
HRO is also a system with diverse set of agents working towards continuous operational 
reliability. In HRO factors like; agent behaviours, actions and agent’s understanding of 
their system,  have a significant bearing on the overall system response (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). This is similar to supply chain agents, where the actions and 
subordination activities can influence the overall stability of the network.  
Heedless Performance 
Weick and Roberts (1993) consider that heedless performance reflects an over-learned 
or routinized response to situations that require attention or action. The mechanism is 
enacted in situations where decision makers or agents disregard the contextual 
conditions or requirement. In instances connected to a lack of heed, agents are often 
unaware of these contextual and demanding conditions and this is either due to a lack of 
knowledge or due to insufficient trust of other agents.  In several events, at Firm 1, the 
cause of disruption was suggested to be a lack of information sharing among internal 
functions. For normal operating situations, the routinized operational processes 
performed well despite a lack of information sharing, however in demanding situations 
that required a consideration of evolving contextual conditions, these acts of heedless 
performance resulted in disruptions.  
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Table 19: Processes associated with instances of supply disruption 
Axial Code 
Observed System Pattern  And Agent’s personal construct system 
Selective code 
Mechanisms  
Observed System Pattern 
Material ordering is less than the future material requirement 
A gross planning and coordination error 
issues related to the complexity of job not clearly shared with supplier 
Risk associated with tender not clearly flagged 
Supplier communication and development is restricted by process 
Breach of trust by supplier 
Supplier did not consider the impact of their actions on the operations of Firm 3 
Monopolistic and opportunistic behaviour of the suppliers 
Behaviour prevalent with suppliers of products that may require a long lead time to 
develop an alternative source 
Information regarding increase in production volume not shared with suppliers 
Suppliers do not have the capability or capacity to deliver a product 
Agent’s personal construct system 
I have full knowledge of the operations and plans 
No need to update or confirm my information 
There is no requirement to coordinate with others 
Lack of trust on others version of knowledge 
My actions does not impact anyone else 
Suppliers in 1st, 2nd and 3rd tier have zero lead time 
Supplier capacity or capability is not required to be factored in. 
Lack of inter functional communication, collaboration, alignment and integration. 
Inability to interrelate their actions within the system 
Lack of trust and sharing of information 
Personality conflicts 
Issues related to the complexity of job not clearly shared with supplier 
Risk associated with tender not clearly flagged 
Information regarding increase in production volume not shared with suppliers 
Heedless performance 
 
Observed System Pattern 
Lack of proactive analysis of surroundings to determine what can go wrong 
Agent’s personal construct system 
Lack of through thinking regarding the reliability of the supplier selection 
False belief of thinking that things will improve over time 
False belief of supplier’s capability to fulfil volume and specification requirements. 
Failed to conceptualize the impact of design and specification changes on the overall 
supply chain 
Failed to understand   what can go wrong 
While drawing a plan for production increase, the production capacity of supplier was not 
accounted for 
Sense making 
 
Observed System Pattern 
Operational best practice are not followed 
Directed procedures  of coordination, involvement and coordination are not been 
followed 
There exits agent version of routines that are deviant from the designed procedures. 
Agent’s personal construct system 
Habitual of Ignoring procedures. Framing their own standards for doing things 
Accepting a non-conformity of standard process as an organizational norm 
Disregarding or consciously ignoring the possibility to learn from mistakes. 
Lack of operational sensitivity and commitment to process resilience. 
Lack of engagement with the right ways of doing things 
Written procedures are not there to be followed as envisaged 
Normalization of 
Deviance  
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Existence of a heedless performance was also observed in the Firm 2, the aerospace 
manufacturing sector, where the respondent repeatedly emphasised that a lack of 
knowledge transfer and information sharing with their suppliers could be judged as a 
vital aspect of supply disruptions. The respondent acknowledged that Firm 2, being a 
public sector enterprise with legacy rules and procedures, found it difficult to share 
technical knowhow and valuable insights with their suppliers. They being in the 
aerospace sector, with a very low tolerance of error, highly specialized or complex jobs 
and high penalty clauses, the act of not sharing the information could be deemed as an 
instance of heedless performance as without a support some suppliers and some 
complex components or outsourced jobs were bound to fail.  
The existence of this mechanism is evident from the respondent’s claims that 
“communication gap between us and him widened”, the use of pronoun ‘him’ indicates 
a Firm 2 supplier. In other Firm 2 respondent’s narrative, “the suppliers were not given 
adequate knowhow to fulfil their jobs”, also indicating the existence of the mechanism 
of Heedful interrelating of actions. In some disruptions related to the Firm 3, supplier 
demonstrated unexpected and monopolistic behaviour; this too could be argued as an 
agent schema of heedless performance, since a thoughtless opportunistic behaviour, 
which is a breach of mutual trust, does not always result in gains. In instance of Firm 3, 
they changed the supplier.  
Lack of Sense making 
The respondent from Firm 1 quotes; “there was a lack of understanding of what all can 
go wrong”. An HRO mechanism that can be associated with the above remark is the 
Mechanism of Sense Making (Weick and Roberts, 1993). Denyer, Tranfield and van 
Aken (2008) suggest that the reliability of an operation is strengthened by the ability of 
the people, related to it, to successfully conceptualize what can go wrong and to 
evaluate viable options. The authors argue that this relates to the process of sense 
making proposed by  Weick and Roberts (1993). Here sense making refers to the ability 
of people to associate meaning to their experiences (Weick and Roberts, 1993). The 
open coding of the interview transcripts indicates that for events of disruption there are 
multiple instances where supply chain agent behaviours and actions resonate with the 
idea of a lack of sense making. These include; people not conceptualizing what can go 
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wrong with weather variability, with a complex product design, with ramp up 
production volume being not shared with procurement etc. A lack of sense making is 
demonstrated in Firm 1 by the fact that the procurement team did not factor in the 2nd 
tier lead time of materials. Another incident related to a lack of sense making is of a 
consignment damage from rain due to insufficient weather proofing of the truck, despite 
the predictability of inclement weather. 
Normalization Deviance 
Vaughan's (1996) concept of normalization of deviance could also qualify as an internal 
model or agent schema. Normalization of deviance refers to the attitude of people 
becoming accustomed to behaviours, events, practices and processes that they normally 
would consider wrong or deviant from their own perspective. The respondent from Firm 
1 talked about the presence of a detailed written guideline documenting when and where 
should procurement participate in the new product development process, accepting that 
the recommendations of the document were seldom followed, indicating a decoupling 
of organizational routines from written procedures. It is a clear case of agents following 
a schema of deviance normalization. Other examples include not following the product 
handling guidelines, and not following the production update procedures etc. 
3.2.5 Summary of pilot study findings 
Before the findings are summarised, it would be worthy to note that the objective of the 
pilot, its nature and scale of enquiry restricts the pilot study from making any conclusive 
claim. It just acts as a preliminary tool to understand the nature of results and the 
effectiveness of the research design. 
The results of the pilot study indicate that macro events or phenomenon, like SCD, are 
influenced by the action, interaction and behaviours of the human agents involved in it. 
The results highlight the importance of context associated with these events and the 
underlying agent mindset and schemas governing agent interactions. One of the most 
important finding of the pilot is that the data demonstrated evidence of some observed 
system patterns that were found to be connected to behaviour of agents. This finding 
suggests that there is a possibility to further study system patterns that link micro agent 
behaviours to macro system outcomes. Or in other words, the amplification of micro 
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events into macro patters has an intermediate step or a related explanatory mechanism 
the presence of which is reflected in the observed system patterns connected to the 
phenomenon. 
3.3 Discussion and implication of the pilot for next phase 
The pilot study has several implications for the next phase of the research enquiry. This 
section presents a discussion of these implications from perspective of the phenomenon, 
research question and methodology. 
Implications for the phenomenon 
The findings from the pilot reveal that there is a definitive dynamical relationship 
between the agent’s schemas, agent’s personal construct system, behaviours and the 
observed system patterns related to events of SCD. However, the step of theory 
building, or the step of answering the question that how these constructs are linked to 
each other, was not so forthcoming. Being aware that complexity has a strong 
theoretical foundation to argue the ‘how’ aspect of micro to macro causation, it was 
perceived that the future phases needed to account more for complexity and its relevant 
theories and constructs. 
A refined conceptualization of Complexity and CAS is presented in the next section. 
This section adds to the complexity theory, the aspect of dissipating structures and 
adaptive tension; the two core arguments that have been extensively used to explain 
micro to macro causation  
The adoption of agent behaviour stereotypes from the literature on high reliability 
organization to argue causal mechanisms was also found to be conceptually an 
incomplete argument. The reason to it was that although these constructs like; Heedless 
performance, sense making or normalization of deviance, were a good aggregation of 
individual/collective behavioural traits or cognitive biases, yet they failed to convey 
how these behavioural /cognitive biases transform into system wide emergence.  
Other reason why these constructs failed to convey a micro to macro transformation 
mechanism was that the guiding research question of the pilot study was too broad to 
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argue micro to macro causation. The next section discusses the conceptual gaps in the 
research question 
Implications for the research question 
The research question for the pilot study was conceived based on the literature review of 
SCD. This was; 
“What are the contributing causal mechanisms to the phenomenon of supply chain 
disruption?” 
Although the literature review had highlighted the gap to be in behavioural antecedents 
of SCD, yet the scope of enquiry in pilot was kept broad. This resulted in an in complete 
account of the transformational aspect of micro agent behaviours. Accepting this as an 
opportunity to learn and reflect, the research question for the next phase was framed to 
reflect more on the amplification aspect of microstate agent behaviours. This question is 
presented at the end of this chapter.  
Implications for the methodology 
The pilot study adopted Rep Grids as a data collection tool and resorted to a mixed 
method analysis of the grids. Rep Grid interviews fall under the category of structured 
interview technique and structured interviews as an organizational research method is 
often recommended for marketing research or where exact data gathering is a priority 
(Easterby-Smith, Mark Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). However, due to its link to theory of 
personal construct and its approach of comparing three randomly selected elements, Rep 
Grid interviews overcome the hurdles of a structured interview technique. Also, the 
scope of laddering during the interview process, with questions like; ‘why do you think 
this happened, could you explain further, please elaborate etc., raises the scope of 
generating insightful qualitative data. The narratives obtained through this approach was 
found to be conceptually closer to the qualitative data generated in a semi structured 
interviews.   
During the process of analysing the qualitative data from the Rep Grid interviews, the 
above argument on the quality and thickness of the qualitative data, was further 
validated. It was found that most of the contextual and behavioural aspects of SCD were 
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revealed in the narratives, while the conjectured bipolar constructs were not able to 
sufficiently reflect the aspects of a SCD. The reason to it was that the interviewee was 
asked to succinctly present a bipolar name tag to indicate the differences and similarity 
among the three randomly chosen events (Rep Grid elements). The respondents found 
this step to be a constraint. However, when allowed to freely speak about these 
differences and similarities among events, the respondents were found to be more 
relaxed and forthcoming with insightful observations. These narratives provided much 
deeper and thicker account of the events. The laddering technique used within these 
narratives also proved to be extremely useful to stimulate a deeper conceptualization of 
connected constructs. It was also revealed in this process that some people were 
creatively able to conceive better constructs while others struggled to find appropriate 
words and thus presented words from their professional jargon which did not add much 
value to the construct. 
The above observation strengthened the idea of giving more weightage to the narratives 
and qualitative data. It also was useful to find that once the interviewee was presented 
with three randomly chosen events of SCD, the interview would turn into an open 
ended, semi unstructured format of interview. Thus, the qualitative data collected from 
Rep Grid interview should ideally be treated as a semi unstructured interview rather 
than viewing it a data from a structured interview. These aspects reinforced the utility of 
a Grounded theory based qualitative data analysis for creating new theoretical 
knowledge on aspect of agent behaviours and SCD.  
The quantitative analysis of the pilot study data also revealed some useful insights about 
adopting a mixed method approach for this research. Every Rep Grid was different to 
each other, in terms of the variables (elements and constructs) and thus there was no 
possibility to jointly analyse these statistically. This aspect of quantitative analysis 
compelled to reconsider the relevance of conducting statistical analysis in the next phase 
of the study. The variable reduction technique of PCA would only group constructs 
within a grid and not among the grids, thus being ineffective for multiple grids when the 
number of constructs would explode to hundreds in the next phase.  If the main research 
phase looks at more than 20 firms with more than 150 events of SCD, then the statistical 
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analysis will have no usefulness to present a cross case analysis, however the qualitative 
narratives could be looked for cross case comparisons.  
Reflecting upon the findings of the pilot study, it was decided that the bipolar constructs 
presented by interviewees would be retained to associate meaning to the narratives but 
there was no additional advantage gained in testing these bipolar constructs statistically. 
The next phase of research will be framed purely on the qualitative data and the 
narratives of Rep Grid interviews. 
3.4  Refining the conceptualization of complexity 
The outcomes of the pilot study and peer reviewed feedbacks on the findings were 
indicative that the full potential of complexity as a theoretical foundation was not 
getting sufficiently exploited. Merely committing to supply chains having emergent and 
self-organizational capabilities was not enough to support the objectives of this 
research. It was required to further look into the theory of complex system for answers 
to ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions regarding micro to macro transformation of interactions, 
which were evident from the pilot study findings. Pilot study had just touched the 
surface of agent schemas and mental models and was able to highlight some kind of 
connection between system patterns, agent behaviours and macro supply chain 
phenomenon like SCD. However, the findings are suggestive that the amplification of 
micro state agent behaviours into macro system outcomes require further attention. It 
necessitates investigating why only in some conditions does the system propel a 
disruption, despite the fact that agents maintain similar mental models and schemas.  
Motivated by these questions, before undertaking a full scale study, it was deemed 
necessary to revisit the tenets of complexity theory, particularly the aspect that reflects 
upon the amplification of micro interactions into macro outcomes. The next section 
presents a discussion of further elements of the complexity theory, that are necessary to 
gain an understanding of mechanisms transforming micro interactions to macro 
outcomes.  
3.4.1 The two views on CAS 
Complex adaptive system view can provide explanatory relevance to the self–organized 
co evolution of many peculiar stochastic micro events concerning agents such as 
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molecules, genes, neurons, particles, organizations or individuals , into emergent 
structures (McKelvey, 1999b). The emergence and self-organization of these microstate 
events can be linked to two popular traditions relating to; dissipative structures 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) and adaptive landscape (Kauffman, 1993). 
In their pioneering work on on dissipative structure theory leading to the research on 
self-organizing systems, Prigogine and colleagues (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977, 1989; 
Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), proposed that adaptive tension in a system, beyond a 
critical value, can create; (i) Varying complexity fields, (ii) provide alternative 
explanations to explain the observed complexity, and (iii) produce a complex behaviour 
at the edge of chaos that may give rise to emergent self-organized structures and 
adaptive changes in the system.   
The fitness landscape view on self-organization by Kauffman (1993), argues that the 
accumulation of complex interdependencies or adaptive tension will result in alteration 
of the adaptive landscape and would result in the system self-organizing to something 
else or in other word the system will exhibit a complexity chaos. This fitness landscape 
view opposes the Darwinian view on a selectionist evolution of the system. The authors 
draws a parallel between the rugged peaks of a mountain range and the alternative 
performance peak/levels available to a system; and argues that depending upon the 
ongoing energy or fitness level of the system, the system will move from one peak of 
performance to another without adhering to Darwinian logic of selection. 
3.4.2 Dissipating structures and adaptive tension 
In his pioneering work leading to a Nobel prise in chemistry, Prigogine explained the 
way in which physico-chemical open system, also known as dissipating systems, are 
able to attain a spontaneous order at a finite distance from equilibrium. These systems 
are characterised by the exchange of energy and matter from the environment and by the 
spontaneous formation of complex structures that the author named as dissipative 
structures. Extending the argument to complexity, Prigogine and Stengers (1984) argue 
that complex system are able to create and maintain structures far above the system 
entropy, contrary to the laws of thermodynamic, by importing energy into the system, a 
phenomenon also known as Negentropic effects (Schrödinger, 1944). Prigogine and 
colleagues further observed that the energy imported in these open systems would 
 69 
consequently be lost or dissipated and thus these structures are named as dissipative 
structures.  
These self-organizing dissipative structures are both persistent and nonlinear. The 
persistent nature of these dissipative structures could be demonstrated by the complex 
processes surrounding the chemical reactions involving autocatalytic hyper cycles 
(Eigen and Schuster, 1979). In autocatalytic hyper cycles an open system that is 
exchanging mater and energy from the environment such as a continuous feed chemical 
reactor far away from equilibrium, there can be produced a class of microstate 
autocatalytic agent that will create temporal oscillations and dissipative structures and it 
will help furthers the autocatalytic process. This progress of the autocatalytic reaction is 
controlled by a positive autocatalytic feedback loop where the activator agent or species 
enforces its own changes which later are counterbalanced by some kind of parallel 
inhibitory process resulting in a system maintained at far from equilibrium but still 
delivering the desired chemical kinetics. During this autocatalytic process dissipative 
entropic structures are formed within the system over space and time as inhibitory 
system effects diffuse through a complex oscillatory system. Argued to be sensitive to 
initial condition and the path of their creation, these autocatalytic disruptive structures 
are able to generate dynamic system behaviour ranging from stable order to complex 
organization under chaos or edge of chaos (McKelvey, 1999b).  The nonlinearity of 
dissipative structures is demonstrated by their tendency to either create substantial 
explosion or a sudden crash of structures. Many such complex, dynamic, self-
organizing dissipative structures, similar to the ones generated in autocatalytic process, 
have been identified in natural phenomenon (Cramer, 1993; Kaye, 1993; Mainzer, 
1997), and have been hypothesized to be applicable to the context of firms and 
organizations (Zimmerman and Hurst, 1993; Levy, 1994; Thiétart and Forgues, 1995; 
Stacey, 1996). 
3.4.3 Adaptive tension 
In his dissipative structures theory for open systems maintained far from equilibrium, 
Prigogine’s (1955) conceptualizes the spontaneous creation of adaptive order and 
complex or chaotic structures to be stimulated by the existence of a tension of energy 
gradient/ differential between the ongoing system conditions and the environment. This 
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tension also known as ‘Adaptive Tension’ is at the core of the complexity argument 
relating to the process of adaptation and structural emergence (Lichtenstein et al., 
2007).  In a dynamical open system, far from equilibrium, the adaptive tension 
argument provides a theoretical explanation for various system behaviours and 
conditions such as; system in a state of order, in a state of chaos or under influence of 
structural emergence. Complexity researchers argue that local interactions and energy 
exchange between the system and environment creates this adaptive tension / gradient 
that system tends to resolve either by damping it using negative feedback or by using it 
to support the evolution of dissipating structures through positive feedback dynamics. 
However, if it crosses a critical value, then the adaptive tension could propel bifurcating 
or chaotic system conditions.  
Critical values of adaptive Tension 
Adaptive tension is said to cause rapid transitions in a CAS, from order to chaos. To 
differentiate among the kinds of system transitions associated with values of adaptive 
tension, a concept of critical adaptive tension value has been conceptualized (Nicolis 
and Prigogine, 1989). For each adaptive tension critical value being less than 1 system 
is expected to be in order, for critical value between 1 and 2 the system is said to be in 
the emergent zone (Cramer, 1993), or the ‘melting zone’ (Kauffman, 1993), and for 
critical values above 2 system is argued to behave in a chaotic manner (McKelvey, 
1999b). The value of adaptive tension 1 and 2 are also referred as system’s edge of 
order and chaos respectively. 
Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) presented the idea of different levels of critical value for 
adaptive tension and the formation of dissipating structures using an example of the 
build-up of a storm. The authors argue that beyond the 1
st
 critical value of adaptive 
tension, the system of storm particles reaches to the edge of chaos and beyond the 2
nd
 
level of critical value the system will move into the realm of deterministic chaos with 
dissipating structures in form of tornadoes developing and dissipating in multiple 
occasions.  In this zone of emergent complexity, it is often argued that adaptive tension 
and self-organization of the system may lead to a chaos that could generate more 
adaptive tension and further emergence through more self-organization. It becomes a 
recursive relationship where change enforces more change. Holland (1995) calls this as 
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a ‘scaffolding’ of activities where one activity in a complex chaotic system builds a 
foundation for the emergence of other system states and activities.  This ever growing 
dynamics of mutual causation driven by the mechanisms of self-organization results in 
emergence of new structures in time and space (McKelvey, 2004a; Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1984) and has been argued to be a fundamental cause for the emergence of 
various structures in organizational settings (Lichtenstein et al., 2007). 
McKelvey (1999) successfully apply the idea of critical values for adaptive tension in 
an organizational context. By comparing Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) storm cell 
metaphor to interpersonal dynamic communications in an organizational value chain 
network, McKelvey (1999) is able to present a narrative about the emergence and 
dissipation of self-organizing dissipating structures due to the build-up of adaptive 
tension in an organizational setting. The author argue that for adaptive tension critical 
values less than 1, organizational agents are expected to offer minimum resistance to the 
ongoing system conditions and produce almost negligible response. For critical values 
between 1 and 2, organizational members show collective action towards reducing the 
environmentally generated tension by self-organization and making dissipative 
structures causing emergence. While an organization faced with adaptive tension critical 
values more than 2, it will turn into chaotic conditions with lot of local, short lived 
system patterns emerging and system demonstrating bifurcations.  
McKelvey (1999a, 2001) discusses a hypothetical condition of a small firm being taken 
over by a large company, to argue the aspect of adaptive tension critical values in 
organizational settings. The author argues that if the bigger firm, the new owner of the 
small firm, does not force any substantial change in the existing management and 
process of the newly acquired firm then it could be judged as a condition of critical 
value less than 1. In such a condition, the methods and processes of the new owner will 
slowly percolate, from person to person, into the acquired firm and would not result in a 
rapid phase transformation. In another possibility, if the new owners raise the adaptive 
gradient by providing targets about market returns, performance efficiency or return on 
investment, then this will prompt the workers in the acquired firm to self-organize to 
respond to such pressures. This phase could be argued to have critical values between 1 
and 2 and the system will remain in a zone of emergent complexity. However, if the big 
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firm takes an extreme step of sending in a team of its managers, McKelvey (1999:p.6) 
calls them “MBA Terrorists”, to enforce a radical change in the management system in 
a very short time, then this will send the system into a chaos. This condition of the 
system could be argued to have a critical value of adaptive tension more than 2. 
The concept of adaptive tension has been utilized by other organizational studies as 
well. These are presented in the next section. 
3.4.4 Adaptive tension in context of organizational studies 
Although complexity ideas relating to adaptive tension, emergence and self-
organization have emerged from the study of chemical kinetics, autocatalysis and 
thermodynamics (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977, 1989; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), yet 
the concept has been successfully adopted in organizational settings (Dooley, Johnson 
and Bush, 1995; McKelvey, 1999b, 2004; Allen and Varga, 2006; Mccarthy et al., 
2006; Lichtenstein et al., 2007). Studying nascent entrepreneurs, Lichtenstein and 
Carter (2007) argue that personal aspirations and perceived opportunities by nascent 
entrepreneurs  leads to the build-up of an adaptive tension in the system that may 
culminate into the emergence of new ventures or start up enterprises. Mccarthy et al. 
(2006) observed that in the process of new product development, sequence of decisions, 
conflicting objectives and agent behaviours outside the formal boundaries of 
organizational practices can result in bringing about adaptation and self-organization. 
Allen and Varga (2006) argue that adaptation and structural evolution in complex 
organizations is brought about by an agent’s axiology that is his values system which 
defines how agents perceive, interprets, define and finally responds to reality and also 
what motivates or instigates an agent to make different choices.  
3.4.5 A note on emergence 
Goldstein presented a glossary of terms in (Zimmerman et al., 1998:p. 270); where he 
conceptualized emergence to be; 
“a process ... , whereby new emergent structures, patterns, and properties arise without 
being externally imposed on the system”  
Goldstein, in (Zimmerman et al., 1998:p. 270)  
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Emergence as a concept has a long history in natural sciences and ecosystems research. 
However, a system’s perspective of emergence could be traced to three fundamental 
principles; Holism that asserts that evidence of emergence is demonstrated in whole 
being greater than individual sum of a system’s parts, control theory that links the 
existence of positive and negative system feedbacks to emergent tendencies, and studies 
that look at energy gradients and system boundary conditions (Goldspink and Kay†, 
2003). 
In the recent times, the field of complex science has contributed the most to the 
phenomenon of emergence with many valuable contributions looking at it from various 
perspectives. Emergence has been studies in natural sciences (Nicolis and Prigogine, 
1989; Kauffman, 1993; Bak, 1996) in organizations (Stacey, 1996; McKelvey, 1999a, 
2004) and also in the sphere of social enquiries(Eve, Horsfall and Lee, 1997; Buckley, 
1998; Goldspink and Kay†, 2003). 
Emergence is not a new abstraction to organizational researchers. It has been studied at 
various levels (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009). Plowman et al. (2007) conducted a 
study on the amplification of small effects into emergent structures at an organizational 
level. Their studies investigated how small changes led to radical emergent changes for 
a religious organization. Lichtenstein (2000) use a CAS framework to study and 
compare self-organized emergence at two firms. Chiles et al. (2004) use the dissipative 
structures model to argue the emergence of collective organizations. The authors use a 
longitudinal case study to collectively study the emergent dynamics of a musical theatre 
and the collective community and other organizations associated with it.  
3.5 The next phase 
This thesis is poised to study supply chain disruptions from a complex system 
perspective. One of the founding argument of complexity is that under the influence of 
an adaptive tension beyond a certain critical value, such that existence of a certain 
degree of gradient between current and future state of a system, the system will remain 
either at an edge of chaos and order; and will demonstrate emergence towards new 
states by the process of self-organization. It can be argued that beyond a critical value, 
adaptive tension dissipates into structures and activities aimed at reducing the tension. 
This dissipation of energy results in self-organization and emergence. 
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3.6 Research question 
Based upon the review of relevant literature and through the reflections on the findings 
of the pilot, following two research questions were formulated for the next phase of the 
study. 
Research question 1: 
How do micro level agent behaviours, actions and interactions influence macro level 
self-organization and emergence in a supply chain disruption scenario?  
Research question 2: 
What are the factors and micro state agent behaviours that influence events of supply 
chain disruption? 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter presented a detailed discussion of a pilot study conducted to test the 
research design and gain initial insights about the phenomenon of interest. The findings 
from the pilot and the experience of conducting it helped revisit the methodological and 
analytical choices of the next phase. It was also observed that there was a need to relook 
at the conceptualization of the complexity perspective. The chapter went on to present 
additional discussion on complexity and related constructs like dissipating structures, 
adaptive tension and emergence. These new constructs and conceptualizations of CAS 
perspective were positioned to redefine the phenomenon of interest and the research 
question needed to interrogate it.  
This formally concludes the first phase of the enquiry and now the next phase will 
present details of how the main study was conducted. This includes Chapters on 
research design and the findings of the main study.  
 
 75 
Phase II:  
The main study 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Preceding chapters presented a discussion of the phenomenon of interest in context of 
the extant literature and offered a theoretical foundation that bounds the scope of 
enquiry. It also presented a discussion of a pilot study that helped in refining the 
research question and the research design. Chapter 4 now presents a comprehensive 
discussion of the research design adopted by this doctoral research. It starts with a 
discussion of the ontological perspective followed by a detailed discussion of the 
methodology and analytical framework. To start with, this thesis presents the research 
question that will guide this phase of enquiry. 
4.1 Research question 
Based upon previous phase of the research the following two research question were 
decided for this phase of research enquiry.  
Research question 1: 
How do micro level agent behaviours, actions and interactions influence macro level 
self-organization and emergence in a supply chain disruption scenario?  
Research question 2: 
What are the factors and micro state agent behaviours that influence events of supply 
chain disruption? 
4.2 Ontological stance 
The primary objective of this research is to explain the micro to macro causation in 
events of SCD. In the previous section, it has been successfully argued that complex 
system theory provides the requisite theoretical foundation to argue the transformational 
influence of micro to macro causation. It has also been established that complexity 
science is the most appropriate framework to investigate structure-process 
transformations of dynamical systems characterised by nonlinear response and 
dissipative structures (Morçöl and Wachhaus, 2009). So the question of consideration 
for this research pursuit is;  
What is an apt ontology for a research driven by complex system thinking?  
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The next section presents a discussion of the existing debates on ontology of complex 
system thinking. The section also recommends an ontological perspective suitable for 
this research enquiry and presents a detailed discussion of it in context to this thesis.  
4.2.1 Ontological stance of complexity 
Complexity theorists argue that precise knowledge of individual systems components is 
not sufficient to predict the future trajectory of a complex system (Morçöl and 
Wachhaus, 2009) and thus a reductionist or positivist stance does not holds ontological 
relevance for such an enquiry. Despite criticising Newtonian positivism, complexity 
fraternity still accepts the existence of a degree of determinism in complex 
phenomenon.  The reason to it is that complexity researchers accept the possibility of 
causal relationships among elements and events; indicating towards some degree of 
determinism (Morçöl and Wachhaus, 2009). However, prominent complexity 
researchers like Prigogine and Stengers (1984) view determinism in complexity with 
scepticism as they advocate the coexistence of indeterminism along with determinism.  
Still, complex systems are considered to be the systems for which the whole exceeds the 
sum of its individual parts (Anderson, 1999). The view is promoted by the dissipative 
structure theory of emergence at the edge of chaos (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), or by 
similar concept like melting zone/ threshold complexity (Kauffman, 1993). Based on 
the research on origin of life or origin of structures in chemical phase transformations, 
these views argue that emergence of structures cannot be explained by reducing it to 
parts. Thus we can conclude that in general, most researchers will accept complexity to 
follow a realist tradition with an interpretive or hermeneutics epistemology (Morcol, 
2001). The interpretive aspect of complexity arises from the fact that a system’s 
complexity is often jointly determined by the interaction of the system with other 
systems or human beings/its controllers. Since the knowledge of the system leans on the 
knowledge and understanding of the agents involved with it, this provides the system 
with an interpretive epistemology.  
Summarising the above arguments on the philosophical perspectives of complexity it 
can be suggested that an apt ontological stance for a complexity driven enquiry will be a 
perspective that has a realist feel with an interpretive orientation. Based upon the 
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objectives defined for this doctoral research, it can also be argued that the chosen 
philosophical perspective should also be suited for discovering mechanism that may 
hold explanatory relevance to micro macro transformational effects.  The ontological 
stance that fulfils most of the above desired objectives is ‘Critical realism’.   
4.2.2 Critical realist ontology 
Positioned between positivism and interpretivism, critical realism is a philosophical 
stance that provides an alternative and unifying ontology to positivist and interpretive 
research (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998) by leveraging elements from both of these 
ontologies (Wynn and Williams, 2012). While retaining the realist perception about the 
existence of a real world, independent of our knowledge, understanding or perception; 
critical realism simultaneously acknowledges the interpretive view that our knowledge 
of this world is subjective, socially constructed, constrained by the context of the social 
actor and thus fallible (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011).  At a broad level it can be argued 
that critical realism combines a realist ontology with an interpretive epistemology 
(Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998).   
The key argument of critical realism is that there exists a real world independent of our 
knowledge and there are rational ways to access knowledge claims (Bhaskar, 1998) or 
generate theories by scientific research. Despite the existence of real world and theories 
that could define this world, our understanding and perception of these theories and 
reality is constrained by the observer’s context, viewpoint and understanding of the 
phenomenon. Thus, our knowledge of these theories and reality is fallible. This notion 
of observer’s inability to clearly understand a phenomenon, takes the critical realism 
based research enquiry into a different trajectory than a positivist research approach. 
Using this argument, critical realists reject the positivist viewpoint of a deterministic 
linear causality relationship between a phenomenon and its empirical data or the 
predictive capability of the data. Instead they focus on explaining and understanding the 
underlying mechanisms that are usually not always easily observed. 
4.2.2.1 Stratified reality 
Critical realism conceives the reality to be stratified into three nested domains; domain 
of the real, its subset the domain of the actual and domain of the empirical which is a 
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further subset of ‘the actual’ (Bhaskar, 1975). The domain of ‘the real’ consists of 
entities, structure and objects that exist independent to our perception of them and these 
structure and objects can either be physical or social. These structures and entities have 
inherent causal powers and behaviours called ‘the mechanisms’, which forms the 
domain of ‘the actual’. In the next domain of ‘the empirical’, these mechanisms, 
behaviours and causal powers enact to trigger events. These events will be triggered 
regardless of them being observed or perceived by humans. This concept of nested 
domains is presented in table 20. 
Table 20: Stratified Reality and Nested domains 
  Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical 
Mechanism    
Event   
Experience   
Adopted from (Bhaskar, 1975: p. 13) 
4.2.2.2 Structures 
Critical realists consider structures of real entities to be a set of related objects and 
practices (Sayer, 1992). Depending upon the unit of analysis, these structures or objects 
could be considered to be made up of further structures or be a part of a larger structure. 
However, the behaviour and properties of these structures are not reducible to their 
individual components (Sayer, 1992); a view that aligns with complexity. 
From a supply chain perspective, structures of the reality domain could include physical 
structures like technological systems, network nodes and connection, organizations in 
the network their operational rules and practices, etc. and social structures like 
behaviour of governing bodies, firms, groups, cartels and people. 
4.2.2.3 Mechanisms 
Conceptually, a mechanism can be explained as a causal power or tendency of a 
structure to enact something or trigger an event (Bhaskar, 1975, 1998). These 
behaviours or tendencies are inherent to both the physical and social structures and they 
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determine the outcome in a specific context by enabling or limiting events (Sayer, 2000; 
Smith, 2006). Contrary to the positivist assumption, of an objective linear causality, 
critical realists argue that outcome of a mechanism is subjective, case specific and 
contextual to other mechanism. This aspect compels the enquiry to focus on subjective 
and idiosyncratic elements of the cases under investigation. 
Thus, from a critical realist perspective the same mechanism may produce different 
outcome under different context. A critical realist research methodology uses these 
mechanisms to explain phenomenon or events rather than to predict them. It can be 
concluded that a critical realism based research enquiry does not sets out to discover 
universal laws rather it tries to explain the underlying behaviours, tendencies and 
mechanisms that produce events in a given context. 
Table 21: Terms used in critical realism 
SNo Terms used  
1 Object Structures are made up of objects. Objects could be individual, practices, institutions etc. 
E.g. supply chain managers, resellers, purchase contracts. Objects can also have some 
unique properties as age, education, ambitions, duration of contracts etc  (Bhaskar, 2010; 
Rotaru, Churilov and Flitman, 2014) An object can be a part of many structure definitions 
(Bhaskar, 2010). 
2 Phenomenon Phenomenon are explained by mechanisms. A phenomenon is an emergent systemic ability 
or capability such as disruption. 
3 Causal 
powers 
These are demonstrated by mechanisms (Bhaskar, 2010). 
4 Behaviours Objects have behaviours (Bhaskar, 2010).  
5 Events Event is a thing that happens or takes place. In organizations ,Events contribute  to the 
continuity and change of the object under study (Peterson and Lewin, 1998).  
6 Outcomes Outcomes are effects generated  by events or we can say that events lead to outcome 
(Sminia, 2009). 
7 Set of 
conditions 
Conditions that trigger or activate causal powers. 
8 Structures Structures are a set of connected or interrelated group of objects or practices (Sayer, 1992) 
9 Mechanism Mechanisms can be viewed as causal powers or tendencies (Fleetwood, 2005; Smith, 2006)  
4.2.3 Critical realism and supply chain 
According to the critical realist thinking, all physical and social systems can be argued 
to have structures and these structures are made up of objects. These objects have 
behaviours that are triggered by causal mechanisms leading to events or outcomes. In a 
supply chain context, an event of SCD could be argued to be an outcome that could be 
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explained using underlying mechanism capable of bringing micro to macro 
transformations. 
The current nature of supply chain enquiry leans heavily on deductive positivist 
approaches and there are only a numbered research papers that take a pure critical realist 
stance. On an extensive search of electronic databases, only two journal articles were 
found that looked at supply chain phenomenon from a perspective of critical realism or 
causal mechanisms. One of these is a recent paper is by Rotaru et al. (2014) that argue 
that generative mechanisms like bottleneck management practices, process 
standardisation, organisational and reporting structure etc. 
4.2.4 Critical realist research design 
The goal of a critical realist is to explain an event based upon causal powers and 
mechanisms, rather than predict the event (Wynn and Williams, 2012). The ontology 
assumes that existence of these mechanisms are often unobservable and non-measurable 
(Wynn and Williams, 2012). Thus, identification of these mechanisms is most 
challenging. The process of discovering these mechanisms and building knowledge 
about them will  be driven by  a combination of intellectual, perception and technical 
skills (Bhaskar, 1975, 1989). For a critical realist enquiry to succeed, the chosen 
research design and data collection tool should be able deliver insights buried under 
deep ceded tacit and functional knowledge of individuals that people find difficult to 
articulate or express. 
4.2.4.1 Critical realism and emergence 
Entities and structures from a critical realist perspective are independent forms that are 
irreducible to their components (Archer, 1995). The behaviours emerge from the 
interaction of different structures and their causal powers. This view positions this 
ontology appropriately to study systemic emergence.  
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4.2.4.2 Critical realism and open systems 
Bhaskar (1998) proposed that critical realist view reality to be an open system that 
cannot be directly controlled. In contrary to a closed system based enquiry where we 
can design replicable controlled experiments to isolate specific outcomes, the open 
system’s view considers systems to be in a continuously changing contextual 
environment with replicable constant condition a rarity thus negating a possibility of a 
replicable controlled experiment (Wynn and Williams, 2012). The open system 
assumption of critical realism aligns perfectly with the open system energy exchange 
phenomenon proposed by Prigogine and Stengers (1984) to argue theory of dissipating 
structures for system maintained far from equilibrium.  
The critical realist assumption of a dynamic , contextual and variable  reality of an open 
system shifts the critical realism based enquiry towards identifying behaviours, 
mechanisms and tendencies specific to a context, system , environment over a   specific 
period of time (Sayer, 1992). These behaviours may not be generalizable yet provide a 
powerful narrative of the events and mechanisms.  
4.2.4.3 Guidelines for a critical realist enquiry 
Wynn Jr. and Williams (2012) suggest guidelines for conducting a critical realism based 
research enquiry. Although the authors recommendation are typically for a case base 
method, yet the principles can be generalise to suit the context of this research enquiry. 
The authors propose five principles for the approach, depicted in table 22. 
These five princples ; Explication of events, explication of structure and context, 
retroduction, empirical cooroboration and tringulation through multimethod, will inform 
the different phases of my research. Here retroduction is indicative of a techinque that 
tries to link mechainsms or behaviours to the events under consideration. Retroduction 
is a kind of an infrence that helps a critical realist identify and verify the mechanisms 
that are influencing the phenomenon under investigation (Wynn and Williams, 2012).  
It can be concluded that the critical realist ontology aligns with theoretical foundation of 
complexity as both conceptualise system’s to be open systems that are influenced by a 
multitude of causal tendencies and demonstrate emergent behaviours.  
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4.3 Methodology  
This section presents the key research design decisions that informed this doctoral 
research and the rational of taking those decisions. Although a few modifications in the 
research design were considered after reviewing the outcomes of the pilot study, yet 
there were many aspects of the methodology that remain unchanged. It was felt that the 
research design decisions for this doctoral research were particularly challenging 
because of the 
Table 22: Principles of critical realist research 
Critical realism based principle Ontological and 
epistemological basis 
Evaluation criterion 
Explication or account of events 
Identify and abstract the event to be studied. 
Use experiences as a guiding principle to 
understand what really happened. 
Stratified ontology 
Mediated knowledge  
A comprehensive description of case 
story including actions and outcomes. 
An abstracted chain of events, 
including experiences of participants 
and observers. 
Explication of Structure and Context 
Identify components of structure 
Identify contextual environment 
Identify the  relationships among 
them.  
Critically redescribe these from  actor’s viewpoint 
into theoretical perspective. 
Stratified ontology 
Open system’s 
perspective 
Mediated knowledge 
Unobservability of 
mechanisms 
Description of the structural entities, 
constituent parts, and contextual 
conditions existing in the case 
Identification of the  relationships 
among the entities 
• Description of the resulting 
emergent properties 
Retroduction 
Identify and elaborate on powers/ tendencies of 
structure that may have interacted to generate 
explicated events. 
Emergence 
Focus on explanation 
of mechanisms 
Multiple explanations 
Unobservability of 
mechanisms 
Identification of a set of plausible 
candidate causal mechanisms 
Logical and analytical support for the 
existence of proposed mechanisms 
linking the structure to events 
Empirical Corroboration 
Ensure that proposed mechanisms have causal 
power and that they have better explanatory 
power than alternatives. 
Independent reality 
Stratified ontology 
Unobservability of 
mechanisms 
Multiple explanations 
Analytical validation of proposed 
mechanism based on case data 
Assessment of explanatory power of 
each mechanism relative to 
alternative explanations 
Selection of the mechanism(s) that  
offers the best explanation 
Triangulation & Multimethods 
Employ multiple approaches to support causal 
analysis based on a variety of data types and 
sources, analytical methods, investigators, and 
theories. 
Independent reality 
Mediated knowledge 
Unobservability of 
Mechanisms 
Multiple explanations 
Multiple theoretical perspectives 
Multiple analytical and 
methodological techniques 
Variety of data sources and types 
 
Adopted from : (Wynn Jr. and Williams, 2012: p. 796) 
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complexity consideration and the nature of study surrounding micro agent interactions 
which called for organizational actors to formulate a rich and relevant account of 
organizational events such as events like SCD.  We start the discussion with a comment 
on the challenges followed by a discussion about the importance of methodological fit 
and a discussion of comprehensive research design strategy. 
4.3.1 The methodological challenge associated with complexity  
Research methodology is a philosophical principle that guides the process of conducting 
research (Dawson, 2002) and for it to be able to deliver quality research outcomes, it 
should have a methodological fit with the research objectives (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007).   
However, there exists a methodological challenge associated with the research enquiry 
of this doctoral research.  The challenge is that the choice of research methodology is 
burdened to deliver the following two research objectives; firstly, to identify micro 
agent behaviours that could trigger system level self-organization and emergence for 
events of SCD and secondly, to establish a logical explanation or to identify a relevant 
mechanism that may explain this transformational influence of micro interactions. 
The choice of methodology needs to address the above two challenges. The next section 
provides a discussion of the methodological positioning of this research and an 
appropriate research design that suits both a complex system thinking and a critical 
realist enquiry. 
4.3.2 Methodological fit 
The notion of methodological fit in organizational studies calls for a research 
methodology to be aligned to the existing knowledge of the domain (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). Since behavioural aspect of operations research is currently not a 
mature field of literature (Gino and Pisano, 2008; Tokar, 2010), and aspect of micro 
macro causation have not yet been emepirically investigated in the supply chain 
complexity research, thus this doctoral research could not borrow a proven 
methodology from any of the previous empirical research in the domain of SCD. 
Instead it was burdened to seek elsewhere for answers. 
 86 
The conditions surrounding this research enquiry closely resonates with the description 
of “Nascent Theory Research”  suggested by Edmondson and McManus (2007: p. 
1161). The authors suggest using an inductive theory building technique for domains 
that have little or no availability of prior theoretical knowledge or are deficient in 
methodological foundation. Authors further argue that a field enquiry, with real 
organizational informants, explaining about real events and observations will be most 
relevant for such a domains to answer the ‘how’ questions by leaning over paradoxes or 
unexplained occurrences. To gain a better understanding of patterns associated with 
enquiries of nascent research domains, Edmondson and McManus (2007)  
recommended to adopt a grounded theory based qualitative research framework that 
draws on inductive logic to build theory.  Edmondson and McManus (2007) define field 
research as management enquiries that are based upon qualitative or quantitative data 
collected from real world organizations.  
Accepting the views of  Edmondson and McManus (2007), this thesis posits to use a 
qualitative data driven field enquiry methodology that aims to identify patterns linking 
micro agent behaviours to macro  events of SCD. The theory building is proposed to be 
driven by inductive logic. 
As this doctoral research is already committed to a critical realist ontological stance, it 
was necessary that the recommendations of Edmondson and McManus (2007) were 
looked at in juxtaposition with the theoretical foundation and philosophical stance of 
this thesis. The next section presents a discussion of a particular kind of qualitative 
research enquiry that will closely aligns with tents of Critical realism and complexity.  
4.3.3 Research strategy 
The review of methodological fit highlighted the nascent nature of the enquiry and the 
need for conducting an inductive logic driven, qualitative field enquiry. This section 
now goes further into the granularity of research design decisions by converging into 
methods, tools and analytical strategies that align with previous recommendations and 
help maximise the effectiveness and extant of learning. The changes in the methods 
originating from reflecting on the pilot study outcomes have been incorporated.  
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4.3.3.1 Key assumptions 
The research strategy of this thesis is driven by the nature of the enquiry and the 
assumptions that define the research landscape. Since, this research is particularly 
interested in the micro agent interactions leading to macro supply chain outcomes, it 
was deemed fit to view human agents as autonomous entities. The views of this thesis 
about human behaviours, their decisions and actions, are more aligned to the bounded 
rationality assumption of the broader organizational studies literature that subscribes to 
the notion of  guile, opportunism and non-rational behaviour (Williamson, 1985, 1998; 
Romar, 2004). Thus, at the outset of conducting this research, I feel obliged to state the 
assumptions guiding this research enquiry. The research enquiry was driven by three 
key assumptions that set the future course of the analytical framework. These were; 
(i) The human agents neither comply nor behave in a rational manner.  
(ii) The organizational members are “Knowledgeable agents” as they are aware of 
their role within the organization and they can express their thoughts actions 
and beliefs. 
(iii) The investigator or researcher is also equally knowledgeable and witty as S/he 
can look beyond the narratives into data patterns and concepts that may be 
difficult for the informants to articulate or conceptualize and the researcher can 
further these patterns into theoretically relevant terms and constructs  (Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton, 2013). 
The first assumption violates the most subscribed supply chain and operations research 
assumption of rational and complying human agents by considering the possibility of 
bounded rationality driven with guile. The second assumption establishes that 
interaction with organizational members can provide a thick and adequate account of a 
respondent’s experience and thus providing legitimacy to an interview based research 
enquiry. The approach of giving voice or recognition to the respondent’s experience in 
the initial stages of data gathering and analysis can provide with rich opportunities to 
conceptualize new concepts and constructs. (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). While 
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the third assumption provides the researcher/ investigator with the liberty to illustrate 
connections, relationships and patterns among emerging construct. 
Driven by the above assumptions and the nascent nature of enquiry it was necessary to 
adopt a research strategy that aligns with the circumstances surrounding this research 
enquiry. A broad taxonomy of research strategies available to an organisational or social 
researcher are; experiments, case studies and surveys (Robson and McCartan, 2016). 
Among these three, case study method is often accepted to be the most appropriate for 
theory building in fields that are yet to attain maturity or research enquiries that seek to 
form deeper conceptualization of a phenomenon (Yin, 1994). For this doctoral research, 
case study research strategy was considered to be the most appropriate and aligned to 
the goals.  
This research proposes to use an exploratory case study to develop theory about micro 
to macro transformational influences associated with events of SCD.  
4.3.4 Sampling criteria 
A purposeful sampling technique was adopted for this study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998; Patton, 2002; Glaser and Strauss, 2009). The conscious choice of a purposeful 
sampling technique over random or theoretical sampling was guided by a will to capture 
diversity of experience, industries and disruptions. Purposive sampling uses a controlled 
degree of variety and similarity among its cases to get a better control of theoretical 
categorization within its cases (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Patton, 2002; Glaser and 
Strauss, 2009) and this informed choice of cases is also beneficial for our study. It was 
considered that although every disruptive event will be idiosyncratic to a context but 
from an agent mechanism viewpoint, despite the diversity similar system patterns and 
agent mechanism will be evident.  
With a motivation to look for presence of similar agent mechanism in diverse case 
settings, a careful choice of firm and participant diversity was desired. A total of 22 
middle managers and senior managers were interviewed from 21 different firms. The 
selected participants represented 15 different industrial sectors, varying degree of 
responsibility, and 6 to 29 years of work experience in both upstream and downstream 
networks. In all there were 167 cases of supply chain disruption were investigated. 
Table 23 represents the details of the sample.  
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Table 23: Description of the sample 
Case 
Marker 
Company  Industrial sector Division/ function Position of Interviewer Mgt level & 
Experience (yrs) 
SCD  
Firm 1 Leading Car manufacturer Automotive Supply chain risk GM Supply Chain and operations Senior (18) 10 
Firm 2 Leading Car manufacturer Automotive Procurement Manager Supply chain and procurement Middle (8) 8 
Firm 3 Global polymer manufacturing & retail  Polymers Sales and distribution Regional Sales Manager Senior (18) 8 
Firm 4 Asia’s leading Semiconductor components 
distribution firm 
Electronics and semiconductors Sales and distribution Country Head Sales and marketing Senior (21) 6 
Firm 5 Countries’ leading Food processing and 
manufacturing  
Food and beverages Procurement Procurement head Senior (14) 12 
Firm 6 Global medical diagnostics manufacturer Speciality chemicals and medical 
diagnostics 
Logistics Logistics manager Middle (7) 7 
Firm 7 international Pharmaceutical firm  Pharmaceuticals Materials management Sr Manager materials management Senior (12) 12 
Firm 8 global manufacturer packaging material and 
equipment 
Packaging materials Purchase Manager Purchase Middle (6) 6 
Firm 9 Petrochemical cracking unit Polymer division Marketing and distribution Sr Manager Marketing Senior (18) 9 
Firm 10 A world leading petrochemical firms Polymer division Marketing and distribution Assistant Vice president  Senior (18) 6 
Firm 11 A world leading petrochemical firms Crude and petroleum Distribution GM Senior (20) 7 
Firm 12 Leading Polyester manufacturer of Asia Polymer  Manufacturing Vice President manufacturing and 
operations 
Senior (25) 4 
Firm 13 Global supply chain consulting firms Manufacturing and operations 
consulting 
Consulting Senior Consultant Supply Chain and 
operations 
Senior (18) 10 
Firm 14  Engineering project installations Engineering projects  Projects Senior Engineering management Senior (16) 5 
Firm 15 Global engineering project installations Engineering projects  Projects Senior Project Manager Senior (20) 6 
Firm 16 Operations consulting firm Consulting consulting Senior Consultant Senior (11) 12 
Firm 17 Nuclear power plant Defence Manufacturing Procurement and vendor 
development 
Senior Manager Procurement and vendor 
development and 
Senior (18) 5 
Firm 18 Leading Shipping Company Shipping logistics Manager Logistics Middle (9) 8 
Firm 19 Global wealth management  Banking and finance Operations Senior Vice president operations Senior (29) 7 
Firm 20 Global food conglomeration firm.   Food Procurement Head Procurement and Supply chain Senior(20) 10 
Firm 21 Public sector aerospace manufacturer Aerospace Procurement Manager Procurement and vendor 
development 
Middle (11) 9 
Firm 22 Medical  equipment manufacturing firm Medical equipment Supply chain and Procurement GM Supply chain Senior (29) 6 
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4.3.5 Unit of analysis 
Events of supply disruptions and variations in material flow were considered as the unit 
of analysis. It is important to understand that events of SCD are embedded in an 
extended network of organizations, relationships, people and processes. Thus, 
organizational actors were asked to discuss these about the people, functions or network 
organizations contributing towards the occurrence of these events. The unit of data 
collection was individual managers from firms within the supply chain network. 
4.3.6 Data collection  
The outcomes of the pilot study had highlighted the effectiveness of the Rep grid based 
data collection tool. The tool was found to be effective in enticing deeper 
conceptualization about SCD events and participants found them to be very interesting 
as it was a first experience with Rep Grids for most of them.  
There was no change made to the data collection tool. A thorough discussion of Rep 
grids has already been presented in the chapter of Pilot study.  
4.3.7 Interview protocol 
A thorough interview protocol was developed, tested in a pilot and then improved to 
ensure that it correctly represents our data collection need, it does not stray from the 
phenomenon of interest, it remains focused on our research enquiry and research 
question, it is thorough enough to be able to account for related phenomenon and 
underlying constructs and finally it avoids interviewers bias by not guiding on leading 
the witness to a desired outcome.  
In line with the recommendations of the grounded theory approach by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), as the research progressed, some minor and subtle revisions were made 
to the protocol, although after a very close evaluation and after extraordinary 
deliberation. Most changes were made to entice the respondent to delve deeper into the 
causes and concerns connected with cases of SCD, particularly in regards to the people 
and processes associated with them. These changes were mostly about the way 
laddering was done during the interview process. Accepting the importance of the 
 91 
insightful and deeper conceptualizations to be revealed in the narratives, the process of 
laddering was extensively used.  
For the purpose of this research, the participants were asked to comment about instances 
of supply chain disruptions experienced by them. It being a systematic interview 
process, the participants were asked to compare three randomly selected events using a 
common question; “How two of these events are similar and different from the third?” 
Table 24  provides details of the interview protocol. 
Table 24: Interview protocol 
Step 
1 
The participant was briefed about the interview process and about key terms such as what could qualify as 
a disruption. Then a permission for digital audio recording of the interview was taken. 
Step 
2 
The participant was then asked to provide a brief description of 6 to 10 events of delay or disruption faced 
by him/her in recent times. The events were given a name tag and were written down on different flag 
cards. 
Step 
3 
The participants were provided a random set of three event flag cards and were asked ; “ How two of these 
events are similar and different from the third?” 
Step 
4 
The dimension of similarity and dissimilarity were documented in a grid format as bipolar constructs. To 
further the understanding about events and the expressed dimensions of similarity and dissimilarity, the 
participants were asked probing questions like why, how , can you elaborate it further etc.  
Step 
5 
Step 3 and 4 were repeated until a conceptual saturation was reached. 
4.3.8 Analytical framework 
Having justified the relevance of a qualitative methodology, it was now important to 
resolve the methodological tension of the theoretical foundation and ontological stance. 
For empirical investigation of mechanisms, critical realism expounds the virtues of 
using retroductive mode of inference (Peirce, 1955; Hanson, 1958; Bhaskar, 1975); 
while the most suited methodology for a qualitative study of nascent organizational 
fields is proposed to be Grounded theory (GT) (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  
A conjugation of both, retroductive logic and grounded theory, is suggested by 
(Kempster and Parry, 2011). This approach that follows a qualitative GT analysis 
following a retroductive logic, often referred as retroductive grounded theory (Kempster 
and Parry, 2011), has proven its utility in the field of leadership and learning (Kempster 
and Parry, 2014) and is deemed fit for the purpose of this research.  
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4.3.8.1 Retroductive grounded theory 
Retroductive reasoning, also sometimes synonymously referred to as abductive 
approach (Shah et al., 2008), is most suited for research enquires that intend to interpret 
or explain observations or a phenomenon using mechanism  from an existing theoretical 
lens (Peirce, 1955; Bhaskar, 1975; Shah et al., 2008), which in perspective of this 
research is CAS theory. Contrary to the hypothesis-deductive research approach, 
retroductive research design engages with an initial theory, in a  creative and iterative 
manner called “Theory matching” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002), to test the efficacy of 
observations and in turn validates or further specifies theories (Poole et al., 2000; Shah 
et al., 2008). To simply put, a retroductive argument suggests a theory that if true will 
render explanatory relevance to any observation or empirical data connected to a 
phenomenon. For the ontological domains where notion of causal powers and 
generative mechanism are the fundamental principles of explanatory approach, like 
critical realism (Sayer, 1992), retroduction research design is unarguably the most 
appropriate approach for postulating causal mechanism linked to a phenomenon. 
Retroductive approach suits the context of this study because the observed complex 
system behaviour of a supply disruption serves as the perfect instance of an observation 
that requires interpretation. And in absence of any known mechanism, retroductive 
research design provides a valid basis to interrogate the phenomenon of SCD using 
existing theoretical framework of CAS theory. 
A retroductive approach, which is a part of the wider realist tradition, encourages an 
iterative and in depth analysis of causal mechanism using a particular context or 
theoretical foundation. Such a postulation of mechanism having explanatory or causal 
influences on observations or events   could be argued to complement the principles of 
grounded theory (GT) research (Kempster, 2006). GT is an apt methodology for 
investigating beliefs and perceptions that underlie action of social actors by 
simultaneously accounting for contexts, human interactions and business processes 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and when used in conjunction with retroductive logic, it can 
help postulate mechanism using qualitative data (Layder, 1990; Sayer, 2000; Volkoff, 
Strong and Elmes, 2007). Often recommended for poorly understood and complex 
social phenomenon, GT succeeds to deliver theoretical explanations about behaviours of 
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actors by providing a thorough account of actions and interaction of individuals and the 
logical and emotional underpinnings of decisions shaping these actions (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).  
A grounded theory based data analysis posits a systematic categorization of data into 
bundles conveying similar ideas (open code), then to creatively evolve these into themes 
relevant to the phenomenon (axial code) and finally provide an overarching theory that 
hold explanatory relevance to the phenomenon (selective code). Although the grounded 
theory analysis based upon open code, selective code and axial code, is most common 
approach in qualitative supply chain research (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008b; Manuj and 
Pohlen, 2012; Gligor and Holcomb, 2013; Thornton, Esper and Morris, 2013), yet this 
thesis proposes to adopts a modified version of it, known as the ‘Gioia methodology’ 
(Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013), that is now been positioned as more robust and 
thorough way of conducting grounded theory based qualitative data analysis (Hannah 
and Robertson, 2015). 
 Elsewhere in organizational research it has been successfully argued that framework of 
grounded theory can be used in conjunction with the retroductive argument to explore 
and reveal causal powers, influences and agent mechanism related to organizational 
phenomenon (Parry, 1998; Kempster, 2006; Kempster and Parry, 2011).  
4.4 Operationalising key constructs 
Accounting for Adaptive Tension Emergence and Self-organization 
Based upon their beliefs, schemas and mental models, agents are continuously making 
choices and decisions about complying or rejecting organizational rules, routines, model 
behaviour etc. The autonomous behaviour of agents adapts and independently evolve 
into new structures and configurations. To reach to or achieve a critical level of adaptive 
tension and to be able to self-organize (Anderson, 1999), the system will require 
sufficient amount of energy to maintain itself at the edge of the chaos. When this energy 
takes the system to this zone of emergent complexity, the system acquires tendencies to 
generate emergent dissipating structures that may appear and dissociate in time to 
consume the excess energy accrued in the system. In an organizational setting it is 
argued that this internal energy required for the system to self-organize or be maintained 
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at the edge of the chaos is generated by the existence of a wide variety of autonomous  
and diverse agents, the imposition of organizational routines and rules governing their 
actions, the coupling between decision rules and processes, prevailing organizational 
structures, conflicting priorities, the requirements related to obtaining formal 
permissions, time pressures and constraints associated with the process, etc (Eisenhardt 
and Sull, 2001; Chiva-Gomez, 2004). Similar to the factors governing autopoiesis in 
chemical reactions, these organizational factors serve conditions assisting the system to 
self-organize or emerge into new structures and forms (Dooley, 1996). 
Mccarthy et al. (2006) have demonstrated in a new product development scenario that 
organizational culture, decision rules and management practices along with pressure 
from the environment influences the system’s ability to self-organize or emerge. The 
authors propose that organizational practices that allow agents to take exploratory or out 
of the box actions, experiment with prevailing routines and rules, break rules etc 
presents with a very high possibility for a system to self-organize or show emergence. 
In an organizational setting, when agents are exposed to both organizational 
expectations and the pressure from the environment, then a CAS framework can help 
explain how diversity of agents, hierarchy in their decision rules, and the mental 
models, mind-sets and   schemas governing behaviours, actions and interactions of 
agents, can aggregate to produce adaptation, self-organization and system level 
emergence. Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001) acknowledge the role of local 
choices over expected norms in generating self-organizing and emergent supply chain 
behaviours. The authors argue that organizations as agents can be driven by self-
interest, can make changes to their organizational goals and can also chose to alter 
processes and structures; all these could bring about emergence and self-organization in 
the whole supply network.  
For the purpose of this thesis we will consider the following as factors that will generate 
adaptive tension. 
i. Agent experimenting with prevailing routines and rules or breaking rules  
ii. Conflict between agent’s personal aspiration and goals with organizational 
values and goals 
iii. Agent behaviours driven by system of agent appraisal and reward 
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iv. High variety of agents associated with tasks 
v. Organisational culture and practices about imposing organizational routines and 
rules 
vi. Management practices governing agent actions 
vii. Organizational, values, structure priorities conflicting with agent aspirations or 
personal goals 
viii. Degree of rigidity in enforcing the requirements related to obtaining formal 
permissions 
ix. Process or task associated time pressures 
Agents characterised by diverse set or organizational and personal targets and 
ambitions, when act using their own set or simple rules to deliver organizational goals, 
can produce outcomes that may be radically diverse and distinct from what the 
organization originally designed, envisaged or planned for. This is a true example of 
self-organization in organizations and will result in emergent processes, structures and 
norms.  It can be said that evidence of supply chain self-organization and emergence 
will be evident from these events that may be considered as equivalent of dissipating 
structures getting generated and dissociated at a high value of adaptive tension.  
i. Change in the structure of the network 
ii. Change in any established process 
iii. Change in agent behaviours  
iv. Change in agent internal models , schemas or mind set 
v. Change in priorities or goals 
Accounting for Resilience and Robustness 
The survey of literature (table 5) is suggestive that a system is considered to be resilient 
if it demonstrates responsiveness, can respond to unexpected events, demonstrates 
ability to quickly regain a desired operational state on being disturbed or has ability to 
survive , adapt and grow in face of disruption. The system is resilient if it maintains 
continuity when faced with disruption and demonstrates control over its structure, 
function and connectedness during such eventualities.  Based upon these formative 
elements of system resilience, the following list is populated that can help isolate 
instances where system demonstrates resilience. 
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i. Preparedness for unexpected 
ii. Effectively respond to disruption  
iii. Quickly recover from an event of disruption  
iv. Quickly return to original system state  
v. Move to a more desirable system state  
vi. Survive a disruption 
vii. Adapt and grow in face of disruption 
While in instances where the system demonstrates ability to preserve functionality 
without reconfiguration, it can be termed as robustness.  
4.5 Data analysis 
With an intention to develop a new theory and to bind it to ongoing practice, this 
research adopts a qualitative case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee, 1993). The 
choice of qualitative study was also driven by a desire to capture livid experience of 
organizational agents relating to their actions, behaviours and mind-sets relevant to 
SCD and also about the circumstances surrounding these events. This thesis follows a 
modified grounded theory qualitative enquiry framework proposed by (Gioia, Corley 
and Hamilton, 2013). This framework adopts the popular inductive qualitative approach 
of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) however it goes beyond that to offer a very scientific method of presenting the 1
st
 
order or second order findings corresponding to axial code, selective codes of the 
grounded theory. The systematic interview data from interviews was subjected to 
retroductive grounded theory based qualitative data analysis. 
Based upon the recommendations of Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) and consistent 
with a critical realist research design, the data analysis was conducted in four phases. 
All along these phases, retroductive logic was been consistently used, in creative and 
iterative manner, to align the results with tenets of complexity theory. 
Analysis Phase 1: Producing a summary of each interview 
The analysis of the data started with a preparation of summaries for each interview. The 
summary was used as an opportunity to elaborate about the respondents role in their 
company and to gain an overarching view on their nature of interaction with cases of 
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SCD. Based upon the recordings, notes taken during the interview and after interview 
comments and feedbacks generated by the interviewer, these summaries attempted to 
position the respondent’s dispositions in the overall objective of the research and also to 
present knowledgeable insights about the respondents perspective and experience. 
These additional summaries to the codded transcripts helped in the qualitative coding 
stage to ground the words and sentences in the overall perspective of the whole 
interview.  
Analysis Phase 2: First order coding 
The first stage of qualitative coding looked for bundles of words, sentences and 
dispositions conveying similar themes or ideas. Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) call 
it 1
st
 order analysis and the process is conceptually similar to the open coding 
framework suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  
This stage of coding deliberately refrains from altering the words or terms used by the 
respondent and it also refrains from converging bundle of ideas into few categories. The 
stage rather prefers to let the number of categories explode into as many as possible 
conceptualizations and meanings about the phenomenon of interest. The stage often is 
accompanied by a feeling of been buried under a heap of data that may initially seem to 
make no sense and the researcher might get a feeling of being lost (Gioia, Corley and 
Hamilton, 2013).  
The themes originating in the first order coding have been preserved and presented in 
the findings along with the other codes. 
Analysis Phase 3: Second order coding  
This stage of codding seeks to develop connections among categories and themes 
identified in the first order codes.  The effort is upon discovering patterns, similarities 
and differences among categories, an approach that is similar to the axial coding step 
proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The bundle of ideas are converged to represent 
a few categories that could be labelled or described by a few sentences, phrases or 
words.  This step of theorising second order themes is the first attempt to structure the 
findings according to the objectives of the enquiry. The retroductive logic is used to 
theory match the emergent themes with existing ideas proposed within the theoretical 
 98 
foundation that is informing the enquiry. This step also calls for accepting the researcher 
as a knowledgeable agent who has adequate authority and capability to conceptualize 
the discrete looking first order themes into meaningful categories relevant to the 
enquiry. Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) call this step as; 
“answering the important question ‘‘What’s going on here?’’ theoretically” 
(Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013: pp20) 
It can be concluded that while developing the second order themes, we are iteratively 
interacting with the governing research phenomenon, theoretical background and the 
ontological perspective. The step is firmly grounded in the theoretical realm of the 
research enquiry as the researcher tries to make sense of events , observations and 
dispositions to describe and explain the phenomenon that one tries to observe or explain 
(Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). 
Analysis Phase 4: Aggregated dimensions and Grounded theory building  
The second order themes are further converged to represent aggregated dimensions of 
the findings. These aggregated dimensions are an overarching view of the cases that 
promises to deliver answer to the research questions. All these themes are presented 
visually in form of a data structure.  
The step of presenting these first order, second order and aggregated themes in form of 
a data structure is the most valuable contribution of the Gioia methodology (Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton, 2013). This format of presenting the qualitative data steps 
provides a process accountability demonstrating how meaning was drawn out of 
narratives. It serves a key criterion of demonstrating rigour in analysis of qualitative 
data and providing an auditable trail of decisions taken by the researcher. The next stage 
of this phase is building theory out of the grounded theory approach. 
The step of theory building was not restricted to the aggregated themes, rather an 
inclusive view on the phenomenon was conceived using the connections and meanings 
of both the second and aggregated themes. With retroductive grounded theory guiding 
the process, the stage of theory building conceived, evaluated and refined ideas 
reflecting the amplification of micros state agent behaviours into macro outcomes of 
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SCD. The iterative implementation of retroductive logic helped conceptualize 
contribution emerging from simultaneous analysis of data, emergent themes and 
theories, and the extant literature. At this stage of theory building, the emerging ideas 
were constantly contrasted with the summaries of the case, second and higher order 
themes and the overarching theory of Complexity. This helped clarify patterns in 
abstract interpretations within the data and paved the way for developing a conceptual 
model that is presented in the chapter of discussion.  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter on research design presented a discussion of the philosophical, 
methodological and analytical choices made and the rational for those choices. After a 
discussion of the ontological stance of complexity an argument was made to adopt a 
critical realist philosophical stance for this thesis. This was followed by a discussion of 
adopting a case based research strategy and a qualitative grounded theory based 
analytical framework. The chapter also presented an argument for adopting a purposive 
sampling criterion and the SCD as a unit of analysis. A summary of the data was also 
presented that accounted for 21 firms, 22 executives and 167 events of SCD.  
The chapter ended with a discussion of the data analysis steps adopted for this thesis. 
The next chapter presents a detailed presentation of the findings. 
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5 FINDINGS   
5.1 Introduction  
Complex system thinking in organization studies promotes a view that microstate 
behaviours and interactions of agents can give rise to adaptive tension which when 
crosses a critical threshold may result into self-organization and system level 
emergence. The analysis of the data was conducted with two objectives; firstly, to look 
for evidence of adaptive tension, self-organization and emergence in a SCD context and 
secondly, to identify agent behaviours that could be argued to have played a mediating 
role in building adaptive tension or creating circumstances for the supply chain network 
to self-organize and emerge into a new state.  
It is widely accepted that agent diversity provides a richness of interaction as guided by 
their individual mental models and schemas, diverse agents act and behave differently 
to similar feedback signals from dynamic and ongoing system conditions. Recognizing 
the importance of context and diversity, we begin this section of findings with a 
discussion of the type of agents involved in these events and the ongoing conditions 
influencing their interactions. This is followed by a discussion of SCD data from an 
aspect of CAS characteristics like adaptive tension, self-organization and emergence.   
5.2 Context and agents involved  
Most of the events discussed by respondents were related to procurement side or 
upstream supply networks and only a few respondents discussed disruptions impacting 
downstream networks. Supplier relations were the most prominent theme followed by 
aspects of internal alignment and cross functional interactions. 
Respondents provided a rich description of the circumstances that led to these 
disruptions and when probed with the standard Rep Grid question of comparing the 
similarities and differences among three random events, the respondents were able to 
provide deeper insights into human aspects of the issues. In most of the cases, it was 
found that the order cycle, from point of requirement generation to the final delivery, 
was in the range of two to three months, which provided a rich data of SCD related 
interactions transpiring among members of the focal firm and other supply chain 
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organizations and stakeholders.  Table 25. provides a detail of context and figure 4 
gives the number of times a particular agent type is mentioned in these interviews. 
Table 25: Context associated with events of supply disruption 
Context Cases that reflect this aspect 
Functions/ Agents involved 
 Procurement 
 Supply chain and logistics 
 Sales/Marketing 
 Design 
 Production and Operations planning 
 Strategy and top management 
 Third party logistics provider (3PL- Truckers and shippers 
 
Nature of procurement 
 Internal 
 External 
Power relationship 
 Buyer power high  
 Supplier power high 
Relationship between participating firms 
 First time purchase 
 Established relationship 
Frequency of purchase 
 Regular buying  
 One off purchase 
Product characteristics 
 New product or service 
 Existing line 
 Complex product or job 
 
 1,3,5,7-11, 19-21 
 2-5, 7-13, 17, 19-21 
 2-7, 11-15, 20 
 5,7,8, 10,14-17,20-21 
 2-9, 16,17, 20-21 
 1-2, 4, 6-13, 15-17, 19-21 
 1, 3, 5-7, 9-13, 16-18, 20 
 
 
 4,6,7 
 1-21 
 
 1-21 
 2,4,6,9,11,14-16 
 
 5-7,14,15,17 
 1-21 
 
 1-21 
 5-7,14,15,17 
 
 5-7,14,15,17, 20,21 
 1-21 
 7,14,15,17,20,21 
 
 
The data revealed the initial and on-going conditions, listed in the table 25, that were 
found to be associated with the investigated cases of supply chain disruptions. The data 
from the 167 instances of SCD revealed 6 important conditions; functions and agent 
involved, the nature of procurement, power relationships, relationships between 
participating firms, frequency of purchase, and product characteristics.  
The histogram in figure 4 presents the percentage of times a particular organizational 
agent gets mentioned in the interview narratives. Since most of the respondents were 
from procurement or supply chain function thus these were mentioned most often. 
However, a very high mention of sales and marketing agents followed by strategy and 
top management and third party logistics providers (3PL) was a surprise. This was 
followed by quality, production planning & control and design functions being 
mentioned in the order of decreasing priority.  
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Figure 4: The ratio of agents mentioned by organizational function 
 
A high ratio of cases being linked to marketing function or 3PL firms could be due to 
the fact that these functions do not share the same priorities and performance measures 
as a supply chain function and thus lack motivation or commitment towards securing 
supply chains against disruption. Participants stated that marketing functions, that 
lacked understanding of the extended network and logistics priorities, put additional 
burdens on supply chains and enhanced the potential for disruption.  Respondents also 
noted that conflicting priorities and differing KPIs were also to be blamed for these 
issues. The respondent in firm 9 said; 
 “So in material planning there are conflicts because everybody has their own KPI.  
The crude Trader will say I will bring in the cheapest crude because that's my KPI. But 
that may not be of use to my refinery because the product Trader would have requested 
for a particular grade of product to get better margin. This is his KPI”.   
The other context associated with these events was the nature of procurement. With 
regards to the nature of procurement, most of these products were sourced from external 
sources except for five events from firm 4, 6 and 7 that had internal or within company 
procurement. The firm 6 and 7 were both pharmaceutical companies from Asia with 
their parent company and most of the production facilities located in Europe; while firm 
4, an electronic components trading firm from Asia, had their consolidation and 
procurement activities based at Singapore. Only a few relationships were found to be 
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disproportionally balanced in power towards the supplier. Apart from one event from 
firm 2, two from firm 5, one from firm 7 and two each from firm 14, 15 and 20 where 
supplier firm was found to be leading the relationship, otherwise for all other cases the 
buying firm commanded a higher power. It is worthwhile to point out that one off 
purchase of highly specialized or high value customized units that were often made to 
order had a very high element of power disparity favouring supplier as the supplier were 
almost certain that there would not be a repeat order or purchase. This element was 
revealed for firms 7, 14, 15 and 20. For firms 7 and 20, the product ordered were long 
working life components or machines for their manufacturing unit, while firms 14 and 
15 which were global leaders in engineering mega project installations faced similar 
issues around ordering high capacity customized engineering equipment 
Product and design complexity also played a significant role in the contexts leading to 
disruption. This aspect was found to be active for firms 5 and 21 belonging to the food 
sector where packaging design and substrate caused disruptions, while complexity of 
job and design in firms 17 and 21 from nuclear and defence industry also contributed to 
disruptions.  
5.3 Adaptive tension: evidence in the data 
Adaptive tension refers to the gradient between actual/operational and planned/expected 
conditions. In an organizational context, a system operating within the range of 
acceptable behaviours and efficiency will signify normal or design operating condition. 
The underlying assumption for achieving such performance is that complying and 
rational human actors will perform their designated tasks with outmost sincerity and 
commitment. However, if action or behaviour of actors starts to conflict with optimal 
system tendencies or centralized decision making, and consequently starts to move 
away from acceptable operating conditions, then the system could be viewed as a 
system accumulating adaptive tension. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, any system 
condition that provides a proof of a departure from expected or design conditions could 
be judged as an indicator of the existence of adaptive tension.  
The interview data was qualitatively coded for elucidating evidence of tensions and 
conflicts between designed system conditions and real operating conditions. Figure 5 
and table 26 presents the findings arranged in first order and second order codes along 
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with exemplary quotations demonstrating proof of departure from normal operating 
conditions. The higher order aggregation of themes originating from the narratives 
indicated of two system conditions that signified a departure from optimal or design 
conditions. These were; increased disruption probability, and an impaired crisis 
management capability.  
5.3.1 System with an increased disruption probability 
The first of the aggregated higher order themes provides details of a system with an 
increased disruption probability. It is obvious that disruption is not a desired outcome of 
an efficient supply chain design. Thus, if the ongoing system conditions affirmatively 
point towards an increased likelihood of an adverse disruptive incident, it could also be 
taken as an evidence of accruing adaptive tension. The data revealed several ongoing 
system conditions that could be argued to increase the disruption probability. These 
included; (i) system conditions supporting ethically deviant and casual work practices, 
(ii) system’s inability to challenge wrong beliefs and assumptions, (iii) prevailing 
condition of a loss of attention, sincerity and sensitivity. 
(i) Prevailing conditions of ethically deviant and casual work practices  
In firms 2,6,7,9,16,18, 20 respondents reported of agents harnessing an apathy and 
undisturbed attitude towards the possibility of SCDs. The respondent from firm 6 
conceded that SCDs were an inevitable reality. In firm 2 the respondent stated that in a 
case of a new product launch where marketing forecast was wrong by more than 200%, 
the top management and marketing people were pushing to expedite procurement to 
make up for the deficit.  
This unwarranted pressure from the top management and a rigid insistence to comply 
could be viewed as an evidence of a growing adaptive tension. This particular incident 
also indicates an unhealthy organizational practice of not considering events of 
accepting high forecasting errors as a deviation or error. High forecast errors were also 
reported by firm 3, 6, 8, 10, 15, 16 and 20. Importantly, respondents reported errors that 
were typically at a granular level of the forecast, such as at stock keeping unit (SKU) or 
seasonal level, which were causing disruptions despite the total volume of forecast 
being tentatively right.  
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Figure 5: Data structure of the 
coding for adaptive tension 
First order concepts 
Ongoing system conditions  
Second order themes 
 Disruption and delays are considered as normal 
operational realities that do not require any 
action 
 False commitment being given without 
considering their repercussion or outcomes 
 Production over prevention 
 No learning from near misses or events 
 Reporting error is neither appreciated nor 
supported 
 Liabilities of success are ignored 
Prevailing conditions of 
ethically deviant and 
casual work practices  
 Wrong belief that suppliers can and will fulfil 
their commitments 
 Rigid mind-sets about one’s own processes or 
decisions resulting in sever operational 
bottlenecks for others 
 Maintain a belief that forecast or planned 
numbers are always wrong whether generated 
by system or furnished by other functions and 
people. 
Inability of the system 
to challenge wrong 
beliefs and assumptions 
 Make careless mistakes in processing 
documentations or following routines 
 Make or change operational plans without 
informing others 
 Habit of not following the defined routines 
 Silo working with severe misalignment among 
functions 
 Make frequent request for expediting 
dispatches, changing volume outlay or making 
purchases 
 Lack of understanding of environmental and 
infrastructure availability 
 Failure to understand what could go wrong 
 Fail to understand that how will ones action 
reflect on others 
Loss of attention,  
sincerity and sensitivity 
towards situations  
 An organizational culture that discourages the 
pursuit of out of the box or innovative solutions 
to a disruption causing situation or event.  
 Dated routines and prevailing culture prevent 
from giving an effective response to crisis as it 
occurs  
 Organizational actors fail to negotiate or 
manage a surprise or a situation not previously 
encountered or thought off 
Unfavourable 
organizational culture 
and routines preventing 
from responding to an 
event of disruption 
 Conventional decision structures and escalation 
of problems through hierarchies  
 Management disregarding important strategy 
recommendations proposed by managers 
closest to the problems 
Fixated to hierarchy 
over knowledge and 
expertise 
 Communication gap widening with multiple 
emails and other forms of communications 
failing to resolve the issue. 
 Forced to visit the supplier location to seek a 
settlement. 
 Lower and middle management rendered 
incapable to resolve an issue and higher 
management or board intervention required. 
 Escalation of anger, frustration and friction. 
Unwilling to resolve 
increased 
disruption 
probability paired 
crisis 
Impaired crisis 
management 
capability 
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Table 26: Illustrative quotations of first -order concepts 
Second order themes First order concepts 
Ongoing system conditions  
firms that conveyed this 
aspect 
Exemplary Quotations 
Prevailing conditions of ethically deviant 
and casual work practices  
SCD events are generated by a casual 
or indifference attitude towards 
failures or potential incidents 
 Disruption and delays are considered as 
normal operational realities that does not 
require any action 
 False commitment being given without 
considering their repercussion or 
outcomes 
 Production over prevention 
 No learning from near misses or events 
 Reporting error is neither appreciated 
nor supported 
 Liabilities of success are ignored 
 2,3,6,7,9,11,15,16,20 
 
 
 3,7,15,16,21 
 
 
 2,3,6,7,9,13,16,20,21 
 2,6,9,11,16,20 
 2,6,7,16 
 
 1,2,6,7,16,18,20  
 firm 6: “The problem is that here a few days delays is considered as normal and is in routine. We don’t 
consider it as a problem at all…Ha Ha Ha....that’s the biggest mind-set issue here.” 
 firm 20: they didn't “understand that, what all went wrong, which can go as a learning in the next project, is I 
think missed out.” 
 firm 7: “it had been running for last 20 years so nobody thought of that some kind of mishaps could happen 
but one fine day it broke down.” 
 firm 15 (A case about purchase of a highly specialized and costly machine): “Well yes we do a supplier 
assessment, but we did not expect such a big multinational company to have a cash crunch. In the agricultural 
piping system, the vendor had delivered this at several other plants and we could not anticipate that he will 
have financial crunch.”  
 firm 2:  “So in the supplies they told us any a times that a certain material was dispatched, its in the pipeline 
and will reach us. But actually these materials were never ever dispatched” 
Inability of the system to challenge 
wrong beliefs and assumptions  
SCD events are generated because 
agents discount or ignore data or and 
fail to question assumptions.  
 Wrong belief that suppliers can and will 
fulfil their commitments 
 Rigid mind-sets about one’s own 
processes or decisions resulting in sever 
operational bottlenecks for others 
 Maintain a belief that forecast or planned 
numbers are always wrong whether 
generated by system or furnished by 
other functions and people. 
 2,5,6,7,9,11,15,18,20,21 
 
 2,6,7,11,13,16 
 
 
 2,6,7,13,16 
 firm 6: “Now China (The Chinese subsidiary of firm 6) has a problem that they only want to work with their 
own registered vendors. So if they have an agreement with DHL or Fedex they will not deal with anyone else. 
If you want them to use your logistics provider, they will not do that. Firstly, there will be a problem to 
register him in the system and then they will not give him the material. And our freight and logistics provider 
are 4 to 5 times cheaper than DHL.   
 firm 20: “ there is actually a document which defines the roll of procurement during specification 
development, It clearly states that if you are in procurement then what you are expected to do during the 
development phase. (mild laugh of sarcasm), you create a document with an intent that this is the way to do it 
but no one follows”  
 firm 7: “Our quality team strictly said a no that we cannot use this material as the purity of chlorine was some 
ppm more. Then I looked into what product it goes and what are the customer’s requirement. I called the 
customer technical and R&D and asked them how much chlorine is permissible in their product and they said 
that 500 ppm was their limit. I laughed; we were originally supplying 75 ppm chlorine and the alternative 
product was having 100 ppm chlorine but both were way below than the customer’s permissible level. I told 
my testing that next time match the products with customer’s requirement as well” 
 firm 16: I am not sure about the legacy but supply chain people knew that these (marketing) guys are over 
forecasting so they will always undersupply and these marketing guys knew that the supply chain will always 
undersupply so they will always over forecast. So there were always second guessing going on forecasts and 
in most cases they would end up trying to improve the product availability at the 11th hour. The firefighting 
would start and then warehousing, transport and all the other cost will go very high. 
Loss of attention,  sincerity and 
sensitivity towards situations such that 
happening and what can it lead to  
 Make careless mistakes in processing 
documentations or following routines 
 Make or change operational plans 
without informing others 
 Habit of not following the defined 
routines 
 Silo working with severe misalignment 
among functions 
 Make frequent request for expediting 
dispatches, changing volume outlay or 
 3,6-8,15,16 
 
 
 2,5,6,8,11,20  
 
 6,14,16,20 
 
 2,6,7,11,14,16,20 
 2,3,6,7,16 
 
 firm 14:  So initially we did the design and sent these designs to the vendor for fabrication. It was a vacuum 
line and the vendor fabricated the line as per our design. But once we installed the exchanger and started 
routing the piping from the exchanger to the vacuum system we realized that there was one concrete column 
in the route.  This column obstructed the routing and there was a requirement to have a change on the routing.  
It resulted in revising the routing and it was a tough time for us to determine how to take that kind of 
modification in the design. …. In this event the step of checking the original site was missed. Routine were 
not followed. 
 firm 2 (Commenting on design function): “so they do not consider the supply chain impact of the 
design…….supply chain issues are not clearly put up and also they should have global backups for those 
designs and products but whenever there is a shortage we're not able to procure those parts because they are 
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making purchases 
 Lack of understanding of environmental 
and infrastructure availability 
 Failure to understand what could go 
wrong 
 Fail to understand that how will ones 
action reflect on others 
 
 1,9,18,20 
 
 1,2,5,6,7,14,16,18,20 
 
 2,5,6,7,11,16,20 
unique to a product.” 
 firm 18: In most of the places the process of pest control fumigation in containers is very long. Actually, here 
they don't do it properly. They just give you the certificate. If done properly fumigation will cost 10 to £15 but 
you can get a fake certificate for just £1 
 firm 5:  (i) and unfortunatey when we changed the specs of the size of our packing material our packing 
material supplier did not have raw film in that specification so , he was carrying a different base material  
(ii)“when we were changing the flavour that we used in our products as ingredients we did not realize that our 
2nd and the 3rd tier supplier of the supply chain were unable to supply us the required quantities because they 
didn’t foresee these things.” 
 firm 20: “unfortunately when we changed the specs of the size of our packing material our packing material 
supplier did not have raw film in that specification  
Unfavourable organizational culture and 
routines preventing from responding to 
an event of disruption 
 SCD are triggered when agents 
lack the knowledge, skills, 
experience or authority or 
resources to contain disruptive 
events 
 An organizational culture that 
discourages the pursuit of out of the box 
or innovative solutions to a disruption 
causing situation or event.  
 Dated routines and prevailing culture 
prevent from giving an effective 
response to crisis as it occurs  
 Organizational actors fail to negotiate or 
manage a surprise or a situation not 
previously encountered or thought off 
 2,6,7,9,11,16, 19 
 
 
 
 2,6,7,16 
 
 
 1,3,5,7,14,15,16,17,20,21 
 firm 7: (Case about a long standing supplier supplying inferior components with wrong test certificates 
resulting in frequent disruptions): “In a work internals senior management meetings, I suggested to send it 
for third party testing and and people discourage me by saying that we don't have approval for third party 
testing we don't have a purchase order for third party testing we cannot send it.  So what I did, I paid from my 
own pocket and sent one materials for testing. You will not believe that the component was stainless steel 202 
which is one of the cheapest grade and not the 304 which we were being billed for.” 
 firm 16:  Now on the S&OP , the second guessing on the forecast by everyone was leading to severe 
confusion. So the correct facts were not coming. It was such a political situation that no one was meeting or 
discussing among them. Everyone was busy guessing so there were always two numbers; one that was being 
discussed or told to them and one that they actually thought was correct and worked or used for their planning 
etc 
 firm 17 (Discussing of a crucial and costly nuclear grade material being stolen from the vendor’s 
premise): “In that case of theft, the company could have taken some sort of insurance so that they could have 
protected themselves from these unforeseen contingencies.” 
Fixated to hierarchy over knowledge and 
expertise 
SCD are triggered when the agents 
with greatest expertise who are closest 
to the problem do not make critical 
decisions and take action.  
  
 Conventional decision structures and 
escalation of problems through 
hierarchies  
 Management disregarding important 
strategy recommendations proposed by 
managers closest to the problems. 
 
 2,4,6,7,11,16, 20, 21 
 
 
 2,6,7,16 
 
 
 firm 4: “if it (Purchase orders in Singapore) is high value then it specially goes for approval to a senior level 
person of management. Over there it could take 1 day or even 3 months, if the person is not there or is on a 
holiday.  In Singapore for higher value PO , our buyers have a process that only the top management can sign 
it and that is a process delay.” 
 firm 9: The economics of the refinery business is very clear it would always be the traders and businessmen 
who make the call. They will always think about how to make more margins and they will least care about 
disruptions in the supply chain. 
 firm 16:  We also realized that strategy people like the directors had no sense or understanding of the 
numbers and data and about the complexity of the supply chain. 
 Unwilling to resolve  Communication gap widening with 
multiple emails and other forms of 
communications failing to resolve the 
issue. 
 Forced to visit the supplier location to 
seek a settlement. 
 Lower and middle management rendered 
incapable to resolve an issue and higher 
management or board intervention 
required. 
 Escalation of anger, frustration and 
friction 
  firm 15: Finally after a lot of discussion we involved our German counterpart 
 
 firm 15: Then of course there were a lot of heated discussions 
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There was another potentially harmful set of conditions that were gaining frequent 
acceptability among organizational agents. It related to giving false or incorrect 
information, commitment or excuses. In firm 15 SCD was generated by misleading 
commitments made by agents.  The respondent stated  
“the problem was the mentality that the sales team carry.  They thought that they could 
take an order for the sake of securing an order and then change the specifications later 
on. It was basically a wrong commitment. They probably knew at the time of taking the 
order that they cannot deliver this product.”  
Similarly, the informant in firm 6 revealed that operational hurdles were created in 
procurement and dispatch processes due to unrealistic commitments made by their 
company’s marketing team. Respondents in firms 2, 7 and 9 also shared related issues 
about representatives of supplier firms indulging in ethically deviant practices.  
In several cases it was obvious that misleading commitments and unfair or opportunistic 
behaviours of suppliers were a source of growing confrontation in buyer supplier 
relationships. The loss of trust and growing impatience waiting for things to improve, 
were adding to the tension in the relationship and the system.  
There were numerous cases linked to casual and careless work practices. For example, 
firms 18 and 20 accepted an ongoing practice regarding careless handling of 
consignments. Where in firm 18, a shipping liner, accepted that many a times the 
mandatory pest control fumigation of shipping containers was not performed as per the 
legal requirements, whereas in firm 20, moisture sensitive consignments such as sugar, 
corrugate boxes etc, were being regularly transported in inappropriate weather proof 
trucks. The results of these activities would occasionally result in consignments being 
damaged and triggering disruptions. Sharing his final thoughts about these occurrences, 
executive from firm 20 stated; 
“In case of box, the rainfall happened and the tarpaulin was not properly secured and 
hence it became wet. In case of sugar similar issue, it was coming in a truck which was 
not sealed properly so the sacks of sugar got moisture. The rainy season was just 
starting and they were not aware that the rainfall will happen on that particular day.” 
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Another aspect of deviant and casual work practices is of indulging in production over 
prevention by accepting success of past being a proof of success in future. Several 
SCDs were triggered by agents who were focused more on past success rather than the 
possibility of future failure. In a case related to firm 7, the procurement team had 
become preoccupied with production rather than prevention as they had been ignoring a 
looming issue about a severe process bottleneck related to their most important raw 
material. The incident relates to the procurement of molten sulphur for their fertilizer 
manufacturing unit. For years, a daily routine of the procurement team at firm 7 was to 
push hard for the dispatch of their daily requirement of two tankers of molten sulphur, 
no matter what. This product proved to be a bottleneck because firstly it was being 
produced as a by-product only by this particular supplier firm and that too in a quantity 
significantly lower than its local demand, and secondly molten sulphur had additional 
handling requirement regarding maintaining a high temperature across the supply chain, 
negating the possibility to either source it from far or keep a high stock in heated tanks. 
But since it was getting almost managed by a very thorough but difficult follow-up 
routine, they had been ignoring adverse possibilities. Executive from firm 7 noted;  
“literally my schedule every morning was to get up and call the Transporter, very early 
in the morning, to follow up that are my sulphur trucks available for pick up or is there 
any problem. Then before leaving for work actually while starting my car, I will call 
again.”  
Being so preoccupied with this not so healthy material procurement routines; firm 7 had 
almost started to trust the inevitability of this flawed approach that required constant 
persuasion and follow-up. Firm 7 failed to accept every day as a near miss scenario that 
was waiting for a disruption to unfold. This disruption eventually happened. Some 
changes in the market disturbed the fine balance of the demand and supply and the 
supplier firm chose to give priority to some other firm over firm 7. Firm 7 had no 
bargaining or leverage position on this key raw material and thus flowed practice of 
follow-up did not help them in any manner. They should have taken some corrective 
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action before. Firm 7 executive revealed the corrective action
1
 that resolved this 
situation.  
Another organizational practice that could be termed as careless or casual work practice 
relates to organizational members abstaining from sharing insightful information with 
other stakeholders. In a case reported by the respondent of firm 21, the organizational 
practice of not sharing crucial technical and design information with suppliers often 
resulted in suppliers incurring heavy losses and the firm 21 facing disruptions. The 
respondent narrated that in their aerospace industry there is a very stringent quality 
requirements and it would require a very high technical competency for the suppliers to 
profitably deliver their goods. The interviewee noted that due to the prevailing practices 
in their firm, an inexperienced small supplier is not provided with sufficient technical 
support to fulfil a highly complex job and when they fail, being small suppliers with 
relatively low financial stability, the penalty clause of contracts often put them out of 
business. This is a very disturbing supply chain condition that promotes the likelihood 
of disruption, as despite being aware of a possible supplier failure, the focal firm is 
reluctant to support their suppliers.  
(ii) Inability of the system to challenge wrong beliefs and assumptions  
The likelihood of disruption was also amplified when agents simplified interpretations 
and made his own misplaced beliefs and assumptions leading to conditions deviating 
from normal operations.  For example, in firm 1, the organization failed to make sense 
of an impending diplomatic crisis between China and Japan that led to a major 
disruption. Recollecting the incident, a firm 1 executive stated; 
 “ I mean everybody knew that this is happening but we had not talked about it from a 
perspective of that it would impact our business” because agents had convinced 
themselves that “it would predominantly be diplomatic in nature”.  
 Another most common wrong belief harnessed by organizational agents was regarding 
their understanding of the lead times in the extended supply chain network. In some of 
the SCD events connected to new products being launched by firms 5, 7 and 20, the 
                                                 
1
 The corrective action is discussed in 5.3.4  
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production, planning and design teams omitted to factor in the material procurement 
lead times required by their suppliers.  The respondent of firm 20 narrated an incident 
connected to this; 
“A new product is getting developed and suddenly you realize that the lead time 
required by the supplier, to buy his products, have not been factored anywhere.  You 
are almost on 60 days of material ordering and you ask the supplier that I need this 
material and the supplier says..well my lead time is 90 days, because I have to put a 
material in this which I have to import from some where else. I can not deliver you this 
material in 60 days, you never told me that you needed the material that soon.” 
(iii) Loss of attention, sincerity and sensitivity 
The likelihood of a disruptive event is also amplified by system conditions where 
organizational members lose attention, sincerity or sensitivity towards ongoing 
operations. For example quite a few cases of SCD in firms 2, 6, 7, 11, 16 and 20 were 
created by insensitivity to operations.   Most of these cases were linked to incorrect 
processing of import, export or transport documentation. For example, a lack of 
attention and sensitivity in the part of one of their offshore supplier, firm 6 experienced 
a significantly costly and long lasting delay in importing a large consignment of drugs. 
The incident relates to a consignment being sent by one of firm 6’s supplier with 
incorrect labels, resulting in the consignment being detained at the port and eventually 
being sent back to the origin for re-labelling, incurring increased costs.  Further cost 
was also incurred in expediting a replacement consignment using airfreight.  
In another case linked to a supplier sending incorrect label or documentation, firm 15 
faced a critical disruption on a heavy machinery equipment that they purchased from a 
European firm to use in a chemical plant installation in Asia. The firm 15’s respondent 
narrated that despite having drafted a very detailed and clear purchase order document, 
with multiple mandatory checks and safeguards, it could only have been a severe loss of 
sensitivity that could have prompted this mistake to be committed by the supplier.  
There were a few more incidents around incorrect entries in ERP (firm 4) or excel 
sheets (firms 13 and 16) that could be argued as cases of a loss in operational sensitivity 
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and attention. Across all cases there were erosion of multiple barriers to disruption (e.g. 
procedures, training etc.) that later amplify to generate SCD. 
5.3.2 Loss in the system’s ability to manage or respond to disruption 
Adaptive tension takes the system to a different energy state than its original design or 
previous operating condition. Thus, if a system is demonstrating inferior or suboptimal 
traits in comparison to its original design, the system is under an adaptive gradient.  
Since supply networks are designed for robustness and continued performance, with 
operational and strategic safeguards ensuring the system to have a certain level of 
ability to respond or manage disruptions; thus, if the system demonstrates a loss in its 
ability to manage or respond to adverse events, it is an anomaly. A supply chain system 
that evidences a loss in its ability to respond to adverse events could be judged as a 
system under adaptive gradient. The analysis of metadata presented with evidence of 
multiple instances where the system was found to have developed tendencies that 
impaired its ability to manage or respond to disruptive events, indicating the presence of 
adaptive tension. These instances included; (i) evidence of unfavourable organizational 
culture, (ii) organizational actors being fixated to organizational hierarchy over 
expertise or knowledge and (iii) unwillingness of organizational actors to resolve 
contagious issues.  
(i) Unfavourable organizational culture and routines 
Organizational culture was found to be intervening with the network’s ability to handle 
disruptions and causing the system to go on an adaptive tension gradient. Among the 
elements of unfavourable culture, member’s commitment to resilience was an important 
one. In firms 19, 20 and 21, some of the SCDs were caused by a lack of commitment to 
resilience, particularly incorrect supplier/vendor assessments that initiated problems.  
Firm 19 recounted losing a vendor firm providing critical operational support. Firm 20 
and 21 also faced multiple issues with vendors failing to deliver desired quantity or 
quality as they had erred in the vendor assessment phase. The respondent from firm 20 
argued that despite being mandatory in standard operating procedures, the failure to 
involve procurement in the design phase sometimes led to SCDs. Similarly, in firm 14 
groups that were critical to auditing the safety performance of their mega manufacturing 
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installations were not included early enough leading to problems being identified too 
late in the process and resulting in severe disruptions.  The respondent from firm 21, an 
aerospace manufacturer, accepted that they often left the suppliers to manage technical 
difficulties on their own, providing them with just the bare minimum technical 
drawings, data sheets and specifications. In the absence of technical knowhow, the 
suppliers are susceptible to fail and incur heavy monetary penalties. All these events are 
indicative of a prevailing culture with a lack in commitment towards resilience was 
interfering with the organization’s ability to respond or manage disruptions. 
Other cases linked to firms 2, 6, 7, 8,18 and 20 demonstrated lack of commitment to 
resilience, as individual and groups lost the ability to adapt and cope with disruptions. 
Problems, such as forecasting errors, were handled by putting additional pressure on the 
logistics and supply chain function rather than resolving the root cause of the problems.  
Respondents also reported a failure to learn from experience. For example, the 
interviewee in firm 20 stated; 
 “Mistakes that you make in one project, you are not able to replicates those learning 
on other projects. It happens most of the time that post project failure learnings are not 
captured appropriately”  
(ii) Fixated to hierarchy  
Ability to manage disruption was also impaired by an approach that gave more 
emphasis to organizational hierarchy over knowledge or expertise. The data suggests 
that many events of SCDs were triggered by failure to defer to expertise. Centralized 
and hierarchal decision making led to events of disruption in firms 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
and 16.  Respondents argued that during disruptions those with the most expertise were 
not empowered to act quickly, instead problems are escalated through formal 
hierarchies resulting in delays and inaction. For example, an experienced manager from 
firm 2 shared his dismay that decision makers were reluctant to understand the problems 
he was facing 
 “every product is not fit for lean (Lean supply chain strategy) but the company is not 
willing to listen ”.  
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(iii) Unwilling to resolve 
Another element of a firm’s impaired disruption management capability was the callous 
apathy of organizational agents towards finding amicable solutions to ongoing 
problems. This too was adding to the growing adaptive tension. 
Driven by ego and personality conflicts, people were sometimes reluctant or unwilling 
to resolve disputes and address problems. Executives from firms 2, 6, 7 and 15, shared 
information around multiple cases with these kind of traits being evident between 
buying and supplying firms. Firm 15 faced multiple SCD where their tier 1 suppliers did 
not appropriately respond to the queries and concerns raised by firm 15 about their 
orders which were getting delayed. The executive of firm 15 disclosed that on numerous 
occasions they were compelled to send a team of negotiators to the supplier’s plant, 
often in different continents, to seek an amicable solution. Sometimes, the suppliers 
would delay the issues for so long that a higher managerial intervention would be 
required to resolve.  Similar issues were also reported by firm 2 and 7, where lingering 
issues of disruption were not addresses due to personality or ego related conflicts. 
Commenting on unwillingness of people to resolve issues, executive of firm 7 said; 
“There was a high level of unwillingness to adopt. There were many issues related to 
ego. In an organizational context ego plays a very major role. Every function every 
person has a very high ego.” 
Microstate agent behaviour and adaptive tension 
Having established evidence of adaptive tension, the qualitative data was further 
analysed to identify individual behaviours contributing towards adaptive tension. The 
analysis was driven by the tenets of the critical realist ontology that organizational 
members as observers can comment on some but not all aspects of the phenomenon and 
there are underlying mechanisms governing the causality. Adaptive tension formed by 
agent behaviours is a precursor of emergence and thus the findings try and 
conceptualize aggregated themes of agent behaviours and mind-sets that can be linked 
to the formation of adaptive tension in the organization. Findings from a three stage 
grounded theory based qualitative analysis, based upon Gioia methodology, are listed in 
table 23. Mind-sets are depicted with (M). One theme, ‘Lose trust in the organization’, 
was judged as a mind-set , while four aggregated themes;(i) over ambitious pursuit, (ii) 
use power and privilege to force one’s own agenda, (iii) conspiring against acceptable 
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best practices and  (iv) heedless performance, pointed towards behavioural aspects of 
agents 
5.3.3 A gradual loss of trust in organization 
An analysis of interview narratives for agent actions and behaviours revealed a set of 
moods and sentiments related to events of SCD. Buried under the description of SCD 
were a set of feelings, mental models and mindsets of the agent which were found to be 
exasperating the occurrence and severity of disruptions. The bundle of ideas related to 
these sentiments and feelings were aggregated into a higher order themes; a gradual loss 
of trust in the organization or its members.  
One of the major themes informing the accumulation of adaptive tension was a growing 
mistrust in the organizations functioning. The aggregated meaning emerging from some 
of the dispositions was that agents had accumulated a general sense of resignation and 
helplessness to the ongoing situations and state of affairs over which they felt they had 
little control or authority to change. In the findings, a growing feeling of mistrust 
towards the organization was been driven by three organizational aspects; (i) a 
displeasure among organizational actors for being unfairly treated by the organization, 
(ii) a feeling that one’s advice or expertise are neither sought nor valued, and (iii) 
organizational members having a growing mistrust towards other function and people.  
(i) Displeased about unfair treatment 
Many respondents shared that supply chain and procurement function was pushed to 
accommodate the mistakes and blunders made by other functions. Repeated and regular 
errors in forecasting always kept the procurement and supply chain function 
preoccupied with constant firefighting. The respondents felt that most of the time and 
energy of supply chain executives was being spent on coordinating and covering-up for 
errors and gaps in sales and operations planning. Firms 2, 6, 7 8, 11, 13 ,16 reported 
encountering regular disruptions due to inaccurate and unscientific forecasting by 
marketing function. Commenting upon poor forecasting, the respondent from firm 13 
stated; 
“actually when forecasting at SKU level, the sales team just keys in numbers without 
giving it much scientific thought. They will look at the total volume and would start 
keying in numbers arbitrarily to forecast the SKUs..put 5 there 10  here an so on.” 
.
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Table 27: Agent behaviour and adaptive tension 
First order constructs 
Agent behaviours and beliefs 
Second order themes Aggregated themes 
 (M) Supply chain function is always forced and  suppressed 
 (M) You have to bear the burden of others mistakes 
Displeased about 
unfair treatment 
(M) Lose trust in the 
organization 
 (M)Convinced that top management does not appropriately understand your 
problems or constraints 
 (M)You know the solution to the problem but no one is listing 
 Displeased that 
knowledge and 
expertise are not 
valued 
 Reject forecast numbers provided by others and work with own numbers 
 (M) Believe that your production and sales forecast is better than others. 
 Believe that others provide false and inflated forecast. 
 Distrustful towards 
other functions and 
people 
   
 Adopt an exploratory strategy 
 Present a novel solution 
 Bend the rules to do the right thing 
Out of the box thinking Over ambitious 
pursuit 
 Take more ownership of a process than you are expected. 
 Do not hesitate to invest personal money or resource to pursue organizational 
issues and also to prove ones point. 
Go an extra mile 
   
  
 Top management unwilling to consider alternative solutions to problems 
 Blindly follow  incorrect dated procedures and routines ( Incorrect ERP forecast 
religiously  
 Fixated to a process, solution or a product with no supporting logic. 
 Inflexible to address concerns of other functions 
 Rigid processes or relationship preferences 
Denial of problem or 
expertise  
 
Use power and 
privilege to force 
one’s own agenda 
 Force decisions on others with a use of inconsiderate authority and lack of 
compassion for how  will it impact other organizational members and functions 
 Top management pushing for  unrealistic targets  
 Dictate the procurement function to support an unplanned high volume despite a 
possibility of  it triggering disruptions on other product lines. 
 Regularly insist on processing off the working hour dispatches ( mid nights)  to 
assuage personal relationships with some selected suppliers 
 Compel to expedite dispatches without considering its impact on others 
Distasteful 
enforcement and 
disparate treatment 
   
 Give genuine sounding excuses for production or dispatch delays when the truth 
is something else.  
 Agents accept and commit to orders that they know they cannot manufacture 
either due to a lack of resources (spare capacity, finance or material or technical 
capability 
 Lie about material being dispatched when it has not 
 Commit to unrealistic delivery dates or schedules  
 Furnish incorrect test certificates for materials or processes 
 Agents  hide crucial information about  constraints in their spare capacity or 
financial capability to handle a given order 
Dishonest demeanour Conspiring against 
acceptable best 
practices 
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 Agents demonstrate favouritisms for some relationships, people or customers 
 Agents demonstrate favouritisms for some relationships, people or customers 
 Reject or ignore the process and necessity to collaborate or work  with other 
organization agents and functions 
 Habitual to violate  laid down process guidelines and written procedures. 
 
Disregard process 
 Agents consciously force the supply chain into disruption for the  purpose of 
making more profits as the profit they make is linked to their KPIs and appraisals 
(this is specific to petrochemical industry trading function and is appreciated and 
rewarded with associated performance bonus) 
 Agents indulge withy activities that may be improving their individual or their 
group’s KPI despite knowing it would impact organization adversely 
 Monopolistic opportunism 
 Cartel formation 
 Unethical and incorrect practices and attitudes 
 To maximise their profits and improve their bottom line some suppliers take 
decisions, with no empathy for their customers, causing disruptions in their 
customer supply chains 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
 Give genuine sounding excuses for production or dispatch delays when the truth 
is something else 
 Agents accept and commit to orders that they know they cannot manufacture 
either due to a lack of resources (spare capacity, finance or material or technical 
capability 
Dishonour a 
commitment  
   
 Functions and individual agents plan actions or make changes in isolation without 
discussing or informing other functions or agents.  
 Take a conflicting path with your peers and contest very hard to secure ones 
local, functional or team interests.  
 Avoid discussing common issues with others 
 Reject possibility to coordinate 
 
Frame narrow 
boundaries of  success 
and team working 
Heedless 
performance 
 Agents demonstrate carelessness or lack of attention in processing dispatch 
documentations. 
 Careless mistakes in material handling 
 Careless mistakes in crucial excel sheets and data 
Careless mistake   
 Lack of understanding about lead times in the extended supply chains 
 Failed to conceptualize the impact of design and specification changes on the 
overall supply chain 
 Fail to foresee the possibility of a failure and how would it impact the operations 
Lack of vigour to do it 
right 
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In most of these cases of inaccurate forecasting, the respondents also disclosed that 
supply chain function was always under constant pressure to do what so ever it will take 
to resolve such situations. Referring to cases of disruptions triggered by inaccurate or 
particularly under forecast, firm 2 executive stated, 
“there is always a pressure from the management side and from the internal that please 
find alternative solutions.” 
Recounting the headache and operational problems originating from such matters, firm 
6 executive stated, 
“The trouble with supply chain problems in India is that although at the end everything 
gets managed but the kind of pain it takes the energy that is spent, actually it should not 
be 1 % of it.”  
Executive of firm 3 also recognized the burden of this last moment firefighting. 
Commenting on all the disruption events that the respondent discussed, the firm 3 
executive stated  
“Everything, 99% is coordination. All the cards of events that you have made is 99% 
about coordination.” 
Reluctantly, supply chain and procurement function had accepted this fact that 
irrespective of blunders and errors done by other functions, the aim of supply chain is to 
go on delivering without asking for rewards or recognition. A fact that they were not 
happy about.  A statement that summarises the deep seeded feelings of the supply chain 
personals came from firm 6. The respondent stated, 
“The major problem is that we (supply chain function) have to keep the customer 
happy, keep the vendors also happy, internal company issues are also to be sorted out 
like tax related , forecast, sales forecast are not proper, but material has to be 
fulfilled.” 
(ii) Displeased that knowledge and expertise are not valued 
The procurement and supply chain function were also displeased about the fact that the 
top management had an apathetic disdain towards supply chain issues. This was 
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effecting the moral and mindset of supply chain executives and was resulting in a 
escalation of adaptive tension. Many respondents recounted that the operational 
constraints of the function were neither understood nor addressed. Firm 2 recounted an 
incident related to a supply issue that had been ongoing for years. This related to the 
aftersales and spares market segment where a range of products was having frequent 
disruptions. Sharing his displeasure, the respondent conveyed that top management was 
compelling the supply chain function to adhere to a lean inventory model while this 
product with a high degree of demand variability and seasonality was not fit for this 
approach.  But the top management was rigidly insistent on pursuing a ubiquitous 
strategy of lean supply chain management. In words of the firm 2 respondent 
“every product is not fit for lean but the company is not willing to listen we had a long 
discussion where we proposed that let us put up an external warehouse and stock these 
clutches (A suggestion that was denied)”.  
Firm 7 executive also disclosed facing hurdles from other functions and management 
over exercising alternatives solutions that could resolve ongoing issues. Firm 16 
executive also reported facing rigidity and stubbornness from top management 
executives to accept what he perceived to be the most logical solutions.  
(iii) Distrustful towards other functions and people 
A common pattern observed over multiple cases was that there was a brewing sense of 
mistrust among organizational functions. The activity of production planning and sales 
forecast was found to be flawed by elements of mistrust. In many cases it was reported 
that marketing people had a belief that planning and supply chain function would 
always supply less than what they would demand and so to upset this possibility they 
would inflate their numbers by an arbitrary value. However, operations and supply 
chain people were aware of this manipulation and thus would further manipulate and 
undersupply. This manipulation of forecast, what the respondent from firm 16 termed as 
second guessing and respondent from firm 13 called it a smartness of supply chain 
function, was having a significant impact on the on-shelf availability and was causing 
frequent disruptions. Summarising the situation firm 16 respondent stated; 
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“Everyone was busy guessing so there were always two numbers; one that was being 
discussed or told to them and one that they actually thought was correct and worked or 
used for their planning etc. They were not trusting each other and this is why lot of 
second guessing was happening. They did not trust others numbers and they had their 
own mandates and numbers that they were planning for.” 
Citing the lack of trust between the procurement or logistics function and the marketing 
function, the respondent from firm 13 stated; 
“So suppose the demand is forecasted by marketing people about various SKU and is 
given three months in advance but the procurement guy is smart and will say that this 
quantity will not be sold so will not order all the material. So procurement changes the 
marketing forecast based upon there understanding and they say that we know you 
would not be able to sell this much you have inflated the forecast” 
This behaviour of not accepting the marketing forecast numbers by procurement or 
supply chain function and instead working with their own scaled down numbers is a 
very serious behavioural issue. However, what differentiates firm 16 disposition from 
firm 13 is that firm 13 executive approved such a behaviour citing that performance of 
marketing people is at the core of this issue. The respondent said that production 
numbers and forecast by marketing function have been highly inaccurate that has made 
them lose their credibility and trust of other functions. The proof of the claim can be 
found in these words of the respondent from firm 13; 
“See I have seen it forecasting accuracy is very poor, in 50% cases it is inaccurate. If 
you look at the SKU level forecast then there is even greater error in it. In 
petrochemical industry this is very high.” 
5.3.4 Over ambitious pursuit 
Events of disruption and conditions leading to them also presented with opportunities to 
tackle or manage them. From the narrative of the respondents it was evident that some 
organizational members were highly self-motivated and committed to approach such 
eventualities. This behaviour of considering events of disruptions as a personal 
challenge and acting beyond the normal organizational response or expected job 
responsibilities could be termed as an over ambitious pursue of disruption events. 
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Accompanying themes to this higher order theme of over ambitious pursuit were; (i) out 
of box thinking, (ii) going an extra mile.  
(i) Out of the box thinking 
Some situations call for innovative and novel approaches to resolve. In the 167 
incidents of supply chain disruption discussed by respondents there were a few events 
that stood out as classical examples for out of box thinking. Respondent of firm 7 
disclose two such events; one related to bargaining a favourable deal with a critical raw 
material supplier and the other related to breaking a logistics firms cartel that was 
pushing for inconsiderate price rise. Both these incidents relate to the same product, 
molten sulphur, which was the main ingredient of firm 7’s fertilizer production unit. 
Since this raw material was produced as a by-product in a petrochemical refinery nearby 
and its output was considerably less than its local demand, firm 7 always had difficulties 
procuring its daily requirement of two truck tankers. An additional handling 
requirement of keeping this raw material in heated vessels and trucks to maintain its 
molten state, was putting additional constraints in stocking this in a high volume or 
buying from locations more than 100 km away.  The supplier for this material followed 
a quota system for allocating material among buyers and sometimes, due to favouritism 
towards certain buying firms, defaulted on its commitment towards firm 7. For firm 7, 
the product had been a critical bottle neck for several years and no one had been able to 
come up with any solution. The firm 7’s respondent said that he adopted an out of the 
box strategy that helped him successfully negotiate favourable terms from the supplier.  
The respondent enquired about portfolio of products his parent company was buying 
from the supplying firms at other geographical locations. Then using a combined buying 
portfolio as a tool of negotiation, he was able to strike a favourable volume commitment 
from the supplier which was negotiated at the company level and was able to upset 
relational favouritism practiced by the local team of the supplying firm. Narrating the 
incident firm 7 executive said; 
“We were also buying propylene from the same company but at a different refinery. 
That was bought for our other manufacturing unit. So I met my counterpart from our 
other manufacturing unit and said to him that I have this issue, since our company is 
same, so together we should discuss this. This person was in a senior position to me so I 
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said to him sir please help me in that, so he said no issues let's talk. Then we went back 
to the refinery PCL  and said to them that we will buy this much quantity of propyline, 
that you are asking us to buy but on one condition, you will have to also give to us 900 
tonnes of molten sulphur.” 
Similarly, another issue at firm 7 also relating to molten sulphur was that due to its high 
temperature handling requirement there were only a few transport and logistics firm 
equipped to provide this service. Due to a monopoly, these firms formed a cartel and 
pushed firm 7 for a substantial price hike. Pushed to a corner, the executive of firm 7 
adopted a novel approach of conducting a forward auction and convincing another 
logistics firm to quote a comparatively lower price for the service. Although this other 
firm had no such resource to provide this service yet firm 7’s executive used it as an 
instrument to break the cartel.    Intimidated by the new entrant, the established logistics 
firms accepted a logical price offer and the disruption was resolved.  Since the firm 
quoting the lowest price was not offered a tender, as it was only used as a decoy, firm 
7’s executive disclosed that he had to make a special note and presentation to explain 
this to the management and audit teams.  The respondent quotes; 
“ In my tender allocation document I had to write a note, because officially and 
ethically it was wrong not to award the tender to the lowest quotation, so I had to write 
additional notes and a document followed by a presentation to the managing director 
that this act was a deliberate act to break the cartel.” 
firm 2’s executive also adopted an out of the box strategy to upset an upcoming strike in 
one of the tier 2 suppliers. This particular supplier was a sheet metal component 
manufacturer and the firm 2’s executive recommended a relocation of the complete tool 
set to an alternative location, which was a challenging decision as the tool had a very 
high tonnage and also there was no possibility to run the mandatory trials at the new 
location. Still the transition from one location to the other was achieved smoothly and a 
major disruption was avoided.  Narrating the incident, firm 2’s executive said; 
“After visiting the plant we took an immediate decision of shifting the tools from the 
affected factory to an alternative location. A lot of quick trials were run,  since complete 
endurance full body trials and testing was not possible we discussed with our parent 
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company and the resultant was that within one week we had an alternative location. 
Thus despite the strike we were not affected.” 
More experiences relating to an out of the box approach were also disclosed by some 
other respondents. Firm 11 executive discussed about handling a transit time issues in 
petrochemicals supply chain by adopting a technique what he called was ‘Sale on 
Water’. This was about sailing ships with different raw materials without orders or 
forecast and using the long transit time as an opportunity to create the required demand.  
firm 17 used an innovative costing technique to resolve a disruption. For a product to be 
used in a nuclear plant application there were issues with inability to freeze the design 
and the fluctuations in the international price of the rare metal alloys used in it. These 
factors were demotivating any qualified firm from participating in the tendering process 
and had resulted in an unresolved disruption. The firm 17 executive proposed an 
unconventional tender costing mechanism of £/ kg for this component as this was able 
to overcome later stage changes in the design and also to some extent the fluctuation on 
the raw material.  
(ii) Go an extra mile 
There were a few cases of disruption where, the meaning emerging from the disposition 
of the interviewees indicated that their response to a crisis situation exceeded the 
expected job responsibilities of an individual; for the purpose of this thesis it is named 
as an approach of going an extra mile. In an incident reflecting this theme, the 
respondent of firm 2 went beyond the expected job responsibility of a procurement 
executive to get personally involved in the testing and sample collection process of an 
alternate material to influence the approval process of an alternate supplier. According 
to the respondent of firm 2, the prevailing circumstances had compelled him to do so. 
The procurement team of firm 2 was struggling to get an alternative supplier and 
material approved for a product that had been a critical supply chain bottleneck. As 
disclosed by him, the procurement team was unable to comprehend why the trial runs of 
the most reputed alternative suppliers suggested by the procurement team were failing 
in the quality. The executive disclosed that he suspected foul play. So, to upset the 
possibility of any mischief, the firm 2’s executive went out of the way to personally 
visit the supplier’s warehouse and collect some samples for testing. He also made sure 
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that the testing process in the quality function was being overseen by two members of 
his procurement team. This extra initiative paved the way for the alternative supplier 
getting approved and for resolving a disruption causing bottleneck.  Narrating the 
incident, the firm 2 executive quotes; 
“Frustrated with these testing issues, intentionally, I personally went to the warehouse 
of these batteries with the litmus paper and opened many boxes and personally tested 
these batteries for leaks and then  with a marker marked a few of them  and sent these 
for our internal testing. I did this because if somebody tried to do a foul play it would be 
clearly evident so this is how I got these approved.” 
There were few more incidents connected to firms 6, 7 and 17, that could be regarded as 
typical cases of personal interventions or actions by procurement team that go beyond 
or exceeds their expected organizational responsibilities. In an issue where the executive 
of firm 7 suspected that the supplier was supplying inferior quality goods than what was 
mentioned in the test certificates, the executive requested the management for a third 
party testing of these components. However, when he was denied such an option, due to 
various organizational processes and constraints, he went ahead and paid himself for an 
independent lab test of these components.  Although the lab test validated his suspicion 
that indeed the components were substandard and not as per requirement, yet this act of 
unofficially and without approval sending off components for external testing and 
paying from one’s own pocket for the initiative is beyond the expected working of a 
procurement and supply chain executive.  There were many other incidents linked with 
firm 7 where this executive adopted similar approaches and went an extra mile to pursue 
a problem.  
The procurement teams of firm 6 and 17 also demonstrated these traits of going beyond 
the expected, however their motivations were significantly different than the firm 2 and 
firm 7. Cases disclosed by these two firms were directed towards providing additional 
support to customers or suppliers while firm 2 and 7 cases were more related to upset 
the corrupt or unethical practices that had been interfering with their efficient working. 
 The narratives from firm 6 executives were indicative that in conditions of crisis or 
disruption, the procurement team of firm 6 was willing to put an extra effort, beyond 
their committed job responsibilities, to resolve it. This included sending members of 
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procurement team to personally go in taxis to collect critical goods from suppliers, 
accessing the warehouses in out of the working hours such as in the night time to 
process critical dispatches etc.  
The case of firm 17 related to vendor support. Firm 17 being a nuclear power plant, has 
a very stringent quality and material requirement for its components and this could only 
be achieved when the suppliers are able to follow a very dedicated and committed 
organizational culture of quality. However, in some case, firm 17 realized that although 
the selected vendor for a particular job did possess technical capability yet lacked either 
the required production quality culture or motivation to complete the task. In such 
situations firm 17’s executive accepted to send his team of engineers and quality people 
to work side by side with these vendors and help them achieve their full potential. This 
meant that a sizable number of his executives were relocated to these vendor plants for a 
considerable length of time but this extra effort reaped rich dividends. Discussing a 
particular case where a supplier purposefully quoted a very low price to engage his idle 
work force and soon lost motivation as they got other more profit making contracts, 
firm 17’s executive disclosed that they did understand the difficulties faced by the 
supplier and also understood his initial motivation to quote a low loss making price for 
this multimillion £ contract. firm 17’s took an initiative to go beyond the expected to 
keep their supplier motivated by ensuring that the supplier make at least some profits 
and successfully delivers the job. In the words of firm 17’s executive; 
“We understood that it would be a loss making job for them so we posted our quality 
assurance teams over there and by expediting our quality assurance process and 
reducing their rejections and processing their payments early we ensured that they 
could make some profit.” 
This is a very peculiar case of vendor support as nuclear power plants with outsourced 
manufacturing contracts in multi millions have different circumstances than other 
manufacturing firms. 
5.3.5 Use power and privilege to force one’s own agenda  
Agents at a privileged power positions were found to be enforcing their own agendas 
and priorities and these behaviours were leading to adaptive tension. The accompanying 
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second order themes to this behaviour are; (i) denial of problem or expertise, (ii) 
distasteful enforcement and disparate treatment.  
(i) Denial of problem or expertise 
Some organizational actor’s behaviour was reported to be at a constant mode of denial 
about disruptions and delays being triggered by their actions. These actors and 
organizational functions were reluctant to introspect their actions or were blatantly 
inflexible to adjust to changing and evolving process needs, thus often contributing to 
triggering disruptions. Organizational members, particularly top management and 
design function were found to disregard the expertise and suggestions of the people 
closer to the problem contributing to adaptive tension. 
Many of the respondents, belonging to the procurement or supply chain function, 
conveyed their displeasure about the fact that their advice or suggestions were neither 
valued nor followed by the management and other organizational functions. Firm 2 
conveyed the rigidity of top management to consider a change in supply chain strategy 
from lean to agile for a group of products in the spares category. The respondent from 
firm 2 regretfully conveyed that the most obvious solution was being constantly rejected 
and thus the product line was facing frequent disruptions. A similar case was also 
presented by the respondent from firm 16. In incidents related to frequent disruptions in 
the downstream availability of a product line of refrigerators, firm 16’s respondent 
conveyed that the sales and operations planning team was blindly following the forecast 
generated by the ERP system, despite knowing the fact that these forecast were proven 
to be significantly wrong, both in total volumes and specific product granularity. Firm 
16’s respondent raised his concern about organizational members following wrong, 
incorrect and dated routines resulting in situations causing disruptions.  
Respondents also noted that quality and design function had a rigid fixation on 
processes to an extent that the procedures were being followed mindlessly. Design 
function was reported by many respondents to be inconsiderate about the operational 
viability of the designs. Product designs that are difficult to consistently produce in a 
large scale at a consistent quality due to either the complexity of design or due to a lack 
of locally availability raw material alternatives, are often the products that are more 
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prone to disruption. Overlooking these key design elements (product complexity or 
local raw material availability) in the design in itself is a denial of the existence of an 
operational problem.  Referring to a disruption in a new product line, respondent from 
firm 20 questioned the validity of design. The respondent stated; 
“In case of laminate rejection, the laminate construct was pretty complex, from a design 
point you could have simplified the design from and R&D stand point. We went with the 
design but the supplier was not able to manage it.” 
Executive from firm 2 also raised his concern about the behaviour of the design team 
that tends to overlook the existence of issues burgeoning from their actions. 
“but at the design stage despite of the previous guidelines they don't consider local 
aspects” 
Quality function was also found to behave in a similar manner. Firms 2 and 7 reported 
several cases around rigid processes and guidelines being followed by the quality 
function. This inflexibility and lack of subjectivity in decision making was causing 
several operation concerns and frequent disruptions. 
(ii) Distasteful enforcement and disparate treatment 
Supply chain function also reported of being unfairly treated by other functions and 
management. Many examples to it were presented in the previous section of the loss in 
trust in organization, which presented the narrative from the aspect of the impacts these 
sort of behaviours had on other organizational functions. However, the act of people 
inflicting and observing such behaviours could be termed as a use of power and 
privilege to force one’s own agenda.  This hierarchical hegemony results in escalation 
of adaptive tension.  
The respondent from firm 6 narrated incidents where the behaviour of top management 
compelled the supply chain and procurement teams to accommodate errors and blunders 
made by other functions. Similar behaviours by management and other functions were 
reported by firms 2 and 20 as well. Top management and marketing functions were 
found to press the procurement and supply chain function to expedite dispatches,  to 
support unscheduled or unplanned dispatches or material requirement requests, to work 
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beyond operational hours so as to accommodate misleading and over commitments 
made by customer facing teams and executives and being asked to firefight frequent 
material shortfall scenarios triggered by incorrect forecasts. All such behaviours that 
impose constant stress and pressure on supply chain and procurement function can be 
argued to be supporting the formation of adaptive tension.  
5.3.6 Conspiring against acceptable best practices 
Another behavioural theme that came out of the narratives concerning events of SCD 
relates to agent’s unethical and opportunistic demeanour. This aggregated theme was 
named as ‘conspiring against acceptable best practices’ and it constituted of; (i) 
dishonest demeanour, (ii) disregard for processes, (iii) opportunistic behaviour. (iv) 
dishonouring of commitments 
(i) Dishonest demeanour 
False commitments and misinformation were observed to be the precursors of 
operational disruptions. Firm 2, 6, 5, 7, 9 and 15 reported operational disruptions caused 
by miscommunication or false commitment given by marketing and sales functions of 
either their own firm or of their suppliers. The behaviour was highly prevalent in events 
connected with buyer supplier relationships having disparate volume dependency or 
power distribution favouring the supplier.  
Dishonest agent behaviours identified in the events included ; giving false commitments 
about quality and specifications, lying about delivery schedules, not informing about 
capacity constraints and providing misinformation about the progress of the production 
and dispatch activities. Discussing a disruption event related to a one off purchase of a 
very high value and high capacity power system for installing in a manufacturing plant, 
the firm 15 faced a five month delay just because the sales team of their supplier, a very 
reputed multinational power systems manufacturing firm of European origin, submitted 
a phased out model as a bid for the tendering process. Once they secured the tender, 
which they were not in a position to manufacture, the sales team kept on giving false 
information on the progress of manufacturing process and the expected date of dispatch. 
Finally when the truth was revealed, it was very surprising and damaging for the firm 
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15 as it resulted in the delay of their chemical manufacturing plant commissioning.  The 
procurement head of firm 15 regretfully said;  
“Basically the problem was the mentality that the sales team carry.  They thought that 
they can take an order for the sake of securing an order and then change the 
specifications later on. It was basically or wrong commitment they probably knew at the 
time of taking the order that they cannot deliver this product.” 
Firm 15 discussed similar issues in procuring piping structures, tailored equipment and 
other goods. Firm 2 also discussed disruption events where the sales and marketing 
teams of their tier 1 suppliers made false commitments about the dispatch of critical 
materials. For a particular event connected to an alkaline battery supplier of firm 2, the 
executive of firm 2 stated; 
“So in the supplies they ( an alkaline battery supplier) told us  many a times that a 
certain material was dispatched, its in the pipeline and will reach us. But actually these 
materials were never ever dispatched. Due to these false commitments we started to 
face a lot of problems.” 
In a similar incident related to a false commitment being furnished by tier 1 suppliers, 
firm 7 executive shared a shocking incident of being faxed a copy of the invoice and 
way bill of goods that were never dispatched.  These false and misleading 
commitments, typically by the outward facing function of the supplying firms, were 
found to be underlying causes of multiple disruptive events and strained buyer supplier 
relationships.  
In the narratives, there were some incidents, connected to firms 7 and 18, where an 
incorrect or fabricated document was furnished by agents. This was an extreme case of 
dishonest behaviour. There were two such events relating to submission of fabricated or 
false test certificates, one concerning firm 7 and the other firm 18.  In the incident 
related to firm 7, a fake test certificate was provided by a steel pipe and fittings supplier. 
The respondent of firm 7 conveyed that their process required a higher grade steel for 
handling molten and corrosive materials but the vendor had been supplying a very 
cheap and lower grade steel pipes and fittings which were constantly getting eroded and 
required frequent replacement.  The executive from firm 7 disclosed that what alarmed 
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him about this behaviour was the fact that the request of reorder from his production 
and maintenance unit of his manufacturing plant was so frequent and so high that it was 
almost consuming all of his time and he lost his patience dealing with the issue.  The 
executive said that 
“one particular time I realised that there were a very high number of this components 
being repeatedly ordered. Means, I was even struggling to cope up with raising the 
purchase orders for every procurement request” 
This prompted him to probe deeper that lead to the discovery of fake test certificate and 
inferior material quality resulting in black listing of the supplier. In firm 18, a shipping 
liner, accepted that many players in the market were giving fake fumigation and pest 
control certificates for their shipping containers.  
Dishonest information being furnished by organizational agents is not only a problem 
for the other firm, but it also puts additional pressure on the operations of the firm 
whose executives and agents engage in such dishonest practices.  This is evident from 
the disposition of the executive from firm 6 who accepted of facing severe operational 
issues such as expediting procurement and dispatch process to meet unrealistic 
commitments made to their esteemed customers by their company’s own marketing 
team. The respondent from firm 6 revealed that most of their time and energy was 
wasted to meet these unrealistic commitments by sales team and many a times they had 
to go to their warehouse and process a dispatch in the middle of the night. However, 
citing a plausible reason for such a practice he said;  
“the way our sales teams work, the kind of pressure they have, that for procuring the 
order they will do whatsoever and commit any unrealistic thing to get an order.”  
(ii) Disregard for processes 
Organizations have a defined process for various organizational tasks, however the 
narratives point towards many SCD events that were triggered when the actors chose to 
disregard the established processes.  Respondent from firm 20 narrated about two SCD 
events triggered by acts of ignoring procedures.  The first of these two events was about 
a new supplier being developed for a new product line having a very strict project time 
line. The process of an early technical or manufacturing capability evaluation of a new 
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supplier, before the commercial negotiations, was disregarded by the quality function. 
This caused a critical delay in the project as it was discovered very late in the project 
that the supplier lacked manufacturing capability to deliver the desired quality product. 
The procurement team was very disappointed with the act of disregarding the process 
by the quality function as this had upset all their efforts of developing this new supplier 
and now they had to start the search for an alternative all over again. In another event , 
also connected to firm 20,  the logistics service provider was known to disregard the 
weatherproofing and material handling requirements of some crucial hydroscopic 
(moisture sensitive) products like sugar, corrugate box etc. This often resulted in one or 
two consignments getting damaged by the rain every year.  
firm 14, an engineering project design and installation firm, also discussed a critical 
operational disruption caused by the act of disregarding processes. The respondent 
narrated about a chemical plant extension project where they had to install a high 
pressure heat exchanger in an operational line. The process of designing the complex 
piping and installation details was to be checked with the existing plant layout drawings 
and this was to be correlated with an onsite survey. However, the survey element of the 
process was disregarded due to project timeline pressures and when the engineers 
reached there to install the tailor-made piping and equipment; they were surprised to 
find a concrete column obstructing the way. This incident had two errors of process 
disregard; one by firm 14 of not conducting an onsite survey and the other of the 
organization where this project was being installed; they did not update their plant 
layouts after erecting an additional concrete column.  
There were many other instances where actors disregarded the processes; for instance 
marketing function failing to update plans, logistics firms and truck drivers tampering 
with vehicle tracking devices, supply chain and dispatch agents disregarding the 
necessity to carefully read the purchase order documents resulting in frequent errors in 
billing and dispatch documentation.  
(iii) Opportunistic behaviour 
Signs of opportunistic behaviour were evident in many of the cases that were narrated 
by the respondents. Typically, with an intention to make more money, agents behaved 
in an opportunistic manner. Firms 7, 13 and 18 reported about opportunistic behaviour 
demonstrated by logistic providers. While firms 9 and 11 disclosed a peculiar case of 
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opportunism, similar to behaviours demonstrated by share and financial trading people, 
being demonstrated by their trading and sales function.  
In the case disclosed by firm 18, the actions and behaviours of logistics firms, in order 
to save damages of holding containers, propelled prolonged disruption in supply chain 
of many organizations and sectors. The respondent of firm 18 narrated the events linked 
to floods in a province of India that had disrupted all the ongoing routes to some major 
cities. All the major transport and logistics provider operating in that area were sure to 
lose money on holding the containers till the routes were cleared. So in order to avoid 
these demurrages, most of the logistics providers offloaded their goods in a public 
sector logistics firm providing containerized train transport. Despite being aware that 
trains were also affected and putting additional load on the train system will have 
further delays due to piling backlog, thus the logistics providers acted only in their own 
interest. The result of this act was that it took months for the train container 
organization to clear the backlog and many organizations faced critical disruptions.  The 
firm 18 respondent said; 
“a costly road transport option was disregarded which put additional pressure and 
backlog in the container division of the train. It delayed everything else for quite some 
time. Cost issue somehow dominated the decision-making of people and idea of being 
thrifty leads to more problems. The willingness to work out cost bottom line was 
creating or was for the deepening a problem.” 
There is another element of opportunism that relates to the act of deliberately propelling 
disruptions for the sake of making more profits. This is demonstrated particularly by 
sales and marketing agents from the crude oil refinery supply chain. The agents of sales 
and marketing division of refineries, also addressed as the trading bench, were found to 
act in a highly opportunistic manner with a blatant disregard to any process or supply 
disruption happening within their firm or at their customer’s end. Firm 9 and 11 , both 
petrochemical cracking units, discussed events that could be categorized as 
opportunistic behaviour  and were actually seen in a positive light. The trading function 
of firm 9 was reported to exercises complete power to override any manufacturing, 
procurement or operations decision creating deliberate and conscious disruptions but 
with a rationale to make more money for their own firm. If they were expected to get 
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better volumes they would alter the refinery productions schedule at the last moment, 
they would delay arriving ship from birthing at the port and willingly pay holding 
charges in tune of thousands of dollars to make way for higher margin vessels etc. 
Although these decisions might result in supply disruption for some customers, yet for 
the sake of making more money, for getting better margins, the trade function would 
keep altering decisions and keep manifesting events of disruption. The participant from 
firm 9 mockingly claimed it to be an act of “fishing for opportunities” and “beneficial 
delays”. Firm 11 cited a similar incident where the trading bench would ask to apply a 
‘forced measure’ an act of discontinuing the production of some particular group of 
SKUs just because the production was not profitable. Under such a condition of 
applying a ‘forced measure’, the company is safe breaking any legally binding 
commitment to supply a particular product to some other firm. This callous act, 
motivated solely by a locally optimised profitability decision, disregards the impact it 
would have on the customer‘s supply chain who might be waiting for the delivery of 
these discontinued SKUs. Most of these decisions are top management decisions and 
the outward or customer facing executives of a firm have a hard timing explain this 
eventuality to the impacted customer.  
(iv) Dishonouring of commitments 
Among the 167 instances of disruption discussed by the respondents, it was observed 
that in asymmetric power relationships or in conditions where the purchase was a one-
off purchase, the supplier firm often undervalued the relationship and did not honour 
their commitments and contractual obligations. A large number of disruption events 
were found to be connected to suppliers furnishing incorrect information, giving over 
commitments or demonstrating ego driven bad attitudes and behaviours towards the 
buying firms.  
Sales and marketing teams were often linked to over commitment related issues while 
top management along with operational planning and production function was seen to 
be linked to bad attitudes and behaviours which were sometimes accompanied by ego or 
personality conflicts. One common characteristic of all such events was that the buyer 
firm was often unaware of the ongoing issue related to their order until the date of 
committed delivery when the order or supply did not arrive as committed.  Then there 
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would start a series of sequential events where for weeks and months, buried under heap 
of emails, teleconferences and other formal and informal communications, the buying 
firm would try and understand the true reason for a default and would persistently 
attempt to reach an amicable solution to resolve the matter. With passage of time and 
with its own projects or supplies getting hampered, these issues demonstrated a 
tendency to easily slip into the domain of a conflict that would require a high level 
intervention, often by senior board level members.  However, as the issue progresses, 
from the first email sent on the day of expected delivery date to the final day of 
resolution, the disruption becomes a case of wearing patience and escalating adaptive 
tension.  Some firms reported that in instances where emails and teleconferences failed 
to clearly establish the reasons for the delay, they had ultimately send their management 
teams to the manufacturing locations of these defaulting supplier, often in different 
continent or country, to discuss the issues face to face. This is a tipping point in testing a 
firms patience as such initiatives are often costly and time consuming and are often 
considered to be the last resorts.  
Another common occurrence among multiple events spread across various firms, was of 
regular suppliers providing misleading or wrong information about dispatches and 
expected arrival dates of supplies. The procurement executives of buyer firm often felt 
violated on discovering that their trust has been misused. Firm 2, 7, 9 and 15 reported 
issues related to this kind of conduct by their regular suppliers. In an extreme case of 
misleading information, firm 7 executive disclosed that in one instance for a very 
critical material , his regular supplier confirmed a dispatch and went on with emailing 
bogus copies of dispatch documentation.  firm 7 was only left with a week of this 
material and considering a 6 day transit time, the respondent who was a procurement 
executive for firm 7, was confident to avoid a disruption. However when the material 
did not arrive by the end of 8
th
 day, as it was neve despatched, the production line 
stopped and  he found himself in a difficult position. Firm 7 executive stated 
“He ( the supplier) sent me a LR, which is a despatch document, confirming that he had 
dispatched the materials. The paper had receipt,  transporter details truck number 
driver details everything, it seemed authentic.” 
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The crisis was resolved only when his senior manager intervened and chastised the 
supplier to get an expedited dispatch. The firm 7 executive said 
“It was then that my boss took charge. My boss picked up the phone and he fired the 
vendor literally all the abuse and nonsensical words that you could think of,  he used 
them. And then on the same day the vendor dispatched the materials on a truck with two 
drivers so that it could travel non-stop and it reached us the 3
rd
 day.” 
5.3.7 Heedless performance 
There was evidence in the data indicating towards a localised and silo working 
tendencies. It was found that organizational members, driven by their local beliefs 
mindsets and performance measures, ignored the possibility of a greater good. Driven 
by a motive to secure their local interests, these organizational members demonstrated a 
reluctance to coordinate or work together.  There were also many instances where 
organizational members, involved with supply chain activities, lacked the required 
vigour or will to do the right things or follow the prescribed routines and best practice 
recommendations. This often led to member committing careless mistakes triggering 
events of SCD. 
This performance can be best described as a heedless working because it is not intuitive 
or logical to either subscribe to silo decision making or commit careless mistakes due to 
lack of vigour or the will to do things right. There were three subthemes identified that 
indicated to wards a heedless performance; (i) Organizational members framing narrow 
boundaries of success and team working, (ii) organizational members committing 
careless mistakes, and (iii) organizational members lacking the vigour or will to do the 
right thing. 
(i) Frame narrow boundaries of success and team working 
Procurement and supply chain executives had a general consensus that many a times 
other organizational functions chose to work with narrow organizational boundaries and 
silo tendencies that often led to operational difficulties. Firm 20 executive recounted an 
incident where the procurement team was not informed about a ramp up in production 
taken up by the manufacturing function and it led to a critical disruption as there was 
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not sufficient raw material to support increased volumes. The respondent from firm 20 
stated that; 
“The plan of the ramp up demand was not visible, so manufacturing had planned a 
ramp up but the planning team was not aware of the ramp up and hence the 
consumption will go up on the line on a per day basis, that they were not aware of. 
Hence they had not ordered it.” 
The respondent further suggested a plausible reason for the lack of alignment among 
functions. The respondent said; 
“You can either owe it to a planning error or owe it to two departments not working 
closely enough.” 
Firm 6 also faced similar issues with misalignment leading to disruption. In one such 
incident a very large and prestigious promotion and marketing activity was planned by 
the sales function but the stock of material requirement for the activity were not checked 
with the supply chain function. This lead to a severe disruption and its resolution costed 
a very high value as most of the material was required to be procured from offshore 
sources and expediting that resulted in costly air freight. Firm 5 also suffered from such 
a behaviour of the production planning team leading to a disruption. In two events, one 
connected with an additive food flavour and one related to substrate of the packaging 
film, the ramp up of production planned by the manufacturing function was not shared 
with procurement function and suppliers. This led to a major disruption as the suppliers 
of these products had either a very long lead times or had capacity constraints that were 
not factored in by the planning and procurement teams.  
Narrow frame of mind was also evident in behaviours where organizational members, 
functions or firms, in the extended network, rejected a possibility of symbiotic working 
over their narrow interests. Firm 10 executive discussed an issue where two zonal teams 
of the same marketing function, were not willing to accommodate requests of each 
other. Recounting about an incident related to a major multinational customer of firm 
10, the respondent disclosed that they often faced internal coordination issues while 
servicing two, geographically separated, manufacturing locations of this multinational 
customer. The issue was that these two manufacturing locations of the customer were 
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allocated to two different zonal marketing teams of firm 10 and each marketing team 
was fiercely competing with each other towards securing their personal interests and 
maximising their local profitability and sales targets.  This often resulted in losses and 
disruption for firm 10.  The respondent disclosed that often, in cases where there was 
ether a lack of sufficient material or was a case of an urgent dispatch processing, the 
two zones would conflict on the dispatch volume and priority of dispatch and his 
marketing zone was always made to suffer as higher management judged his zone to be 
of less priority than the other zone.   Being denied a volume or dispatch priority by his 
planning and supply chain team, many a times he was forced to get the material by air 
resulting in additional cost to the company.  The firm 10 respondent stated; 
“Since we were located furthest from our production plant so we had a priority on 
despatches as  we had the longest lead time. Yet still there were internal departmental 
conflicts and in some cases it lead to material rationing and quota system for dispatch 
priority. Since our competitor was located closer to the southern plant and for the 
northern plant ( where respondent was based)  we were having similar lead time to our 
competitor. So southern sales team was always fighting that they should have a priority 
of despatch over us as north region can manage. Because of the competitor , they were 
always pressurising more to get the material first. It used to happen that due to this 
infighting we sometimes at the north were forced to airlift the material and bear the 
cost.” 
This incident highlights the existence of bitter conflict among different teams of the 
same organizational function, within the same company, demonstrating a behaviour of 
narrow mind frames. The respondent accepted that this infighting was putting extra 
burden on the supply chain. Firm 2, 7, 9, 11 also disclosed having operational issues 
with individualistic behaviours of quality, design and sales functions of their firms. 
(ii) Careless mistakes   
Respondents narrated about multiple events concerning careless mistakes triggering 
disruptions. Mistakes were committed in processing documentations, managing data, 
material handling etc.  firms 4 and 16 reported about disruptions caused due to errors in 
entering or maintaining data in ERP and excel files.  Respondent from firm 4 accepted 
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that sometimes double entries or missing entries in the ERP result in planning errors 
while respondent of firm 16 disclosed that in his various supply chain consulting 
projects he often discovered managers working and taking decisions based on excel 
worksheets with wrong data, formulas and many logical errors.  
Incidents related to careless mistakes in dispatch documentation were reported by firms 
6, 8 and 15. In the firms 6 and 15 the materials were imported materials from far off 
geographies and the errors in documentations resulted in heavy losses and extended 
delays. While firm 8 reported of processing a dispatch before the delivery schedule date 
of the purchase order. In this incident, the material reached to the buyer before the 
expected date and since the ERP system of buyer did not allow intake of any such 
material before the scheduled delivery date, the whole consignment was returned.  
(iii) Lack of vigour to do it right 
In the narratives, there were many disruptive events triggered by a lack of vigour in 
performing the task in hand. Due to a lack of vigour to do the right things, agents often 
missed out on crucial elements such as lead times of extended supply chains, impact of 
design change on the overall supply chain or even failed to see how their actions would 
reflect on others. 
The most common case of lack of vigour was found to be in sales and operations 
planning, particularly related to the quality of forecast. Commenting on inaccurate 
forecast errors respondent from firm 13 said; 
“See I have seen it forecasting accuracy is very poor, in 50% cases it is inaccurate. If 
you look at the SKU level forecast then there is even greater error in it . In 
petrochemical industry this is very high.” 
The respondent disclosed that the issue was bigger than just the forecast being wrong as 
the marketing people were not putting enough rigour to improve the accuracy. They 
neither demonstrated will nor any scientific knowledge to improve these numbers and 
were , on a regular basis, every year doing the same mistake over and over again.  
 140 
“Actually when forecasting at SKU level, the sales team just keys in numbers without 
giving it much scientific thought. They will look at the total volume and would start 
keying in numbers arbitrarily to forecast the SKYs…..put 5 there 10  here and so on.” 
This disposition challenges the core behaviour of the marketing teams and raises a 
question not just on their ability but also in their intent. Questioning the reliability of 
such forecasts, the firm 13 respondent cited that no consideration of seasonality or 
trends was making things worse.  
“They have no clue of seasonality. What they will do is forecast for the whole year and 
then break it in equal parts for all the months. Now you tell me ..will the sale be uniform 
across the months..no it won’t be..it’s a straight forward fact , but these guys do not 
care or put effort to forecast at SKU level.  They do it on very elementary excel sheets 
and thus cannot see any trends.” 
Forced to deal with high forecast errors has been raised as an issue by many respondents 
and the behaviour highlighted in the above disposition could be considered as one of its 
reason. 
In other instances, connected to a lack of heed, agents are often unaware of contextual 
and demanding conditions and this is either due to a lack of knowledge or due to 
insufficient trust on other agents. In several events, at firm 20, the cause of disruption 
was suggested to be a lack of information sharing among internal functions. For normal 
operating situations, the routinized operational processes were performed well despite a 
lack of information sharing, however in demanding situations that required a 
consideration of evolving contextual conditions, these acts of heedless performance 
resulted in disruptions.  
Existence of a heedless performance was also observed in the firm 21, the aerospace 
manufacturing sector, where the respondent repeatedly emphasised that a lack of 
knowledge transfers and information sharing with their suppliers was causing supply 
disruptions. The respondent acknowledged that firm 21, being a public sector enterprise 
with legacy rules and procedures, found it difficult to share technical knowhow and 
valuable insights with their suppliers. Since firm 21 was operating in the aerospace 
manufacturing sector with a very low tolerance of error, highly specialized or complex 
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jobs and high penalty clauses, this act of not sharing knowledge was further deepening 
the problems. The respondent quotes; 
 “communication gap between us and him (one particular supplier) widened” 
 In other narrative connected to firm 21, the respondent quotes; 
“the suppliers were not given adequate knowhow to fulfil their jobs”,  
This is a clear case of heedless performance. In some disruptions related to the firm 5, 
supplier demonstrated unexpected and monopolistic behaviour; this too could be argued 
as an agent schema of heedless performance, since a thoughtless opportunistic 
behaviour, which is a breach of mutual trust, does not always result in gains. In instance 
of firm 5, they changed the supplier.  
5.4 Self-organization and emergence  
5.4.1 System’s tipping point 
Not all behaviours leading to adaptive tension will force the system to self-organize or 
emerge to a new state. Its only when the system crosses a critical tipping point, it 
demonstrates emergence and self-organization. Among the events chosen by the 
respondents to discuss, firms 1, 2, 7 and 15 had the most events demonstrating self-
organization and emergence, thus were the firms that had the most signs of adaptive 
tension crossing the tipping limits; while firms 5, 8 and 20 had a few events that 
resulted in self-organization and emergence and thus consequently lessor evidence of 
adaptive tension crossing the critical limit. Table 24 presents these system conditions 
leading to self-organization or emergence.  
Act against the people or organization responsible  
Some system patterns indicated that there were situations when an organization was 
compelled to act against the people or organizations causing them troubles. This is a 
tipping point that culminates in emergent structures or processes. The two system 
patterns associated with it were; loss of trust and patience, and conflict escalation. 
(i) Loss of trust and patience  
The loss of trust and patience was the most common tipping point for cases where 
behaviours like misleading and false commitment by supplier firms were underlying 
cause for a disruption. In the cases, this tipping point leading the system to self-organize 
or emerge was found to be a result of several events and interactions spread over as 
considerable length of time ranging from 1 month to an year. It was observed in the 
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cases that in a relationship between a supplier and a buyer, to begin with, these 
misleading or false commitments were considered as truth in a good faith. However, 
after default on committed supply schedules followed by a chain of communication 
exchanges over emails, telephone calls or meetings, it would be eventually discovered 
as an apologetic surprise for the suffering firm that the commitments made at the 
beginning of the relationship were either false or were not honoured. This process of a 
slow realization of being cheated or mislead reaches to a tipping point where the 
suffering firm completely losses its patience and trust in the relationship. Such events 
were observed in firm 7, firm 15 and firm 20. 
Table 28: Patterns demonstrating system tipping point  
First order findings Second order findings Aggregated dimension 
Multiple communication ranging from emails to 
teleconferences being pursued at various levels in the 
organizational hierarchy over a significant duration of time.  
After being furnished inaccurate and misleading information 
for an extended period of time, the buying firm is forced to 
visit the supplier firm to find out what exactly was wrong 
Non relenting and inconsiderate behaviour of monopoly 
suppliers to accept a fair price for their products and services  
 
Loss of trust and 
patience  
Act against the people 
or organization 
responsible for it 
 
Once lower management failed to negotiate an amicable 
solution higher management had to come in 
Required arbitration or proof for resolving the conflict 
Escalating frustration or anger 
Conflict escalation 
A growing discontent and grievance among union and 
workers 
Acceptance or 
realization of a 
previously ignored 
issues 
Introspect and take a 
corrective action  
(ii) Conflict escalation 
Escalation of conflict among partnering firms, beyond a certain limit, was also 
indicative of a change in structure of the network as the relationship were eventually 
broken. In multiple events connected to firm 7, 15 and 19 there were instances where 
the procurement function was unable to resolve an ongoing conflict and the higher 
managerial or board level interventions were sought.  Some events also required legal or 
neutral arbitration to apportion any sort of financial burden or losses accruing due to a 
strained relationship. In one such event connected with firm 15, a European supplier 
shipped very heavy and costly machine equipment to Asia with an incorrect port and 
 143 
billing documentation. This led to a heavy penalty and significant long delay for firm 
15. Firm 15 had to seek a legal intervention and furnish proofs that they had very clearly 
documented the dispatch and billing details in their purchase order, which the European 
manufacturer carelessly overlooked.  There were also a few cases where attitude and 
conflicting behaviour of representatives of the supplier firm was causing frustration and 
anger among the members of the buying firm dealing with scenarios of delays. Firms 2, 
7 and 15 reported most of these. This anger and frustration also acted as a tipping point 
for the relationship to slip into quandary. 
Introspect and take a corrective action 
Findings were suggestive that in some instances organizations and its members tend to 
realize that there are some issues and decisions that need attention. It is this realization 
that leads to self-organized emergence. 
(i) Acceptance or realization of a previously ignored issue 
In events connected to firms 1, 5, 7, 8 and 20, there were instances where the 
organizational members realized that an ongoing practice or a previously ignored issue 
had become a serious concern and needs to be addressed. This realization was a tipping 
point before the system self-organized or emerged by adopting changed mind-sets and 
change in established processes or procedures. The executive from firm 1 accepted that 
after a major labour union strike the top management embarked in the process of 
introspection and there was a general realization that there were important worker issues 
that were ignored and it was high time to take a corrective action. The respondent from 
firm 1 stated; 
“A lot of activities undertaken to ensure that the grievance of the union or the grievance 
of the workforce can be understood better. We upgraded a lot of facilities because it is 
not that only they created problem it was our infrastructure also which was creating 
problem for them. So because any industrial relations issue is both ways. The 
recognition of it is only the best way. And there we invested a lot of money” 
Design, quality and marketing and functions of firm 5, 7 and 8 respectively realized that 
their rigid mind-sets were responsible for propelling a few disruptions and they needed 
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to coordinate and work along with other functions and teams.  Executive of firm 20 
conveyed that after multiple disruption issues and coordination errors among functions, 
there was a realization for the need of working together. The respondent stated; 
“In my company, I saw that journey, when I started off in packaging it was very similar 
story that R&D will finalise a supplier, will complete a product trial and then ask the 
procurement to negotiate the price. And from there we moved to a position where there 
would be a common briefing between marketing, R&D and Procurement and then you 
would involve the supplier together.” 
5.4.2 Evidence of self-organization and emergence 
In an organizational context it was identified that self-organization and emergence 
would bring about a recognizable structural, process or behavioural change in the 
system. Table 29 and table 30 provide details of findings from the meta-analysis of the 
data and illustrative quotations validating it. The data was analysed to isolate evidence 
demonstrating self-organization or emergence. 
Table 29: Evidence of emergence and self-organization 
First order concepts Second order themes Aggregate 
dimensions 
New supplier developed 
Established supplier discontinued 
Relocating manufacturing tools to a new location 
 
Change in network structure 
Emergence Testing procedure changed 
Product quality requirement changed 
Tendering process changed  
Change in approach to sales and operations planning  
A significant monetary penalty for the behaviour 
Change in established processes 
or procedures 
Agents realized that they need to break a cartel that they 
themselves had formed 
Change in agent behaviour 
Self-organization  
Started looking at socio political and geographic risk 
Started an  inward introspection process of accepting HR 
and labour issues 
Updated the definition of redundancy 
Change in the priorities or goals 
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Table 30: Illustrative quotations validating first order concepts related to emergence and 
self-organization 
Second Order 
Theme 
First order concept Illustrative quotations 
Change in 
network 
structure 
New supplier 
developed 
Established supplier 
discontinued 
Relocating 
manufacturing tools to 
a new location 
 
firm 2: After visiting the plant we took an immediate decision of 
shifting the tools from the affected factory to an alternative location. 
firm 2: So we got this alternator supplier and within weeks approved 
another supplier, Panasonic, who was operating from Thailand 
firm 20: Three to four rejections spread over two to three months. You 
give a supplier a two to three months window, but if it does not 
change then you conclude that it’s a process or capability issue and 
you need to change the supplier. Which we did. 
 
Change in 
established 
processes or 
procedures 
Testing procedure 
changed 
Product quality 
requirement changed 
Tendering process 
changed ( Rama) 
Change in approach to 
sales and operations 
planning ( the sale on 
water case) 
firm 2: A lot of quick trials were run,  since complete endurance full 
body trials and testing was not possible we discussed with our parent 
company and the resultant was that within one week we had an 
alternative location. thus despite the strike we were not affected. 
firm 7: “I called the customer technical and R&D and asked them how 
much chlorine is permissible in their product and they said that 500 
ppm was their limit. I laughed, we were originally supplying 75 ppm 
chlorine and the alternative product was having 100 ppm chlorine but 
both were way below than the customer’s permissible level. I told my 
testing that next time match the products with customer’s 
requirement as well.” 
firm 2: I had to go to an extent that I asked this battery manufacturer 
to use world's best designed lid from a German company;  we paid for 
the air freight the German lid was such a robust design that even if you 
turn head 180 degree it would not leak but in our testing that also 
leaked. To avoid the embarrassment we intentionally put two of our 
procurement employees  to monitor the testing and to everyones 
surprise even the normal design which was not the German lid, of the 
alternative supplier passed 
firm 2: Another issue that happened was that he wanted to sell more 
diesel cars because there was high demand from the market and we 
had no spare capacity as we had not forecasted it to that level. So we 
sat and discussed the ramp up (with an alternative supplier) and we 
accepted some design changes and supported the company. 
firm 1: there were around 60% part numbers for which we had to 
resort to other sources so we ended up doing quick evaluations and 
getting into. 
firm 1: So the whole exercise takes 18 to 22 months but these kind of 
disruptive scenarios we basically look at what is critical on the basis of 
production location. The concept is already proven and we have a fair 
idea of what the tooling should look like in this case so it's just, most of 
these cases it is just the evaluation of the production location with 
little bit of tinkering on the tool. That's why we are able to shorten the 
time frame to about a month or two months time.  
firm 17: After the tender was processed suddenly nickel prices so an 
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exponential increase. Now  the material procurement was close to 25 
tons and the difference was coming out to be 50 million dollars. So the 
company that had secured the tender denied citing this reason and 
everybody knew that nickel prices Rising so we had to scrap the tender 
because our system does not allow any variation after the tendering 
process. We never did any hedging or price link tendering so we learn 
from that incident. So the third time we recognised the fact that this 
particular tender required some flexibility. So then we incorporated 
those flexibilities into the tender and that was done in a very unique 
way so normally in our industry the tendering is done on for part basis 
but we did this in cost per kg basis.  
Change in agent 
behaviour 
Agents realized that 
they need to break a 
cartel that they had 
formed 
firm 7: The discussion was stuck for more than 3 months and when 
they finally realised that someone would supply at the lower price they 
agreed to supply at old prices which was 5.5£ per ton. Although these 
prices were higher, but I let them supplies they were afraid of two 
things one that I can disturb the market price and then probably other 
customers would also use the same  alternative transporter. So they 
agreed to support as they did not want any new entrant into the 
market it took 3 months but I had awarded a contract which was £1 
(per ton) less than the previous. 
Change in the 
priorities or 
goals 
Started looking at 
socio political and 
geographic risk 
Started an  inward 
introspection process 
of accepting HR and 
labour issues 
Updated the definition 
of redundancy 
firm 1: this socio political agitation has thrown up on a lot of issues at 
our end.  In terms of how to make ourselves little more proactive.  I 
mean we are basically going in a different Direction now, we are now 
looking locational and geographical risk very closely and taking action 
accordingly. 
firm 1: At the same time we spent a lot of money insuring that this 
kind of incident does not happen again. A lot of activities undertaken 
to ensure that the grievance of the union or the grievance of the 
workforce can be understood better. We upgraded a lot of facilities 
because it is not that only they created problem it was our 
infrastructure also which was creating problem for them. so because 
any industrial relations issue is both ways. The recognition of it is only 
the best way. And there we invested a lot of money.  
firm 1: as a policy, after going through so many incidence in past I 
mean what I told you is just last two years or three years what has 
happened. We have developed a policy that if we are buying beyond a 
certain level, either the supplier has to have multi-location or we will 
have alternate sources developed 
 
(i) Change in Network Structure 
Instigated by behaviours, actions and interactions of supply chain agents, there were a 
few cases that reflected a recognizable change in network structure and these instances 
could be viewed as evidence of emergence. Agents self-organized to the events of 
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disruptions and brought about a change in system structure. The findings revealed that 
most of these changes were brought during the course of disruption. 
 A structural change in the system was in the form of either a development of new 
supplying nodes or discontinuation of some suppliers or manufacturing locations. Firms 
1, 2, 5, 7 and 20 accepted of being forced by the demeanour, behaviour and actions of 
their suppliers to develop alternative sources. Annoyed by continuing false 
commitments and inconsiderate and non-cooperating behaviour of their alkaline battery 
supplier, firm 2 executive accepted of going beyond his defined procurement job 
responsibilities to develop not just one but two alternative sources. Here the decision to 
develop two additional suppliers conflicted with the company’s lean policy and was 
sure to have financial implications as each supplier and related transactions have a cost 
of management, but the firm 2 executive was insistent that the behaviour of the previous 
supplier had left him with no choice but to opt for this not so efficient decision. 
Similarly, firm 5 and 7 also accepted being forced into developing alternative sources 
because they had lost trust and patience in the business and moral abilities of existing 
suppliers. 
In two events, one connected with firm 7 and the other with firm 21, the organizations 
were forced to discontinue a supplier at a very short notice and in absence of an 
approved replacement it resulted in an immediate disruption. Both these cases were 
linked to unethical and fraudulent behaviour of the supplier. For firm 7 the supplier was 
furnishing inferior goods on fabricated test certificates while firm 21 conveyed a case of 
billing fraud been done by one of its supplier.  In comparison to firm 7, firm 21 being an 
aerospace manufacturer suffered more from such a decision as, in words of the firm 
21’s respondent, developing a good supplier in aerospace sector is challenging process 
as often the outsourced tasks are complex and there are not many suppliers having the 
desired level of technical capability and commitment to quality. It takes time, money 
and management to develop a supplier in aerospace industry.  
A quick restructuring of the network to avoid a certain disruption was also observed in a 
few cases. In a case related to firms 1 and 2, the respondents narrated incidents where 
the complete manufacturing machinery and tool set, weighing in tonnes, was relocated 
to an alternative location. Firms 1 was trying to avoid a socio political unrest happening 
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near one of its tier one supplier units while firm 2 resorted to the initiative to avoid a 
call for strike in one of its tier 2 suppliers manufacturing unit.  Both these being 
automobile manufactures, presents a case of high degree of adaptability and self-
organization capabilities demonstrated by the automotive sector. 
Similar to relocating the manufacturing process, firm 7 demonstrated adaptation of 
working with alternative sources of raw material, molten sulphur and solid sulphur that 
could be melted to be made to a molten form, to avoid disruption. This event of 
switching between raw material sources was driven by non-cooperative behaviour of the 
supplier firm, market forces and price fluctuations. 
(ii) Change in established processes 
A change in an ongoing, practice, routine or process can also be considered as an 
evidence of emergence.  In a case connected to inferior piping and fittings been sold to 
firm 7 by one of its highly trusted and long standing supplier, firm 7’s executive was 
able to justify his management team about a merits of independent testing of 
components rather than relying on manufacturers provided test certificate. Following 
this, in firm 7, the established process of accepting the manufacturers test certificate was 
replaced by a process of randomly sending a few components for independent third 
party testing. This change demonstrates an emergence of a new organizational reality. 
In two other cases connected to firm 7, the quality function was forced to relax their 
quality parameters and permissible ranges for two products. In one incident connected 
with sulphuric acid being sold by firm 7 to a large number of small and medium scale 
metal work firms, the sales team of firm 7 was struggling to adequately price their 
product in comparison to a cheaper version of their competitors. The effort of firm 7’s 
procurement team to bring down the price of their product was met with a strong 
resistance from the quality team which insisted on a high purity grade of sulphuric acid 
that was obviously costlier than the competitors. The procurement team was able to 
persuade the quality team to lower their quality parameters for this particular product 
grade as it was being used for meatal etching and the process did not require a grade of 
high purity. Similarly, in another incident, the procurement team of firm 7 had to 
compel the quality team to reduce their permissible limits of chlorine in a product that 
was difficult to source due to a stringent quality parameter set by the quality function. In 
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this product, which was originally procured internally from another manufacturing 
location in Germany but now was discontinued, the quality function had set a chlorine 
content limit of the product as 70 ppm (parts per million) while none of the available 
alternative suppliers were able to manage a purity beyond 100 ppm chlorine. On 
enquiring the process requirement of the buyer who was procuring this material, firm 7 
executive found out that the buyer’s permissible chlorine limit was 500 ppm , which 
was suitable to achieve even with the 100 ppm chlorine raw material.  This led to 
quality function accepting and updating the permissible limit of chlorine in this product. 
Firms 1 and 2 narrated incidents where faced with an eminent disruption they change 
their testing procedures to reduce the setting up time for a new production location. This 
relates to the case of shifting the machines and tool sets from one location to an 
alternative facility.  The respondents accepted that normally the outlined procedure 
requires components from every new manufacturing facility to go through a full body 
endurance testing which takes close to 18 months. However, faced with events 
originating in the extended supply chain, the new locations were setup in matter of 
weeks.  With regards to this, the firm 1 executive stated; 
“So the whole exercise takes 18 to 22 months but in these kind of disruptive scenarios 
we basically look at what is critical on the basis of production location. The concept is 
already proven and we have a fair idea of what the tooling should look like in this case 
so it's just, most of these cases it is just the evaluation of the production location with 
little bit of tinkering on the tool. That's why we are able to shorten the time frame to 
about a month or two months’ time.” 
 The firm 2 executive also narrated a similar incident. In his words; 
“A lot of quick trials were run, since complete endurance full body trials and testing 
was not possible we discussed with our parent company and the resultant was that 
within one week we had an alternative location.” 
(iii) Change in Agent Behaviour 
There were instances where feedback from system level outcomes, triggered by micro 
state agent behaviours, resulted in a change in the behaviour of individual agents. In a 
case related to firm 7, the logistics service providers of firm 7 were compelled to 
abandon their opportunistic behaviour and accept ethical working terms with firm 7.  
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These logistics service providers had formed a cartel and were using it as a leverage to 
negotiate favourable working terms and prices. However, the events that followed the 
evasive actions taken up by the procurement team of firm 7, led to a change in the 
behaviour of these logistics agents as they willingly dismantled the unethical cartel.  
Change in agent behaviour was also reported in firm 18, where the actions and 
behaviours of the supplier relation team of firm 18 was able to motivate its suppliers in 
developing quality culture and meeting delivery and production schedules.  A supplier 
of firm 18 who was severely demotivated to complete an order as it had secured other 
jobs that were higher paying and more profitable. However, a strong supplier support 
and close working provided by firm 18 led to the supplier successfully delivering the 
job. The respondent said; 
“So we really had to motivate the vendor again. I mostly used to go there 3 times every 
week. We showed them opportunities of future and motivated them.” 
(iv) Change in priorities and goals 
Many firms accepted that events of disruptions forced them to look inwards into their 
supply chain strategies, priorities and goals. This introspection led to the firms self-
organizing to adapt better with the changed circumstances and accrued learnings. 
Adoption of these new set of priorities and goals can be argued to be system level self-
organization. Firm 1 disclosed many insights about the way post disruption scenarios 
compelled them to relook at their strategies and priorities. In the disruption concerned 
with a very long union strike that also saw some industrial violence, the firm 1 
executive accepted that although a lot of strict penalties and disciplinary actions were 
imposed on the agitating workers but once the strike was resolved the incident was 
thoroughly analysed to establish the underlying causes of such an occurrence. The firm 
1 executive accepted that the first step towards it was accepting that the problem was 
both ways and the organization too was falling short of meeting the worker’s 
expectations. This change reflected emergence of a new realization and the harsh 
realities of the strike compelled the agents to self-organize and the top management to 
look into matters that were being ignored for a very long time.  
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Firm 1 also disclosed that repeated disruptions originating in specific geographies like 
Japan, Thailand, Philippines and Taiwan compelled them to start grading the risk by 
political and geographical priorities. This reflected a major shift in their policy.   firm 20 
also disclosed a similar change in policy. Faced by persistent disruptions due to 
uncoordinated and silo working culture of various function, the executive of firm 20 
conveyed that there was a slow and steady realization of the merits in working together. 
In his tenure, he saw this transformation as sales, quality, design, production and 
procurement functions started to work much closely.  
5.5 Microstate agent behaviours contributing to system’s resilience and 
robustness to disruption  
Among the firms studied, the firm’s 1, 2 and 7 discussed the most cases that 
demonstrated resilience and robustness in terms of handling and managing events of 
disruption.  In all these four firms the procurement and supply chain executives shared 
behavioural trait of going an extra mile such that beyond their expected and defined 
scope of their job, to effectively negotiate and respond to crisis situations. For example, 
the participant of firm 1, a senior management personal, spearheaded an initiative to 
expedite the testing and approval of alternate sources to SKUs impacted in Japan 
Tsunami. He shared that a process that normally took 18 months was completed in 30 
days, saving them from impact of the catastrophe. Similarly, firm 2 respondent 
disclosed that to avoid the impact of a labour union strike at their Tier 1 OEM supplier, 
they helped the supplier move over a weekend the entire manufacturing tool set of 
several tons to an alternate location. The commitment to resilience demonstrated by the 
executive of firm 7 was also quite evident in all the events. In a particular incident firm 
7 was facing a disruption on one of its products that they sourced from their parent 
manufacturing firm in Germany and sold to customers after repacking. Due to some 
restructuring, the German manufacturing unit had stopped the production of this product 
and firm 7 had to look for local alternatives. The firm 7’s executive disclosed that his 
procurement team was able to identify a few alternative sources but the these alternative 
failed in their internal quality check as one of the quality parameter, product’s chlorine 
content in parts per million (ppm), of the sample was 100 ppm while their internal 
quality permissible limit was 75 ppm.  Failing to find any supplier capable of providing 
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75 ppm chlorine content, firm 7 was sure to lose all its customers. However, showing 
commitment to resilience, the firm 7 executive went beyond his procurement 
responsibilities and contacted the buyers to enquire about the permissible limits of 
chlorine. To his surprise, the buyer’s processes were having a quality requirement of 
500 ppm chlorine, which was well within the range of alternatives sources his 
procurement team had identified. The firm 7 executive said; 
“I called the customer technical and R&D team and asked them how much chlorine is 
permissible in their product and they said that 500 ppm was their limit. I laughed, we 
were originally supplying 75 ppm chlorine and the alternative product was having 100 
ppm chlorine but both were way below than the customer’s permissible level. I told my 
testing function that next time match the products with customer’s requirement as well.” 
However, such out of the box approaches and contingency actions to upset the impacts 
of disruptions have a cost. Respondents conceded that there was a high price of 
resilience. In all these cases the focal firm was able to avoid production losses yet many 
a times at a very high cost. Firm 1 executive accepted that direct costs of handling some 
of his disruptions was in millions of pounds and they had not accounted for the overall 
impact. Commenting on disruption associated cost for one particular event, firm 1 
executive said  
“Quantitatively it is very difficult to put a number to it but my guess is it was in 
millions. I mean it is not something we accounted, but it was a huge amount.” 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter of findings presented the interview data structured in a manner to assist the 
understanding of SCD from a micro agent perspective. The cases of SCD were firstly 
analysed for their context and environmental aspects. Findings revealed that contexts 
relating to the diversity of people involved, product characteristics and the nature of 
relationships played a crucial role in how people behaved.  
Further the qualitative data was analysed to discover patterns demonstrating the system 
to have departed from acceptable operating conditions. These patterns were argued to be 
an indicator of accruing adaptive tension in the system. It was observed in multiple 
narratives that patterns associated with events of SCD demonstrated the system to have 
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lost its ability to manage or contain disruptions. The systems had also developed 
adverse tendencies leading to an increased probability of disruptive events. This was   
judged as a departure from expected operating conditions and a proof of system 
progressing on an adaptive gradient. The findings then investigated micro agent 
behaviours, mindsets and actions contributing to the above system patterns. Evidence of 
behaviours like loss of trust, over ambitious pursuit, use of power and privilege, 
conspiring against best practices and heedless performance were found to be associated 
with multiple cases. It was also found that not all the behaviours or adaptive tension 
patterns forced the system to self-organize or emerge. However, the aggregation of 
some of the microstate agent behaviours did cause the system to self-organize and 
emerge into either a new structure or a new process or goal. Some behavioural traits 
were also found to be associated with system demonstrating robustness or resilience to 
disruption. 
This concludes the second phase of this research where the main study was designed, 
conducted and results analysed in juxtaposition with the phenomenon of interest. The 
next phase of the study presents a discussion of the findings with respect to the existing 
body of knowledge and carves the contribution of this research. It essentially answers 
the question that what do the findings tell us and how do they extend the existing body 
of knowledge.  
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Phase III:  
What the research tells 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This thesis began by highlighting the importance of accounting for micro agent 
behaviours in deciphering supply chain phenomenon. Having chosen SCD as the 
phenomenon of interest, this research is interested to answer the question; How do 
micro agent behaviours, actions and interactions influence events of supply chain 
disruption? If they do influence it, then how these individual actions bring about self-
organization and emergence at a network level? The analysis of complexity literature 
revealed that adaptive tension, a measure of energy gradient between designed and real 
system conditions, can be used as an explanatory mechanism to comment on the 
contribution of micro level interactions towards system level phenomenon. Guided by a 
critical realist research philosophy of linking the observed to the real by explanatory 
mechanisms, this thesis approached the analysis of data to reveal the evidence 
highlighting the presence of adaptive tension, self-organization and emergence in the 
events of SCD. Accepting the critical realist view that an objective reality cannot be 
completely expressed or conceptualized by the observer, this thesis resorted to an 
abductive logic of moving between established theory and research data to argue the 
influence of agent behaviours and actions on instances of supply chain emergence and 
self-organization, with the mechanism of adaptive tension being the crucial link.  
In the following discussion, this thesis elaborates the insights depicted in figure 6 and 
explains how these insights contribute to the literatures of supply chain complexity and 
SCD. Briefly, the findings of this research emphasize on three understudied aspects of 
supply chain as CAS: (i) How individual behaviours, actions and interactions produce 
emergence and self-organization in a supply chain setting (ii) The kind of agent actions 
and behaviours responsible for emergence and self-organization in a SCD scenario and 
(iii) why some actions could result in resilience and robustness while others contribute 
to the fragility of the network. 
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6.1 Micro agent behaviours to macro outcome: pathways to self-
organization and emergence 
Established complexity research, whether it subscribes to the theory of chaos and  
dissipative structures or to the concepts of self-organization and emergent adaptive 
landscape; both the streams argue that system level explanations have micro level 
underpinnings (Poulis and Poulis, 2016). This calls for a greater need in organizational 
studies to account for an agent and agency perspective of organizational complexity. 
Building on this premise, the current literature on complex adaptive supply chain 
networks posits that an agent’s internal mechanism, schemas, behaviours and actions 
lead to emergence and adaptation (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et 
al., 2005; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009). However, the literature does not clearly 
explain how individual agent contributions contribute to macro system outcomes. The 
findings from this thesis, represented in a theoretical model of micro to macro causation 
figure 6, aspires to answer this ‘how’ question by dissecting the black box which holds 
the explanation for the transition from micro agent behaviour to system level self-
organization and emergence, as suggested by supply chain complexity literature. The 
model also describes alternate pathways that a system can take on being pushed to an 
adaptive gradient arising out of dynamic agent interactions. 
6.1.1 Model of micro to macro causation in supply chains: pathways to self-
organization and emergence 
The findings from the exploratory phases of this doctoral research have been condensed 
into a theoretical model of micro to macro pathways, figure 6. The model describes how 
the micro agent interactions result in a rise of adaptive tension and how the accumulated 
adaptive tension is dissipated by the system in three alternative pathways. Although the 
supply chains investigated were established networks that did not require any 
initialization by introduction of agents, yet for illustrating the micro to macro causation 
cycle and to understand how environment, agent behaviours and macro outcomes are 
related in a loop, this thesis proposes to considered the environmental and contextual 
conditions as its starting point.  
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Figure 6: Supply chain micro to macro pathways model 
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The model proposes that individual system agents use their internal models, schemas 
and mind-sets to interpret the feedback signal received from prevailing environmental 
and contextual system variables (depicted by transition 1 in the model). These 
individual interpretations, depending on agent characteristics and preference, may lead 
to behaviours, actions and interactions (depicted by transition 2 in the model). Many 
such actions and interactions of diverse system agents become embroiled or entangles 
leading to aggregation or dissipation of adaptive tension; ie. dissipation could occur 
before supply chain dynamics is interrupted. The system responds to this accumulation 
of excess energy/adaptive tension in three distinct ways resulting in three alternative 
system pathways: pathway of order, pathway of emergence and pathway of chaos. Since 
this thesis adopts a critical realist philosophy, it posits that this process of aggregation 
and dissipation of adaptive tension can be seen as bundle of steps (depicted by grey 
boxes in figure 6) that may be brought under a definition of one explanatory 
mechanism; ‘the mechanism of generation and dissipation of adaptive tension’. 
In the next section, this thesis presents a discussion of the mechanism of generation and 
dissipation of adaptive tension. This mechanism is presented as an explanation to 
answer the question of how individual agent behaviours and actions result in system 
wide emergence and chaos.  This will be followed by a discussion of the kind of micro 
agent behaviours and interactions produce adaptive tension and how these findings are 
positioned with respect to broader organizational science research.  
6.2 Mechanism of generation and dissipation of adaptive tension 
Supply chains are an arena in which a system of actors act, interact, adapt and establish 
relationships on the basis of their local knowledge, rules (McAdam and Scott, 2005) and 
system feedbacks resulting in emergent self-organisation (Plowman et al., 2007). 
Considering supply chains as complex system, it can be argued that the diversity and 
complexity of such a complex system makes it impossible to predict the outcomes of 
agents’ actions and activities (Holland, 1995) as small changes can be amplified to 
create dynamic and nondeterministic macro level effects (Plowman et al., 2007). That 
is, certain catalysing activities bring together the enabling conditions (mechanisms and 
contexts) necessary for collective action to emerge and have aggregated effects.   
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This thesis posits that the mechanism that brings about a micro to macro effects in 
complex supply chains is that of ‘generation and dissipation of adaptive tension’. The 
mechanism explains how individual agent behaviours contribute towards scenarios 
where the ‘normal’ dynamic supply chain is stressed to traverse into a trajectory of 
emergence or chaos and it also sheds light on the aggregated outcomes of individual 
agent actions and behaviours.  
The mechanism of adaptive tension is theorized to have two constituents; first 
escalation of adaptive gradient, and second the macro dissipation of it through three 
alternative system pathways.  
6.2.1 Escalation of adaptive gradient 
The analysis of the data revealed that two system patterns were at the core of producing 
destabilizing effects and contributing to adaptive tension. These were; (i) an increased 
disruption probability and (ii) system’s impaired crisis management capability. Each 
system pattern had several collective agency behaviours contributing towards it. These 
collective agency behaviours were a direct outcome of the aggregation of contributing 
micro agent behaviours and interactions.  
Inability of the organizational agent’s collective cognition to timely detect, interpret or 
anticipate adverse events was at the core of patterns linked to an increased disruption 
probability. While a loss in the system’s ability to manage, crisis was linked to 
collective behaviours that allowed a disruption to be handled inadequately because 
problems were either not contained or were allowed to amplify and cascade. 
Failure of collective cognition 
Increased disruption probability was directly linked to micro agent behaviours that 
demonstrated ethically deviant and casual work practices amongst actors. This meant 
that agents were not constantly concerned about supply chain disruptions so signals of 
impending problems were overlooked.  Other related micro behaviour was concerned 
with the loss in agent’s abilities to challenge or question wrong beliefs and assumptions 
about possible interpretations of looming SCD events. This was accompanied by 
agents’ demonstration of diminishing sincerity and sensitivity towards worsening 
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situations. The data revealed that a loss in shared understanding of ongoing operational 
and environmental conditions of the supply chains resulted in serious consequences. 
Problems being allowed to cascade or amplify 
Unfavourable organizational culture and deviant work practices were at the core of the 
loss in the system’s ability to manage crisis. An absence of a culture towards resilience 
contributed to the erosion of barriers to disruption (e.g. procedures, training, corrective 
action), which meant that problems that were generated were neither trapped nor 
mitigated. The organization had lost its potential to generate or capture knowledge and 
learnings from past events. Another element of unfavourable organizational culture was 
that problems were not being deferred to those with the requisite expertise to resolve the 
problems quickly and effectively and it led to delays and inaction. The escalation of 
crisis was also found to be linked to the stubborn and ego driven attitude of agents that 
inhabits them from finding logical solutions to impending problems.  
It was an ongoing and dynamic interaction between these two system patterns; Failure 
of collective cognition and the problems being allowed to cascade or amplify within 
contextual factors that led to an escalation of adaptive gradient. That is, these system 
patterns not only seemed to alter the context of the supply chain, but also that the altered 
context seemed to affect these system patterns, forming a recursive relation and 
influencing SCD.  
The escalation of adaptive gradient and the recursive relationship of system patterns and 
context can be argued using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). It can be argued that 
human agency and social structure are in a relationship with each other and it is the 
repetition of the acts of individual agents, which reproduces the structure (Giddens, 
1984). When people act they bring events, structures, constraints, and opportunities that 
were not there before they took action into existence and set them in motion (Weick, 
1987). People's actions reinforce and reproduce a set of expectations and it is this set of 
expectations that shapes future performances of the action. That is, these system 
patterns together contributed to the escalation of adaptive tension and had a negative 
effect on the supply chain, which had a detrimental effect on the action of other agents 
and so on.  
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The amplification of these micro agent interactions into defining system patterns was 
quite evident in the data. A possible explanation of it is that when a system is moving 
toward increased nonlinearity, small changes are more likely to be amplified by other 
actions and result in unintended radical change (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995). Plowman 
et al. (2007) note,  
“when social systems experience stress, people or groups that were independent 
become highly interdependent, often as the result of a crisis or turbulence of some sort. 
In highly interconnected systems, positive feedback reinforces an initial signal and can 
amplify small changes.” (Plowman et al., 2007: p. 520) 
That is, when supply chains start to drift toward disruption, the micro level actions of 
agents are likely to be amplified by other actions and increase the likelihood of a SCD.  
6.2.2 System pathways: Dissipation of adaptive tension 
A complex system displaced from dynamic equilibrium, due to exchange of energy in 
with the environment, tends to dissipate any excess energy and tries to attain a new 
equilibrium state. The process of adjusting and dissipating excess energy will compel 
the system to follow different trajectories that are often correlated to the excess energy 
in the system and the amount of energy it dissipates. These pathways linked to different 
levels of adaptive tension are systems response to lower its energy gradient. Talking 
about the dynamic pathways associated with adaptive tension and autocatalytic 
dissipative structures, Depew and Weber (1995) argue ; 
“are capable of generating dynamics that produce order, chaos, or complex 
organization at the edge of chaos” (Depew and Weber, 1995: p. 462) 
Similar to the above propositions, the theoretical model suggested in this thesis, figure 6 
provides three alternative pathways for a supply chain system under an adaptive 
gradient. Triggered by micro agent interactions, these possible pathways are determined 
by the gradient of the prevailing adaptive tension. Based upon  Prigogine and Stengers' 
(1984) conceptualization of critical adaptive tension values and its application for 
organization studies as argued by McKelvey (2001, 1999), this thesis suggests that the 
gradient of adaptive tension in supply chains will force the system to  descend into 
either of these  three distinct pathways: (i) Loop of order with increased energy 
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dissipating through local interactions, (ii) Loop of emergent complexity with the 
increased energy dissipating through emergence of new structures and (iii) Loop of 
deterministic chaos where the excess energy creates multiple basins of attractors that 
tend to induce an oscillatory behaviour to the system and its agents, creating multiple 
short lived processes to deal with increased energy. 
6.2.2.1 Loop of order with adaptive tension critical value less than 1  
Out of the 167 cases of supply disruption only 23 cases resulted in any form of 
emergence
2
. In rest of the cases all the organizational actor efforts and behaviours 
focused on preserving the continuity of the network without altering any of the system 
elements. The additional adaptive tension accruing due to agent behaviour or 
interactions was managed and reduced by managerial interventions and agent 
coordination. In these cases, agents ignored the behaviours causing SCD and accepted 
these SCD occurrences as unavoidable features of the system that did not require any 
system or behavioural adjustment. Inevitability assumptions restricted these agents to 
analyse or reflects on these events and thus there was minimal possibility of the system 
to emerge or self-organize into a new structure.  
For SCD events that did not result in any structural or procedural change, it can be 
argued that the adaptive tension is below the level that agents perceive would require 
attention or action. For example, respondent of firm 20 did not see the need to change 
anything regarding transit damage of their moisture sensitive goods due to a careless 
handling of consignments by the logistics provider. Top management of firm 2 did not 
see any merit in altering their lean policy for their automobile spare parts which had a 
high level of seasonality and demand fluctuation. The executive of firm 6 was 
comfortable with disruption causing behaviours of their sales and marketing team. In 
these cases supply chain executives settled for inaction, sometimes due to the 
assumption that disruptions are bound to happen or sometimes due to a feeling of 
resignation that their recommendations will not be approved by the higher management. 
This resulted in the system to continue with its practices, operations, processes and 
agent behaviours. The occasional SCD events were managed with variations in the sales 
                                                 
2
 Refer to appendix for details 
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and operations process or manufacturing schedules or, in most cases, production/ sales 
loss was just accepted as an unavoidable eventuality.  
The above discussion of loop of order, signifying the path 1-2-3-4-5-6-1 in the model 
suggests that despite adaptive tension being induced by the environment and 
interactions of agents, the negative feedback from managerial intervention or prevailing 
organizational culture of accepting SCD as an inevitable operational reality, is able to 
dampen or mitigate this tension.  
These findings resonate closely with the tenets of institutional science literature on 
agent schemas which argues that changes in organizational structure and its operations 
could be explained more by the actions of its powerful and influential members rather 
than factors like an organization’s size, its business environment or aspects of 
technology (Bartunek, 1983). Collective outcome of agent’s cognitive interpretations 
and schemas have a tendency to converge around the cognitive interpretation of a 
powerful leader or an influential manager (Daft and Weick, 1984) and thus at low levels 
of adaptive tension, less than 1
st
 critical value, powerful organizational actors may 
suppress the individual agents from self-organizing or influencing system wide 
emergence. Bode et al. (2011) also argue in their model of SCD that the motivation to 
act on a SCD is determined by the perception about the encountered variation in 
performance associated with that event; if the difference in performance exceeds an 
acceptable or defined level then the supply chain will evoke a corrective or non-routine 
response. In these cases of findings, where the system avoided self-organization or 
emergence, the perception about the departure from equilibrium conditions and the 
accumulated adaptive tension could be argued to be within an acceptable level and thus 
did not evoke any significant response.  
The raised adaptive tension due to agent interactions and behaviours were subdued by 
managerial decree and higher managerial decisions and interventions. This corresponds 
to the concept of a negative feedback in the system that tries to avoid structural changes 
by dampening the system disturbances and diffusing the excess energy through other 
means such as management. These negative feedbacks are mechanisms to manage, 
coordinate or control the behaviours generating adaptive tension and relates to effective 
operational organization (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001). 
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6.2.2.2 Loop of emergent complexity with adaptive tension between 1st and 2nd 
critical value  
This loop of emergence and self-organization is depicted in the model by the pathway 1-
2-3-4-7-8-9-1. In events connected to SCD, where some actors were found to be 
conspiring against organizational best practices, other actors were trying hard to 
negotiate and manage the chaotic situation, leading to oscillation between order and 
disorder.  The findings correlate with leadership behaviour studied by (Lichtenstein and 
Plowman, 2009)  that talks about some behaviours pushing the system to disequilibrium 
while other agent behaviours trying to stabilize the feedback signals by taking charge of 
local governance and enactment.  
However not all efforts to stabilize the uncertainty and chaos generated by conflicting 
agent behaviours are successful. The findings suggest that going past the 1st critical 
value of adaptive tension; the system would eventually self-organize and emerge into a 
new state. In this zone the system has sufficient energy that creates adequate adaptive 
tension to support the operations between the edge of order and edge of chaos. The zone 
corresponds to a zone of emergent complexity (Cramer, 1993), or the ‘melting zone’ 
(Kauffman, 1993) where this accumulated  system energy is dissipated by the formation 
of emergent structures; or division of existing ones ‘emergent simplicity’ (Cohen and 
Stewart, 1994) works to resolve the adaptive tension.  
In a supply chain context, Wilding (1998) has argued that parallel interactions can lead 
to demand fluctuations, uncertainty and chaos. It can be argued that supply chain system 
conditions during such occurrences of parallel, overlapping and conflicting interactions 
are comparable to the system conditions  termed as being at the edge of chaos: systems 
demonstrating such a behaviour are at the zone of emergent complexity (Cramer, 1993), 
or in the ‘melting zone’ (Kauffman, 1993). According to complexity paradigm, it is here 
that the system will eventually self-organize and emerge to a new form or new 
operational conditions. The same was observed in the findings from this research.  
This melting zone or the zone of emergent complexity is said to occur between the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 level of adaptive tension critical values (Cramer, 1993; Gell-Mann, 1994; 
McKelvey, 2001). If the adaptive tension is below the critical value, the system is at an 
increased energy but still in order, however being at an elevated energy level, the 
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system has the tendency to slip into the zone of emergent complexity with the slightest 
of perturbations or nudge. While above the 2nd level of critical adaptive tension value, 
the system will slip into deterministic chaos where multiple forces and attractors will 
define short lived system behaviours. 
The findings suggest that at multiple instances before, during, and after a SCD, the 
behaviour of agents forced the system to move into a new structure or condition. These 
findings are consistent with the organizational complexity work presented by 
McKelvey(2004, 2002, 2001, 1999) that accredits the escalation of adaptive tension and 
system wide emergence to coevolving agent interactions and dynamic mechanisms. As 
a direct result of agent behaviours and actions, an escalation of adaptive tension linked 
to cases of supply chain disruption, was found to be pushing the system to a chaotic and 
high amplitude oscillatory behaviour. This finding indicates that supply chains follow a 
similar path of moving from stable operating environment to the edge of chaos, as 
proposed by Benbya and McKelvey (2006) in the context of emergent information 
systems. The human actions and behaviours in supply chain settings were also pushing 
the system to a region of bounded instability (Stacey, 1996), causing the system to flips 
between order and disorder. System conditions that were found to be tipping the system 
into emergence were: a complete loss of trust or patience in a relationship, escalation of 
conflict, and acceptance or realization of previously ignored issues. 
Instances of self-organization and emergence were either reflected in a noticeable 
change of system structure or in a change related to the behaviour, mental models, 
practices, norms or goals of participating agents. 
The aggregation of schematized exploration of rules, options and decisions made by 
each individual agent results in the creation of a system wide agency and a collective 
behaviour that confers nonlinear, self-organized and emergent tendencies to the systems 
(Mccarthy et al., 2006). In the findings, it was observed that agent behaviours 
contributing towards adaptive tension, linked to cases of SCD, reached a critical 
aggregation level or an event space/ zone that could be viewed as tipping point for the 
system. System conditions and agent schemas associated with this event space/zone 
included: agents reaching to a point of a complete loss of trust on others ability to 
resolve the situations, disagreements turning into fully blown conflict that may require 
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legal arbitration or higher management intervention, acceptance of committed errors, 
mistakes or previously ignored issues and a clear realization for the need to take 
corrective actions. This zone or event space is represented in the model, figure 6, as 
‘zone of emergent complexity’. The system conditions in this zone of emergent 
complexity, represent aggregated schematized mental state of the decision makers and 
the following actions, decisions bring about self-organization and system wide 
emergence.  
In the findings from the cases of SCD, it was witnessed that on 23 instances
3
 the 
aggregation of adaptive tension causing behaviours results in agents seeking localised 
changes in the system structures, procedures, goals and agent mind-sets. This local 
order is neither governed nor instigated by any centralized order or top down decision. 
Instead it emerges out of the self-organizing behaviour of agents. For instance, in a case 
connected to firm 2, pushed to a corner by high degree of opportunism and nonchalant 
attitude of one of its suppliers, an executive of firm 2 acknowledged interfering with the 
process of quality approvals to expedite the approval of an alternative supplier. This 
event not only changed an existing organizational routine but also resulted in the 
alteration of the network structure by the addition of two more suppliers for a product 
that initially had only one supplier.  
It is noted that this change conflicts with the prevailing lean manufacturing culture of 
this Japanese automobile firm, yet localised actions of the procurement team could 
induce a not so lean structural change. The transaction cost economic view would argue 
that this initiative will increase the cost of administration and relationship management 
and thus diminish the overall efficiency (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). This drop in 
efficiency validates another complexity axiom that localised adaptation might not 
improve efficiency, rather it may, considering the mountain metaphor of the rugged 
landscape conceptualization (Kauffman, 1993), move the system from one peak of 
performance to another. This localised initiative, without a central directive or 
motivation was not just restricted to firm 2 but firms 1,7,9,11,15,17,20 and 21 also 
demonstrated similar traits. 
                                                 
3
 Refer to appendix for events demonstrating emergence 
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Discussing complexity and emergence in supply chain , Choi, Dooley and 
Rungtusanatham (2001) quote;  
“Emergence can be operationalized as some observable patterns that appear in the SN 
in an unanticipated way, and case studies can help identify what these observable 
patterns are in the supply network.”( Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001:pp 364) 
In the cases of SCD, the observed patterns indicating emergence were found to be; a 
change in network structure, a change in established process or procedure, a change in 
agent behaviour or a change in agents’ priorities or goals. These system changes were a 
result of aggregated agent behaviours, their collective schema shaping a collective 
agency and the accompanying adaptive gradient. Elsewhere in organizational 
complexity literature it has been successfully argued that a wide variety of autonomous  
and diverse agent behaviours, the manner of imposing organizational routines and rules 
to direct or govern agent actions, the nature of coupling between decision rules and 
processes, prevailing organizational structures, conflicting agent priorities, the 
requirements related to obtaining formal permissions, time pressures and constraints 
associated with the process etc, are some of the organizational factors that assist self-
organization and emergence (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Chiva-Gomez, 2004; Mccarthy 
et al., 2006). In supply chain settings, the findings of this research validate these 
findings from broader organizational literature. 
These changes in the organization and alterations in agent’s behaviours, goals and 
mind-sets, act as a positive feedback that feeds into context and organizational 
environment creating a pretext for inspiring changes in individual agent schemas and 
mind-sets. The process continues with a new set of updated agent actions and 
interactions which take the system forward. 
6.2.2.3 Adaptive tension greater than 2 and the path of chaos  
In organizational settings, McKelvey (1999) argues that organization conditions 
comparable to adaptive tension value above 2nd critical limit will result in the system to 
move into a reign of chaos. McKelvey (1999) suggests that under such conditions, a 
system is influenced by multiple attractors or with possibilities of bifurcated attractor 
basins, under the influence of which organizational actors and agents are drawn to 
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oscillatory and short term behaviours to respond or to negotiate the rise in adaptive 
tension.  In this region of bifurcated chaos (Benbya and McKelvey, 2006), a system is 
bound to demonstrate highly unstable behaviour. The excess energy is dissociated by 
the chaotic behaviour and the system may either collapse or will return to the emergent 
complexity zone. In the theoretical model of figure 6 this process is represented by the 
pathway 1-2-3-4-10. 
In the findings of this thesis, there were two events that could be argued to be 
representative of chaotic behaviour prescribed by organization complexity researchers. 
Chaos was demonstrated in an event connected to an industrial relation problem; in firm 
1, where the worker’s union went off into a strike with a complete breakdown of 
negotiations and efforts to reinstate work. This period of labour unrest was marred by 
various short term behaviours both by the union and the management to gain control of 
the situation. The respondent of firm 1 disclosed that many workers were fired and 
many temporary work force arrangements were used to restore production and all these 
initiatives were met with a strong resistance from the union. This was a typical case of 
the system entering a zone of chaos and uncertainty and it was accompanied with a total 
breakdown of the supply network. However, the company survived the crises and it was 
followed with multiple initiatives and instruction of safeguards to avoid such 
eventualities in future. This is representative of the system returning back to the zone of 
emergent complexity. 
Another event of supply chain chaos and a total breakdown of the system operations 
were disclosed by the respondent from firm 18. This event relates to a severe flood 
situation in a particular geographical location which resulted in the cutting off of all 
road and railways links to that area, resulting in transport links being broken for more 
than 4 weeks. But it was not the environment that triggered the chaos but the behaviour 
of the shipping and logistics provider operating for this geographical area. Being aware 
of a possibility of a month long transport link disruptions, to avoid the holding or 
warehousing cost, some of the logistics firm decided to off load their cargos in a public 
sector container and inland cargo service firm. As other logistics providers and shipping 
companies learnt about such behaviours, they too dumped their cargo in the government 
sector warehouse, resulting in a huge pileup of goods and a backlog that took months to 
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recover from. Many firms suffered due to this act as their precious cargos were stuck in 
the public sector warehouse and the logistic firms washed their hands off from taking 
any responsibility by saying that they had passed on the cargo to another firm. In the 
case above, it was evident that it was the agent behaviours and their choice of decisions 
that caused the system to collapse and many supply chains to go into a zone of 
uncertainty and chaos. Although the environment and floods did play a role but the 
action of agents extended the disruption much longer than the 4 weeks’ period for 
which the transport links were unavailable. These findings corroborate with Wilding's 
(1998) concept of ‘supply chain complexity triangle’ which argues that the uncertainties 
and fluctuations in supply chain are not always a result of external perturbation but are 
sometimes a result of the operations and system design. 
Chaos theory and the concept of attractor space and basins are not as easily adoptable to 
organizations as these terms are to a natural science (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995). 
However, axioms like sensitivity to initial conditions,  bifurcated attractor basins, 
strange attractors etc, can lend a complexity perspective to the chaos experienced in 
organizational settings (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995). The findings of this thesis reveal 
that situations that turned into chaos had many elements of similarity with the 
propositions on organization and chaos by Thiétart and Forgues (1995). These include; 
sensitivity to initial condition, such as growing unrest of workers being ignored by 
management or a natural disaster like flood; existence of counteracting forces and 
motivations, unpredictability of outcomes and changes etc.  
It is noted here that the chaos discussed in the above examples identifies itself with the 
deterministic chaos caused by different basin of attractors  and driven by simple rules 
(Cramer, 1993), rather than the a chaos associated with probabilistic distribution of 
random occurrences (Gell-Mann, 1994).  
6.2.3 Summary of the mechanism 
Bhaskar (1978), suggests that the understanding of a phenomenon is construed by an 
individual’s ability, viewpoint and understanding of a phenomenon, thus it is unwise to 
suggest a deterministic causality between an action and the observed outcome. 
Subscribing to this critical realist ontology, this thesis posits that although in supply 
networks a deterministic causality can be observed between micro agent behaviours 
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actions and interaction and the observed macro system behaviours like self-organization 
or emergence of a supply chain network, yet there is a need to understand this 
phenomenon from a viewpoint of underlying causal mechanisms. The discussion of the 
mechanism of generation and dissipation of adaptive tension lends explanatory 
relevance to the observation of micro agent behaviours translating into macro system 
outcomes.  
The next section of discussion looks into the individual micro agent behaviours that 
have potential to create aggregated system patterns leading to adaptive tension. 
6.3 Adaptive tension causing micro agent behaviours 
The findings of this research revealed many micro agent behaviours connected with 
events of SCD. These included; disruption of existing practices, violation of 
stakeholders’ ethical expectations, breaking of organizational norms and creation of an 
atmosphere of conflict and tension among participating agents. These behaviours were 
found to be triggering and propagating operational disequilibrium, uncertainty and 
disorder in the supply chain network. The observation aligns with the propositions of 
broader organizational research on human behaviours, dissipative structures theory  and 
CAS (Benbya and McKelvey, 2006). As observed and suggested by Benbya and 
McKelvey (2006) and Allen and Varga (2006) in information system’s research, 
Lichtenstein and Plowman (2009) in leadership research, Lichtenstein and Carter (2007) 
and McKelvey (2004) in entrepreneurship research and Mccarthy et al. (2006) in new 
product development, this thesis also found evidence supporting that system wide 
disequilibrium was being triggered by micro agent interactions. The analysis of SCD 
cases revealed that aggregated micro-state agent interactions and behaviours were 
pushing the supply chain systems away from its equilibrium operating conditions into a 
region of instability and chaos. It was also observed that parallel, overlapping and 
conflicting interactions of organizational groups and individuals connected to cases of 
SCD were a precursor of emergence and self-organization.  
However, the first place to look for the roots of agent behaviours is in the prevailing 
environmental conditions and contextual influences. Context and environment acts as a 
feedback signal that influences an individual agent’s mind-set and subsequently shapes 
their behaviours and interactions. This is discussed next. 
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6.3.1 Environmental conditions, context and agent schemas 
To help explain findings, that the situated actions of agents and the resulting adaptive 
tension were shaped by context and environmental factors, we refer to the literature on 
complexity and mechanisms. Since this thesis subscribes to a critical realist ontology 
and accepts the view that there are underlying mechanisms capable of explaining 
observed system patterns and behaviours, an understanding of the interplay of 
mechanisms and context is very relevant for the findings. 
The relationship between mechanisms and their effects is not fixed but is contingent 
upon context (Sayer, 1992). Mechanisms will only be activated in the right conditions 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997). These contexts enable as well as constrain the actions of 
agents (Giddens, 1984). It is the combination of conditions and the fact that happen 
together, their conjuncture (Ragin, 1987) which triggers the mechanisms that generate 
SCDs. Existing theory fails to explain how these outcomes happen. The context shapes 
boundaries, regulations and motives that guides and bounds an agent’s action.  
Complexity theory, with its emphasis on initial conditions and adaptive tensions 
(Anderson, 1999; McKelvey, 1999b), enabled the identification of five contextual 
conditions (type of agent involved, power asymmetry of relationship, frequency of 
procurement, timespan of the relationship and product characteristics) that help explain 
how the actions of agents can emerge and lead to supply chain disruption.  
Agent and context have a recursive relationship as context defines an agent’s 
schematization of experience while at the same time agents trigger and carry forward 
idiosyncratic and non-isomorphic changes in organizational environments and contexts, 
thus providing a clear reason to embrace complexity. 
6.3.2 Amplification of micro interactions 
The organizational studies and commitment literature view agent and agency as an 
entity that is influenced by the past, committed to the future and has its decisions and 
actions informed by the present (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). This conceptualization 
of agency does not compel it to be rational by definition or to be explicitly aligned to 
organizational expectation, instead it just seeks to define it using experiences, 
expectations and goals of agents that are consistent with past present or future.  
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Commenting on the rationality argument of agent and agency from a complexity 
perspective, Poulis and Poulis (2016) observed that the behaviour of agency can yield 
both aligned or misaligned outcomes because not all decisions of agency can be judged 
as rational or purposeful and calculative decisions aimed at future optimization. The 
authors view agents to be immersed in varying forms of organizational complexities and 
the decisions of agents to be driven by their cognitive and emotional interpretation of 
past, present and future. Under such premise, it is improbable for actors to be able to 
always subscribe to normative decisions, to make rational choices to complex scenarios 
or to be able to always end up with optimal solutions. The factors that suppress the 
possibility of optimality are structural constraints (such as  insufficiency of information, 
power asymmetries with others) and constraints related to the emotional or cognitive 
capabilities of actors (Poulis and Poulis, 2016). In the investigated cases of SCD, the 
agent behaviours that were found to be constraining the possibility to achieve optimal 
performance were; agent’s perceived loss of trust in organization, ambitious pursuit of 
issues by agents, the use of power and privilege to force their own agenda, agents 
conspiring against best practice and heedless performance by agents. These agent 
behaviours and actions were found to be diminishing the possibility of achieving 
optimal outcomes related to smooth functioning of the supply chain. 
In the extant literature there are findings that could be linked to the destabilising agent 
behaviours observed in the 167 cases of SCD. For example, over ambitious, and 
unsanctioned pursuit of organizational issues and problems by agents resonates closely 
with the idea of creative deviance proposed by Mainemelis (2010). The author suggests 
that when an employee’s new ideas or an out of box suggestion is rejected by the 
managers or management, branding them as unrealistic, or inappropriate; then if  the 
organization culture permits deviance (Mainemelis, 2010) and if the concerned 
organizational actors are capable, bold and imaginative to misalign with the 
organizational expectations (Poulis and Poulis, 2016), the employee may choose to  
violate the organizational recommendation and still pursue the idea. This violation or 
deviance is referred to as creative deviance (Mainemelis, 2010) and this has a potential 
to generate undesirable manifestations (Poulis and Poulis, 2016). The behaviour of 
overambitious pursuit observed in the data was also found to have generated 
undesirable consequences and to have amplified some responses that inflicted 
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disruptions either for the agent’s own organization or for a supplier firm. It is often 
argued that organizations avoid or disapprove innovative and entrepreneurial 
interventions that may be accompanied by deviance from established organizational 
norms (McClelland, Xin Liang and Barker, 2010). If an actor still pursues an 
unsanctioned, self-motivated entrepreneurial initiative, this is bound to have 
repercussions and would result in the escalation of adaptive tension within the 
organization.  
Although, it is accepted that deviant behaviour has personal and relational antecedents, 
yet the prevailing social context and structure could be argued to be the defining 
element of such a behaviour (Beyer and Trice, 1984; Staw and Boettger, 1990). In the 
results, such behaviours were found to be concentrated in a few firms and within these 
firms there were multiple instances of such behaviours. This is indicative that these 
firms could have had organizational culture and management related issues otherwise 
the phenomenon should have been witnessed across cases.  
Use of power and privilege to force one’s own agenda or dominant hierarchical attitudes 
also has tendency to amplify the responses in an organizational setting. In an example 
pertaining to  a scenario where a big firm takes over a smaller entity, McKelvey (1999) 
argue that if the big firm sends a team of managers from the headquarters to impose 
dominant and hierarchical rules and routines on the employees of the smaller firm then 
to cope with this tension, the people will act and behave to produce oscillatory response. 
In other words, the system will have oscillatory tendencies where individual actions 
have potential to amplify. It is also argued that rigid organizational norms and forceful 
exercise of privilege and power can demotivate and stagnate organizational actors 
(Mainemelis, 2010). Aggregation of such behaviours associated with reduced 
motivation can seriously undermine optimal performance and diminish the potential to 
manage crisis situations. 
In the findings, there were evidence suggesting that a top down enforcement of 
operational strategies and decisions was creating disequilibrium and tension. In new 
product development literature , linked to complexity thinking, it has been established 
that top down hierarchy and coupling between decision levels has a potential to amplify 
or supress complex system characteristics (Mccarthy et al., 2006). Although Mccarthy 
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et al. (2006) discuss the effect of hierarchal intervention in a positive light, yet in supply 
chain settings, as per our findings, this has negative connotations especially for the 
stability of the system.  
It can be argued that in an organization patterns linked to increased disruption 
probability and impaired crisis management capabilities can both be influenced by 
behaviours that motivates an individual or a group to conspire against acceptable best 
practices and to act against the right way of doing things. Behaviours like dishonest 
attitude, opportunistic behaviour, dishonouring commitments were found to be 
widespread across cases. Most of these behaviours were found to be connected with the 
marketing or customer service teams of the suppliers and the motivation behind such 
behaviours was often to gain short-term benefits and to secure business deals. Such 
behaviours have been long observed and debated in studies that subscribe to a 
transaction cost economic view; "self- interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985: 
pp 30, 47). Williamson (1985) argues that a definition of an act of guile should not be 
restricted to the act of stealing, cheating or lying, instead there is a need to generalise 
them by including acts like providing incomplete or distorted information, efforts to 
mislead others, intention to obfuscate or confuse the thinking and perception of others 
etc.  
Commenting on opportunistic behaviour, Romar (2004) observes that in any 
relationship where the accepted terms of agreement are not fulfilled in spirit is also a 
form of opportunism. The authors list a few kinds of opportunistic behaviour that 
resonates very closely to the findings of this thesis. These include; (i) delivering a lower 
than expected level of performance, (ii) intentionally defaulting on agreed upon 
deadline, (iii) Promising or committing to deliver higher quality or specification than 
what is actually delivered, (iv) misrepresenting capabilities. In the findings there were 
multiple events across cases where such behaviours were prevalent. The transaction cost 
view is suitable to argue such behaviours in a dyadic relationship however this thesis 
takes it further and looks at the macro impact of such behaviours.  
The discussion above corroborates the findings with similar observations in the extant 
literature. The findings of this research suggest that behaviours of organizational agents 
were escalating adaptive tension and consequently destabilising the system. Local 
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interactions were instrumental in creating conditions and contexts that were 
considerably undermining a supply chain’s ability to ward off or cope with disruptions. 
Elsewhere in operations management it has been experimentally illustrated that for 
systems with complex characteristics and feedbacks, with agent demonstrating bounded 
rationality and possibility of misinterpreting the system variables; there is a possibility 
for small changes in demand to amplify into large oscillation in the inventory (Sterman, 
1989). 
Using a distribution game driven inventory management experiment, Sterman (1989)  
demonstrated that a variance in demand, production order and inventory levels has a 
tendency to amplify as one moves from customer to its suppliers.  Sterman (1989) 
attributed this variance to be a result of a sequence of behaviours and decisions taken by 
the participants which author termed as “ misperceptions of feedbacks”. Drawing a 
parallel of the experiment with the errors committed on replenishment decisions 
connected with dynamically complex system/ environments, the author further argues 
that these amplified variances are a result of decision maker’s misperception about the 
feedbacks and of the individual’s insensitivity to the feedbacks that are generated by 
their own flawed decisions.  The underlying cause of these errors and amplification of 
effects could be traced to the cognitive limitations and flawed mental models of the 
decision makers (Sterman, 1989). It was also observed by the author that while placing 
future orders for systems with lead times or significant feedback delays, decision 
makers often struggle to give adequate weightage to the inventory in their supply lines 
and thus end up generating large fluctuations in their order rates in response to only a 
step increase in the customer demand.  It is also commonly observed that most 
participants of this experiment would blame others (other players or the game 
coordinator) or would suggest external causes for their poor performance.  
Sterman (1989) players demonstrated a lack of rationality and were found to be prone to 
misinterpretation; resulting in destabilising the system.  Although, this doctoral research 
does not investigate any oscillations in inventory, yet it was found that far from rational 
behaviours, misinterpretations of system conditions/context and local agent mind sets 
and mental models were prone to amplify system errors and lead to disruption and 
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destabilisation of the system. The findings correlate with the propositions made by 
Sterman (1989) in the beer game experiment.  
However, apart from the studies related to inventory and order fluctuations in the beer 
game experiment, the existing supply chain research tends to ignore behavioural aspects 
of supply chain phenomenon thus undermining the possibility to have higher relevance 
and preferring the appeal for its existing explanations and models related to observed 
supply chain phenomenon. This brings us back to the argument that there is a need to 
account for agent and agency perspective in design and modelling of supply chains 
(Gino and Pisano, 2008; Tokar, 2010) and a CAS perspective is argued as the 
theoretical foundation to study the amplification of such behaviours at the system level.  
6.4 Agent contributions to resilience and robustness of supply chains 
Most of the existing supply chain resilience and robustness studies approach the 
construct using structural, strategic and operational drivers, typically the ones that 
influence the strategy and structure at the network level (for details, refer to a discussion 
of SCD in the literature review section of this thesis). Since this research investigates 
supply chain resilience and robustness performance from an agent perspective, a 
perspective that has not been sufficiently researched in the existing body of supply 
chain literature, it becomes imperative to look for explanations originating elsewhere in 
the domain of broader organizational science literature. 
The dominant behavioural pattern emerging in cases demonstrating resilience was that 
of agents having strong commitments towards securing resilience and for that they were 
eager to go beyond their expected organizational commitments. The findings have a 
similarity to the aspect of resilience and robustness demonstrated by high reliability 
organizations (HRO). In the HRO literature it is shown that human resource practices 
targeted at prevention through anticipation or containment of an event are very effective 
approaches to ensure reliability and robustness performance of complex, dynamic and 
demanding systems (Vogus and Welbourne, 2003; Sutcliffe, 2011).  In doing so, actors 
in HRO settings develop capabilities and skills to respond to unusual or unexpected 
occurrences. Some of these capabilities, as proposed by HRO literature, are; (i) agents 
succeeding in better improvisation of their existing skills,(ii) agent developing 
multitasking capabilities, (iii) agent learning to adapt and respond to situations, (iv) 
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agents adopting a flexible hierarchy of decisions and structure of response (Sutcliffe, 
2011).  
In the instances where agents demonstrated resilience in the cases of SCD that were 
investigated, some behavioural traits of HRO human resource practices were evident. 
For instance, the executive of firm 7 demonstrated a proficient improvisation of 
negotiation skills to avert two events of disruptions relating to supply of molten sulphur. 
In the first event the disruption that was expected due to the formation of a cartel among 
logistics providers was broken by using a threat of new entrant. In the second event, 
cumulative buying portfolio was used to negotiate a favourable deal (full details of the 
events are in chapter 5, section 5.3.4). Similar skill full improvisation was also observed 
in firm 2’s decisions to relocate a high tonnage sheet metal manufacturing tool set from 
a supplier facing labour strike to an alternate location. This firm 2 intervention could 
also be seen as an act of flexible adaptation and quick response.  In instances where 
procurement and supply chain executives personally took ownership of testing and 
quality accreditation process of new suppliers or batches of supplies, then it could be 
argued that the agents demonstrated multitasking capabilities and the organizational 
culture gave them the freedom to flexibly alter the decision hierarchy. Other events 
discussed in the finding section of agent resilience
4
 also resonate closely to the human 
resource characteristics of HRO. 
So why do only few firms demonstrated resilience traits while others did not? The 
answer to it is that some executives and managers were able to negotiate and react to 
SCD better than others and this had a mediating role of the prevailing organizational 
culture as well as the individual traits of the manager. For instance, the executive of 
firm 7 shared multiple cases demonstrating resilience and these cases were spread 
across his current firm, a pharmaceutical production unit of a large multinational group, 
as well as the firm he worked for before, a fertilizer manufacturing unit. Probability of 
having a very flexible culture of resilience in both the firms is highly unlikely, thus 
indicating that this particular executive enjoyed taking bold decisions and this could be 
embedded in his personality. While the firm 2 executive shared experiences where in 
                                                 
4
 Chapter 5: section 5.3.4 
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some events he was able to take bold, resilience strengthening decisions, while in other 
events, due to the rigid attitude of the higher management, he was forced to abandon his 
out of the box ideas. Considering that firm 2’s executive was a middle manager while 
firm 7 executive was at senior position, this also explains why the firm 2 executive 
failed to implement all his ideas as he lacked the desired level of autonomy or power 
privilege. Commenting on the ability of executives to bring about a desired change in 
the policy or operations of an organization, (McClelland, Xin Liang and Barker, 2010) 
argues that capability to change the organizational practices is contingent upon personal 
attributes of top managers such as their experience, age, tenure and firm characteristics 
such as; size of the organization, past performance, the degree of managerial discretion 
and freedom provided by the organizational culture and the norms of the industry in 
which the firm is located. All these factors suggested by McClelland et al. (2010) have 
an influence on the resilience investigation of this thesis. Most of the resilience cases 
discussed by firm 7 executive were from his previous organization which was a 
relatively small manufacturing unit. While firms 1 and 2 were both automobile 
manufacturing units that are characterised by their high volume production and strong 
time pressure commitments suggesting an industry or sector specific trait of resilience 
culture. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a discussion of findings and positions these findings in the 
existing literature. Based upon empirical findings, this thesis develops a theoretical 
model of micro to macro causation, which provides an explanation for system level self-
organization and emergence originating from micro agent behaviour. The model also 
describes alternate pathways that a system can take on being pushed to an adaptive 
gradient arising out of dynamic agent interactions. Using the model, this thesis further 
explains the mechanism of generation and dissipation of adaptive tension. The 
mechanism explanation begins with a discussion of the ways in which a supply network 
moves away from operating conditions and gathers adaptive tension. The behaviours 
that were found to be associated with destabilizing system patterns were argued to be 
linked to the inability of the organizational agent’s collective cognition to timely detect, 
interpret or anticipate adverse events. It was also inferred that a loss in the system’s 
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ability to manage, crisis was linked to collective behaviours that allowed a disruption to 
be handled inadequately because problems were either not contained or were allowed to 
amplify and cascade. 
The stage of dissipating adaptive tension brought the focus of the study to critical values 
of adaptive tension and the possible dissipation pathways that could be associated with 
each level of adaptive tension. The model proposes three pathways; order, emergence or 
chaos, and elaborates how for different critical values of adaptive tension, a supply 
chain traverse one of these. For additive tension values critical value less than one, the 
influence of adaptive tension is dampened by negative feedbacks like managerial 
interventions or suppressive and hierarchical organizational culture. Under the influence 
of these negative feedbacks, agents neither act nor respond to factors causing adaptive 
tension and the system remains in its original state. When faced with critical values in 
the zone of emergent complexity, the agents act without any centralized order or control 
and this act brings about a self-organized, spontaneous and radical emergent change in 
the system. However when forced into a zone with critical adaptive tension value 
greater than two, a system turns to chaos. Under these situations a system oscillates at a 
very high amplitude and shows short term bifurcating tendencies. In empirical data, 
supply chain disruptions associated with industrial relationship issues and strikes were 
found to demonstrate such tendencies. In such situations either the system collapses or 
reduces adaptive tension to move to the zone of emergent complexity. settings  
The chapter further presented an association of the observed supply chain destabilizing 
behaviours and similar behaviours argued in the wider organizational behaviour 
literature. The chapter ended with a discussion of agent’s contribution to resilience. The 
thesis argued that there are also some positive agent behaviours associated with raising 
the adaptive tension and these behaviours could support beneficial self-organizational 
and performance enhancing system emergence.  
The next chapter of conclusion uses the arguments of this chapter to highlight the 
contributions made by this study. 
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7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter presents the contribution of this doctoral study to the existing body of 
literature and to the wider practitioner community. The chapter starts with a re-
introduction of the phenomenon of interest and the research question that was framed to 
support the enquiry. It is followed by a section on how the findings and discussion of 
this doctoral research answer the research questions conceptualized at the outset. 
Contributions made to the domains that directly influenced the design of the research 
question are mentioned under primary contributions. While additional insights gained in 
related bodies of literature are presented as secondary contributions.   
7.1 Research phenomenon and question 
The wider complexity fraternity and the organizational complexity research community 
have credibly established that systems/organizations operating far from equilibrium can 
demonstrate self-organizing emergence at the edge of chaos, leading to radical changes 
in system structures or associated processes. Proponents of emergence at the edge of 
chaos seek to theoretically explain the phenomenon based on adaptive gradient, a 
measure of energy tension between a system’s conditions and the environment, and the 
microstate element/agent interactions that contribute towards building this tension. 
These micro agent interactions are said to be driven by agent schemas and can bring 
about emergence or spontaneous system change without any centralized order or 
control. 
The progressive domain of supply chain complexity research also acknowledges the 
contribution of agent interactions and mechanisms in bringing about system level 
emergence and self-organization. However, supply chain complexity research is yet to 
formalise a theoretical explanation for the amplification of microstate interactions into 
self-organized emergent outcomes. This doctoral research set out to address this gap and 
takes a bottom up complexity perspective to study the influence of micro agent 
interactions on macro supply chain outcomes. To support this enquiry, cases of SCD 
were selected as the macro outcomes for which contributing microstate agent 
behaviours were investigated.  This was done using the following two research 
questions. 
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Research question 1: 
How do micro level agent behaviours and interactions influence macro level self-
organization and emergence in a supply chain disruption scenario?  
Research question 2: 
What are the factors and micro state agent behaviours that influence events of supply 
chain disruption? 
The next section summarises the discussion of findings to answer the above research 
questions and in doing so, the section presents the way this research has contributed to 
the academic and practitioner community.  
7.2 Primary contribution 
The primary objective of this research was to elucidate the link between micro agent 
behaviours and macro level supply chain phenomenon. With SCD as a context and 
complex system thinking as its theoretical framework, the research also planned to 
identify a set of micro agent behaviours that could be linked to the cases of SCD.  
The starting phase of the research enquiry revealed that the extant literature on SCD was 
deficient on the microstate agent perspective or behavioural aspect of operations and 
supply chain management. The majority of existing studies subscribed to the rational 
and complying human agent assumption and preferred to focus on structural and 
strategic drivers of SCD. In addition, the results from a systematic review of the 
literature revealed that the methodological perspective was dominated by simulation or 
survey based statistical techniques working with a restricted set of assumptions. While 
only a small number of studies looked at the phenomenon form interpretive or 
qualitative aspect. The contribution of human actions towards events of SCD was 
largely neglected in the literature.   
As the research progressed, the motivation to establish a firm scholarly foundation to 
argue micro to macro causation led to the investigation of complex system’s literature 
and its CAS perspective. Within the CAS literature there is a small body of research on 
supply chain as a CAS. Supply chain complexity literature was found to be aligned in 
their claim that micro agent behaviours and interactions can produce self-organization 
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and emergence in supply networks, leading to changes in the structure and operations of 
the network (Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Surana et al., 2005; Pathak et 
al., 2007; Nair, Narasimhan and Choi, 2009; Pathak, Dilts and Mahadevan, 2009; Bode 
and Wagner, 2015). However, despite a conceptual agreement on microstate agents’ 
capacity to impose macro outcomes at network level, none of the existing studies list 
any kind of agent behaviours that could reflect upon the system or provide any 
empirical evidence to validate this claim. These studies treat micro to macro causation 
with a black box approach since they fail to provide intermediate steps that would 
indicate how aggregated agent behaviours result in systemic outcomes.  
This doctoral research examines the intermediate steps associated with the mechanism 
translating micro agent behaviours to macro outcomes. By positioning the enquiry in 
systems’ pattern associated with events of SCD and juxtaposing it with empirically 
derived agent behaviour and interaction profiles linked to the patterns; this study 
proposes that agent behaviours impose a tension on the system. In the dissipating 
structures theory of CAS, a tension imposed by microstate behaviours is called adaptive 
tension and systems with adaptive tension above a critical value show emergent 
properties. Supply chains under tension due to agent interactions and behaviours are 
also likely to demonstrate self-organization and emergence.  
Elsewhere in organizational studies, it has been established that micro agent behaviour 
can lead to adaptive tension and if the adaptive tension goes beyond a critical value then 
the organization will demonstrate self-organization and emergence. These 
organizational studies have successfully operationalized terms like adaptive tension, 
critical value, dissipating structure, self-organization and emergence in leadership 
studies, new product development, and entrepreneurial studies. However, the 
conceptualization has not yet been adopted or formally used to argue CAS perspectives 
of supply chains. This thesis argues that CAS based supply chains studies need to define 
and operationalise these concepts in a supply chain setting. This is important to 
understand the influence of micro events on macro system phenomenon.  
This doctoral research contributes in this domain of supply chain complexity research 
by formally introducing the concept related to adaptive tension, critical values, and zone 
of emergent complexity. It further operationalizes these concepts using an empirical 
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investigation. This study presents a conceptualization of supply chain emergence and 
self-organization from dissipative structures and adaptive tension based view of 
complexity. This is the first primary contribution of this research and is made to the 
domain of supply chain complexity research.   
In their seminal work on supply chains as CAS, Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham 
(2001)  calls for operationalising key constructs like emergence and self-organization in 
a supply chain perspective by observing system or  organizational patterns linked to it. 
Discussing about the future research directions for supply chain complexity research, 
Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001)  argue; 
“Supply networks can undergo significant structural changes when crisis is upon them. 
As the crisis looms and agents in the system become aware of the crisis state, how do 
they react to such crisis? What relations exist between the way agents reacted and SN 
performance?” 
(Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham, 2001: pp365)  
The above statement prompts researchers to study agent reactions to supply chain crisis 
and to formalise the relationship between agent actions and supply network 
performance during disruption or crisis.  
Since no existing supply chain study documents the actions and behaviours of supply 
chain agents connected to events of crisis or disruption, there is an opportunity to 
contribute. This study answers the above call and extends the literature on supply chain 
disruption by going beyond the structural, strategic and operational drivers of SCD 
proposed in popular supply chain risk, vulnerability and disruption research (Stecke and 
Kumar, 2009; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Craighead et al., 
2007; Papadakis, 2003), into the domain of behavioural operations management. This 
thesis contributes to the disruption research by identifying a set of agent behaviours and 
mindsets connected to events of supply disruption (Chapter 5 – table 23). These are; (i) 
lose trust in the organization (ii) over ambitious pursuit, (iii) use power and privilege to 
force one’s own agenda, (iv) conspiring against acceptable best practices and (v) 
heedless performance. The findings formally introduce and establish the role of 
behavioural and cognitive element of human actions in a supply chain scenario. The 
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formalization of agent’s perspective in SCD events and empirical validation of it is the 
second primary contribution of this research.  
This research further contributes by answering the second question raised in the above 
statement by Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001) about the kind of relationship 
between agent reactions and crisis performance of supply network. The question raised 
by Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001) resonates closely to the first research 
question of this doctoral research that aims to explore the link between agent 
interactions and emergent system behaviours in events connected to SCD. The micro to 
macro causation model (Chapter 6 – Figure 7) particularly explicates alternative supply 
chain system pathways that a network under crisis can traverse. These pathways, 
bifurcating into order, emergence or chaos, are linked to both individual agent 
behaviours and aggregated system patterns, represented in the model as evidence of 
adaptive tension. A model that can be used to explain the possible future pathways of a 
supply chain under crisis is the third primary contribution of this research.   
The micro to macro causation pathway model presented in the discussion chapter, figure 
6 , also extends the existing work of Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001), by 
explicating an intermediary mechanism linking events of emergence in a supply chain to 
agent behaviours at micro level. In doing so, the model also empirically validates the 
conceptual suggestions of Choi, Dooley and Rungtusanatham (2001)  , Surana et al. 
(2005) and Nair, Narasimhan and Choi (2009) that micro state behaviours and schemas 
play a significant role in emergence and self-organization of supply chain networks and 
that supply chains are truly complex adaptive systems. This doctoral research affirms 
the complex adaptive system based conceptualization of supply chain networks by 
validating the claim that agent schemas and internal mechanism have an explanatory 
relevance for systemic phenomenon. This is the fourth primary contribution of this 
research 
7.3 Secondary contribution 
During the process of conducting this research, there were some insights gained on 
related literature domains. 
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The first secondary contribution relates to the assumption of the complying and rational 
human agent that is at the core of studies concerned with designing and optimising 
supply chain networks. It was observed in the literature review that supply chain 
disruption drivers were (Chapter 2 – Table 6) primarily conceptualized based upon 
structural and strategic antecedents of disruption. An underlying assumption of these 
studies had been that agent behaviours and cognition has no impact on the networks. 
Supply chain models and phenomenon explanations that disregard human aspect of 
behaviour have been thoroughly criticized in a small body of literature that is referred to 
as the behavioural operations management domain (Bendoly, Donohue and Schultz, 
2006; Gino and Pisano, 2008; Bendoly et al., 2009; Tokar, 2010). Bendoly et al. (2009) 
calls this lack of consideration of behavioural aspect as a major limitation of supply 
chain research which restricts the scope, depth and practical relevance of these studies. 
In theoretical research, Bendoly et al. (2009) present a compelling argument to support 
the behavioural aspects of supply chain management by positioning supply chain related 
constructs in four behavioural and cognitive literature domains; cognitive psychology, 
social psychology, group dynamics and system dynamics. Bendoly et al. (2009) call for 
future operations research to judge the impact of human behaviours and to present 
accountability of systemic phenomenon from a behavioural aspect. This call reiterates 
the suggestions made by Gino and Pisano (2008) to raise the awareness and legitimacy 
of  the behavioural aspects of operations management. The findings from this doctoral 
research answer the above call. They formally introduce and establish the role of 
behavioural and cognitive element of human actions in a supply chain scenario. This is 
the first secondary contribution and is made to the domain of behavioural operations 
management.  
Furthermore, this study contributes to the domain of supply chain resilience and 
robustness literature by identifying a link between system resilience and the behavioural 
and cognitive traits of people managing supply chains. This extends the current 
resilience debate that until now has not considered the managerial perspective or 
behavioural antecedents of a system’s resilience. It is worthwhile to note that the human 
perspective of systems’ reliability and resilience is an established body of literature in 
the high reliability organization theory (Vogus and Welbourne, 2003; Sutcliffe, 2011) 
and organizational safety domain (Reason, 1990, 1998); however, it is yet to be 
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accounted for in the supply chain robustness and resilience literature. This doctoral 
research presents a conceptualization and explanation of agent behaviours leading to 
supply chain resilience and robustness and validates it by using qualitative case data. 
This extends the current conversation in the supply chain resilience literature and is the 
second secondary contribution of this research.   
The research also contributes to the ontological perspective of supply chain research 
which until now remains to be rigidly rooted in a positivist ontology and assumptions of 
deterministic causality (Aastrup and Halldórsson, 2008). Research approaches leaning 
on positivism fail to provide a context relevant explanation of ‘how’ or ‘why’ a 
particular supply chain phenomenon comes into existence (Sachan and Datta, 2005). 
This thesis proposes to use a critical realism driven mechanisms based enquiry to 
answer the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Critical realism as a philosophical stance has 
found recognition in the wider organizational literature for its ability to provide context 
relevant explanations of causality (Mingers, 2000, 2006; Easton, 2010; Adamides, 
2012; Wynn and Williams, 2012; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Peters et al., 2013). 
However in supply chain research, to date, only two critical realist enquiries have been 
published in quality journals and these are: Adamides (2012) who uses a critical realism 
to study the inventories in a perishable goods supply chain,  and Rotaru et al. (2014) 
who used Fredendall et al.'s (2009) research about operational failures in post-operative 
services of the health care industry to illustrate a critical realist methodology. This 
doctoral research furthers the domain of critical realism based research enquiry in 
supply chains and provides a field study to operationalise it in a SCD context. To 
summarise the ontological contribution, this study presents the utility of having a 
critical realist research design for investigating complex system phenomenon, 
particularly the ones that require accounting for an agent’s perspective. It also 
demonstrates the utility of abductive reasoning in supply chain theory building. This is 
the third secondary contribution of this research. 
On the methodological front, the use of Rep Grid triads to compare cases of SCD is 
unique to disruption research. The approach served its purpose of stimulating the 
respondent to present deeper levels of association among cases. It helped respondents to 
access and express insights buried under their abundant tacit and experiential 
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knowledge of supply chains and the cases they were discussing. The use of the ‘Gioia 
methodology’ to gain rigour in the use of grounded theory and present the qualitative 
findings in a very scientific manner is also a contribution as it has never been utilized 
for interrogating supply chain data. Together these two aspects of methodology form the 
fourth secondary contribution of this research.  
7.4 Implications for practice 
The aspects of SCD addressed in this research have significant implications for practice. 
Insights gained from the research can guide managers on aspects of human behaviour 
and its contributions to the management and design of supply chain networks.  
Mulani and Hau (2002) argue that 40-60 % of supply chain managers’ time is spent on 
handling disruptions. In hindsight, reflecting on my experience of talking to several 
supply chain executives from various organizations, an obvious conclusion was that 
supply chain executives were constantly involved in firefighting issues originating out 
of behaviour or actions of others. Indeed, they were handling disruptions as suggested 
by Mulani and Hau (2002), but on closer inspection it was found that they were 
constantly battling with behavioural aspects of the humans associated with the network. 
Respondents openly accepted that problems were triggered and amplified due to the 
behaviours of other organizational functions, organization’s top management, 
representatives of suppliers and members of logistics companies. This is evident from 
the fact that out of 167 cases of SCD discussed by the respondents, only 12 cases relate 
to natural catastrophes or genuine problems originating in the extended network. While 
all the other cases had a behavioural antecedent associated to events leading up to 
disruption. Respondents also expressed their disappointment that the supply chain 
function is always burdened with the responsibility to cover for the errors made by other 
people, teams or organizational functions.  
Accepting the importance of agent behaviours, actions and interactions, this doctoral 
research highlights particular destabilizing agent behaviours and actions that may lead 
to supply chain disruption. The practitioner community can gain from the list of agent 
behaviours proposed by this research to understand and avoid particular kind of 
disruptions that are propelled by behavioural interaction of humans engaged in the 
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supply network. For instance if managers observe that organizational members are 
losing trust in organization and its management, supply network members are 
disregarding processes or showing signs of opportunism /dishonesty and there are 
frequent instances where people repeatedly commit careless mistakes or show a lack of 
vigour towards adhering to the process requirements, then these observations are signs 
of accruing behavioural tension in the supply chain. Using the findings from the 
investigation of 167 real cases of SCD, this doctoral research demonstrates that impact 
of such kind of behaviours and the resulting behavioural tension could amplify under 
complex and dynamic conditions and that such behaviours of micro agent interactions 
should not be discounted.  If supply chain managers are willing to avoid disruptions, 
they need to cautiously monitor and timely address such behaviours.  
Findings of this research also indicate that supply chain members connected with events 
of disruption had problems with organizational hierarchy and inter functional alignment, 
which often resulted in supply chain members loosing motivation and willingness to 
perform as per organizational expectations. The patterns in the data indicated that an 
aggregated impact of inter-functional misalignment and demotivated supply chain 
members was increasing the likelihood of disruptions and was also severely 
undermining a network’s capability to respond to disruptions. The practitioners should 
view this finding as a guideline to evaluate the events in their supply network regarding 
burgeoning issues related to organizational members losing their motivation or 
willingness to be resilient towards possible disruption scenarios. The findings 
demonstrated that events like; pushing supply chain members to expedite dispatches, 
compelling supply chain members to work additional hours to support urgent requests 
or asking supply chain to resolve issues originating from forecasting or planning 
blunders done by marketing function, can negatively impact the mind set and behaviour 
of supply chain members. Patterns in the data also revealed that if the organization fails 
to sufficiently recognize or reward the efforts of supply chain members then this could 
further damages the willingness and motivation of supply chain members to be 
proactive towards disruption incidents.   
Moreover, the insights from this research are important for supplier management 
practices. Managers and organizational members should be aware of the levels of 
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opportunism and false commitments made by people representing suppliers and such 
practices should be recognized at the earliest. The findings suggest that if such 
incidences or practices persist, then they have a potential to escalate into bitter tussles 
and in extreme circumstances culminate into disruptions. Managers should work 
towards reducing the effects and impact of such behaviours.   
Patterns from the 167 cases of disruption discussed in the findings are also indicative 
that behaviour of organizational actors was more prone to cause disruption under some 
typical system and ongoing conditions such as, while launching a new product, products 
that have complex design or manufacturing requirements, product purchases that are 
either first time or one off purchase and asymmetry among network partners in terms of 
power , volume or turnover dependency. Organizations can gain from awareness of 
these conditions/ disruption context as these conditions have a strong bearing on 
people’s behaviour and the outcomes of disruption events. Managers are advised to 
carefully consider the context of the procurement and judge the associated behaviours of 
stakeholders to evaluate the quality of the relationship.  
This doctoral research further demonstrates that managerial behaviours and actions 
targeted at supporting struggling suppliers could improve disruption performance. 
Incidents reveal that behaviour of procurement and supply management teams could 
have a great impact on the completion of complex outsourced tasks. Based upon the 
task requirement, the supplier management team should establish their behaviours and 
degree of support rendered to their suppliers and this should not be just restricted to Tier 
1 suppliers but should also be extended to key accounts on Tier 2 as well. A case 
connected to firm 2 demonstrated that going an extra mile to help a struggling Tier-2 
supplier’s manufacturing unit facing a labour strike helped firm 2 avoid a major 
disruption. Firm 18 also went beyond the contractually committed support to help a 
supplier avoid losses, while contrary to these examples, firm 21 followed a callous and 
apathetic attitude towards their suppliers which led to severe disruptions.  
Finally, this study demonstrated that agent behaviours supporting resilience and 
robustness were contingent upon two aspects; (i) the prevailing organizational culture 
that supported decentralized decision making and out of the box thinking; and (ii) 
individual traits of the managers that prompts them to take bold decisions and go an 
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extra mile to pursue disruptions.  In eight disruption cases related to firm 7 and three 
cases from firm 2, supply chain executives adopted out of the box thinking and over 
ambitious pursuit, resulting in avoidance of disruptions. This is a crucial finding for 
organizational decision makers responsible for harnessing organizational culture as a 
culture promoting such managerial traits could reinforce the performance of supply 
networks. In hierarchical organizations, there is a need to introspect the prevailing 
rigidity in organizational cultures and the prominence of a top down hierarchy and 
conventional decision making. The cases support the view that there is a need for 
decentralizing decision making and supporting innovative and creative approaches. 
To summarise the implications for practice, the most important takeaway for 
organizations is that this study succeeds in providing organizations with an explanation 
for observed deviations in their operations performance using a behavioural aspect of 
human agents. Using the findings of the research, firms and managers will be able to 
look beyond normative supply chain models and operational procedures into the aspect 
of how these procedures are disposed in an operations environment. Being aware of 
agent behaviours and schemas relevant to SCD, firms will be able to draw better 
interventions and create more robust strategies to tackle events of disruption.  
A summary of all the contributions is presented in table 31. 
7.5 Limitations 
Like all research, there are limitations that are to be noted. First, the research strategy of 
investigating cases related to SCD required to take some key design decisions which 
imposed certain limitations on the outcomes. The decision to adopt a purposeful 
sampling technique over a random or theoretical sampling could be argued to be 
influencing the patterns of outcomes observed in the findings; it was heavily biased 
towards manufacturing firms. Also, in pursuit to control both a sufficient degree of 
variety and of similarity among the investigated cases, the opportunity to evaluate the 
idiosyncratic possibilities associated with random sampling were compromised. 
Data collection posed another limitation for the research. The interview data used in this 
research is reliant on a single respondent from each firm. Whilst, respondents were 
senior managers with first-hand experience of SCD, reliance on a single respondent 
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could add an element of personal bias and thus in future there is a need to include the 
viewpoints of other agents associated with the SCD events. Thirdly, SCD are temporal 
events and necessarily our study was reliant on retrospective accounts. This puts a 
limitation on the ability of the respondents to sufficiently and accurately account for 
elements associated with these historical events.  
Table 31: Summary of contributions 
Type of 
contribution 
Description of the contribution 
Primary 
contributions 
 presents the conceptualization of supply chain emergence and self-organization from 
dissipative structures and adaptive tension based view of complexity. 
 Formalizes the agent perspective in SCD events and empirically validating it in a field based 
case study by presenting a set of agent behaviours contributing to the departure of supply 
chain from normal operating conditions and influencing network disruptions.  
 A model that can be used to explain the possible future pathways of a supply chain under 
crisis  
 affirms the complex adaptive system based conceptualization of supply chain networks by 
validating the claim that agent schemas and internal mechanism have an explanatory 
relevance for systemic phenomenon.  
Secondary 
contributions 
 establish the role of behavioural and cognitive element of human actions in a supply chain 
scenario  
 presents a conceptualization and explanation of agent behaviours leading to supply chain 
resilience and robustness and validates it by using qualitative case data. 
 presents a systematic data collection tool of Repertory Grids as a preferred technique to 
help respondents articulate and discover agent and agency aspect of a supply chain 
phenomenon. 
 presents the utility of having a critical realist research design for investigating complex 
system phenomenon, particularly the ones that require accounting for an agent perspective. 
It also proves the utility of abductive reasoning in supply chain theory building. 
  operationalise a modified version of grounded theory based inductive, qualitative analysis 
framework based upon Gioia methodology. 
Contribution to 
practice 
 provide organizations with an explanation for observed deviations in their operations 
performance using a behavioural aspect of human agents. Using the findings of the research, 
firms and managers will be able to look beyond meagre normative supply chain models and 
operation procedures into the aspect how these procedures are disposed in an operations 
environment. 
 help organizations to draw interventions and strategies. Being aware of agent behaviours 
and schemas relevant to SCD, firms will be able to draw better interventions and more 
robust strategies to tackle events of disruption.  
Furthermore, in each case the data was collected from only the focal firm. The issues 
and concerns raised by respondents about their suppliers could neither be verified nor 
correlated with their partner’s perspective. A one-sided analysis of relationships and 
behaviours could be argued to limit the possibility of developing deeper insights.  
Lastly, in an effort to conceptualize causal mechanisms influencing the micro to macro 
transformation of agent behaviours, from a critical realist perspective, required a degree 
of creativity and theory matching which could be judged as subjective. Although, the 
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use of abductive logic for theory matching between the observed and available 
theoretical explanations is a proven research methodology for a critical realist 
perspective, yet it limits the possibility to comment on other possible mechanisms that 
may be active in the investigated cases.  
7.6 Direction for future research 
The outcomes of this research and the discussions of its limitations are suggestive of 
possible future research endeavours that could address unanswered questions related to 
this doctoral enquiry. 
The theoretical model proposed in this thesis can be extended and refined by evaluating 
behavioural aspects from either side of a relationship. The escalation of adaptive tension 
due to agent interactions, in a supplier buyer context, can be better expressed if 
narratives of tension causing micro agent interactions are correlated from each side and 
inference drawn about accompanied agent schemas prompting such behaviours.  
The theoretical model proposed in this thesis presents a very restrictive account of agent 
schemas and mindsets and that is an area that needs to be further extended. In the 
organizational behaviour literature, there are instruments available to account for 
cognitive and behavioural aspects of organizational members, for example empirical 
study on organizational citizenship behaviour and counter productive work behaviour 
by Dalal (2005). These proven instruments can be used to enrich our understanding of 
behavioural aspects of supply chains. It should be noted that this doctoral thesis came 
up with only negative and destabilizing agent behaviours, however there will be an 
abundance of agent behaviours that may be positively contributing to a supply chain’s 
performance. This could include citizenship behaviour, positive deviance, creative 
deviance etc. 
The concept of emergence and self-organization has been viewed in a positive light in 
new product development and entrepreneurship literature. There is a need to 
conceptualize the supply chain zone of emergent complexity from a positive viewpoint. 
Supply chains within a zone of emergent complexity that support positive adaptation 
and self-organization could provide useful insights for designing adaptable, resilient and 
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robust supply networks. This is an area that needs attention from micro interaction and 
adaptive tension perspective.  
Future studies could further examine the contextual conditions that contribute to 
destabilization, particularly using configurational approaches that stress nonlinear 
relationships and conjunctural causality and identify the combinations of factors that 
shape particular outcomes (Ragin, 1987; Fiss, 2007). Whether and why certain 
behaviours cause greater magnitude SCD events than others. The findings here also 
raise questions about how micro level actions might generate other macro level 
outcomes. An adaptive tension based explanation of more supply chain phenomenon 
could be investigated. These future studies could focuses on how these outcomes are 
produced, and the agent schemas that give rise to action, how acts, activities and 
interactions are undertaken and how these actions have transformational effects.  
7.7 Summary 
This chapter presented a discussion of the contributions of this research to both the 
academic and practitioner community, accounted for its limitations and lastly provided 
future directions that could further extend or enrich the findings of this research 
contribution. This formally concludes this doctoral research and this thesis. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Details of Data Sample 
 
Firm 
code 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event  10 Event 11 
Event 
12 
Total  
event
s 
Emergen
t events 
Firm 
1 
Japan 
Tsunami 
(E) 
Thai Flood 
(E) 
Regional 
Agitation 
Broken 
transport 
links 
Political 
agitation 
Thai 
monarchy 
Japan vs 
China 
Tax 
litigation 
Fire at 
vendor 
IR issue 
(E) 
  10 3 
Firm 
2 
Spare part 
clutches 
Supplier 
end strike 
(E) 
Alkaline 
battery 
supplier 
(E) 
Repeated 
failure of 
alternative 
supplier 
(E) 
Quality 
check 
bottle neck 
Changes in 
testing specs 
S&OP issues      7 3 
Firm 
3 
Flooded 
transport 
routes 
Transport 
strike 
Truck 
availability 
Load 
clubbing 
Material 
availability 
Financial 
block on 
credit limit 
Govt delay 
Driver 
related 
issues 
    8  
Firm 
4 
Consolidatio
n related 
delay 
Process of 
signing PO 
Frequency of 
shipping 
A misplaced 
PO 
Human 
error in 
S&OP 
Financial 
delay 
      6  
Firm 
5 
Packaging 
quality 
disruption 
Packaging 
shortfall in 
expansion 
Utility supply 
issues 
Bureaucratic 
or political 
interventions 
Port strike 
Machine 
spares 
New product 
launch 
disruption 
due to design 
issues 
New 
flavour 
quantity 
issues 
Unorganised 
sector 
procurement
s 
   9  
Firm 
6 
License issue Label issue Airlift issue 
One off 
purchase 
incident 
ERP 
integration 
issue 
Split PO 
consolidatio
n 
Chinese 
counterpart 
issues 
     7  
Firm 
7 
Packaging 
supply 
disruption 
(E) 
conveyer 
belt 
Molten 
sulphur 
(E) 
Transport 
cartel 
(E) 
Sulphuric 
short fall in 
market 
Monopoly 
vendor close 
down 
(E) 
Work 
contract 
related issues 
European 
unit 
stopped 
production 
of a key 
component 
(E) 
False 
commitment 
by resin 
supplier 
(E) 
False test 
certificat
e related 
disruptio
n 
(E) 
Quality 
people 
creating 
bottlenec
k 
(E) 
Acid 
purity 
relate
d issue 
(E) 
12 9 
Firm 
8 
Stress film 
disruption 
UDM 
machine 
break down 
( spare 
camera also 
A critical low 
volume 
additive ( the 
company 
acquisition 
Shortage of 
reuse 
material 
scrap 
Newly 
developed 
supplier 
now asking 
price rise ( 
Stress film 
and 1st may 
close down  
      6 2 
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did not 
word) 
(E) 
coincided with 
the event) 
it was 
developed 
as a low 
cost 
moderate 
quality 
supplier) 
(E) 
Firm 
9 
Pirate attack 
Weather at 
sea 
Que up for 
birthing 
Discharge 
hose leak 
Supplier 
default on 
delivery 
date 
Diesel 
dilemma 
Traders 
change 
schedules 
Policy 
changes at 
user end 
    8  
Firm 
10 
Train 
schedule and 
delays 
Freight bill 
lost 
Interstate 
documentatio
n 
Whirlpool 
events 
LG delay        5  
Firm 
11 
Netwback 
issues 
KSA asset 
stabilization 
Variation in 
product 
output 
bleeding into 
supply chain 
issues 
(E) 
Long lead 
time and 
sale on 
water 
(E) 
2000 grades 
of PVCMA 
forecasting 
issue 
Forced 
measure 
related 
disruption 
Finance block      7 1 
Firm 
12 
Port delay 
No entry 
timings 
Supplier break 
downs (once a 
year) 
Transport 
issues 
Quality 
issues with 
suppliers 
       5  
Firm 
13 
Part supply 
to customers 
Quality and 
quantity 
issues 
Vessel 
availability 
Offload 
pumps on 
ports 
Pooling of 
tank 
resource at 
ports 
PR to PO 
cycle 
SKU level 
forecasting 
error 
Tempering 
with 
tracking 
device 
Financial 
crunch 
Shift in 
supplier 
location 
and port 
  10  
Firm 
14  
Reactor 
supply delay 
Technical 
specificatio
n not 
agreed 
bottling 
plant 
Dust collector 
Temperature 
and fire 
proofing  
Design 
modificatio
n due to a 
concrete 
column 
       5  
Firm 
15 
Warehouse 
stackers 
Agri pipping 
system 
Tractor in 
European 
plant 
UPS 
manufacture
r 
Joint 
venture 
specialized 
machine 
with a 
world 
leading firm 
Specialized 
piping 
(E) 
      6 1 
Firm 
16 
Forecasting 
granularity 
related 
Product 
proliferatio
n 
SAP as a 
blackbox 
KPI and 
forecasting 
calculations 
DC and RDC 
neither 
optimally 
Inter nodal 
issues 
Second 
guessing, 
trust and 
System and 
personal 
excel files 
GM sales 
personality 
and identify 
Marketin
g not 
clear of 
Incorrect 
or absent 
matrices 
 11  
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issues wrong located nor 
inventoriall
y optimised 
alignment had 
various 
versions 
issues logistics 
priorities 
in new 
product 
launch 
for lost 
sale 
accountin
g 
Firm 
17 
Low 
Quotation ss 
fabrication 
(E) 
Quality 
Culture 
(E) 
Theft with no 
rider on 
contract 
Reluctant to 
reserve till 
testing 
 
Iteration of 
skilled 
manpower 
       5 2 
Firm 
18 
Port low tide Thai rice 
Thai port 
feeder vessel 
Rice weavers Yemen port 
Agent death 
in war 
Redirect KSA 
cargo 
Transport 
links 
inaccessibl
e due to 
floods 
    8  
Firm 
19 
Man
u 
Barrel 
explosion 
Snow 
blizzard 
kerosene oil 
disruption 
Land slide cut 
off a post for 8 
months with 
2000 men 
brigade 
Disruptive 
floods 
Kingfisher 
disruption 
Vendor 
going out of 
business 
Cash 
replenishmen
t issue 
     7  
Firm 
20 
Laminate 
Rejection on 
line 
Short fall 
butter 
scotch 
Laminate Start 
up 
Glucose 
lumping 
Cashew 
shortfall 
Jar rejection 
(E) 
Hair 
contaminatio
n 
Cartoon 
short fall 
 
Sugar 
rejection 
Corrugate 
box  
  10 1 
Firm 
21 
 
Skin panel 
disruption 
TRS 
disruption 
Cage free 
wheel 
disruption 
Bottom 
stretch 
Dyna Tech 
(E) 
Supporter 
tube 
Legend 
disruption 
Frame 9 MGB    9 1 
Firm 
22 
Finance 
block 
Outsourced 
equipment 
delay 
New product 
launch 
disruption 
Govt sector 
suppliers 
Customers 
ask newer 
versions 
Channel 
partner 
discontinued 
      6  
            Total 167 23 
Coloured boxes demonstrate events that were either natural calamity or disruptions not caused directly by human behaviours 
(E) symbol demonstrates that these events resulted in network emergence; either due to a change in network structure or a change in system’s process, priorities or goals 
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Appendix B Repertory Grids 
 
Firm 1 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event  10 
Sudden impact 3 3 5 4 3 3 3 5 5 4 
Production was not possible 5 5 5 1 2 2 2 1 5 5 
Quick evaluation of alternative supplier 1 1 1 5 3 4 4 5 1 5 
Multi location advantage 1 1 5 4 5 4 4 5 2 4 
Long pipe line of material in transit 5 5 1 2 2 5 5 1 1 1 
Logistics disruption 4 4 5 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 
Political influence 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 
Man-made 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 1 
Government failure 5 5 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 5 
Involvement of top management 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 5 5 1 
Lobbying was required 5 5 3 3 3 3 1 2 5 1 
Truck driver issues 5 5 2 1 1 4 5 5 5 3 
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Firm 2 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 
Very close cooperation with supplier 2 5 1 1 1 5 3 3 
70% dependency of supplier on us 2 5 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Opportunistic supplier behaviour 1 1 5 5 5 3 1 1 
Monoploistic supplier behaviour 1 1 5 5 5 3 1 1 
Market effect 5 1 4 3 1 1 1 5 
Product not fit for lean still Management forcing a lean approach 5 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Inflated demand 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Design and supply chain impact not considered 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Supply chain not involved in decision making 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 4 
Supply chain priorities and concerns not understood 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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Firm 3 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 
Material available but not billed 3 5 5 3 1 5 1 1 
Visibility related issue between us and customers 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 1 
Required better internal planning 2 4 4 5 5 5 1 3 
Transporter were forced to search for an alternative or invasive plan 5 5 2 1 1 1 4 3 
Convince the customer for a particular volume 4 4 1 5 5 2 1 1 
customer forecast are inaccurate 1 1 3 5 5 4 1 1 
 
 
Firm 4 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Process difference between countries 5 5 1 1 1 1 
forecast issues 5 1 4 1 5 1 
Buyer does not disclose the real cause 5 1 1 1 1 5 
Human error 1 4 1 5 5 3 
financial viability issues with half container 5 1 5 1 1 1 
multiple buying by the buyer 5 5 3 1 1 5 
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Firm 5 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E9 E8 
Sole Supplier  
5 3 5 5 2 5 5 1 4 
Unexpected Supplier Behaviour  
5 3 4 3 1 5 5 2 5 
Non Substitutable product  
5 2 5 1 5 5 4 2 5 
Relevance Of Supplier Flexibility  
4 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 2 
Incorrect Supplier Capability Assessment  
5 5 5 4 1 2 5 5 4 
Abuse Of Bargaining Power By Supplier  
5 1 4 1 1 5 1 5 2 
Dyadic Relationship  
5 5 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 
Low Influence Of Product Price  
1 4 5 5 5 1 2 1 5 
Process Or Procedure Fault  
1 5 5 5 5 1 1 3 3 
Government And Policy Issue  
1 1 5 5 4 1 1 3 2 
Low Cost of Negotiation  
3 4 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 
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Firm 6 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 
narrow or inconsiderate view 5 1 4 5 3 1 5 5 
Did not consider our priorities or urgency 5 4 2 5 1 1 5 5 
carless behaviour of supplier 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 
lot of unnecessary energy and money waste 3 5 5 5 1 5 5 2 
we payed for someone else’s fault 5 5 1 1 1 5 4 4 
stock was unavailable 5 1 5 5 1 5 5 1 
forecast was not there 1 1 5 4 1 1 5 1 
to support a marketing activity 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 1 
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Firm 7 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event  10 Event 11 Event 12 
Opportunistic behaviour and cartel 5 1 5 5 3 1 5 2 5 5 1 1 
Internal people with fixed mind and lack of innovation 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 5 1 4 5 5 
Unwilling to try alternatives 3 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 1 4 5 5 
Quality was unsure of product specification or alternatives 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 3 5 5 
Technical Myopia 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 5 1 4 5 5 
internal team alignment 1 1 1 1 2 5 3 5 1 4 5 5 
unwilling to adopt or be flexible 1 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 1 5 5 5 
ego and intentional behaviours 5 1 5 5 1 1 4 4 5 5 3 3 
lack of practical perspective 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 5 1 4 5 5 
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Firm 8 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
regular high volume 5 1 1 5 4 1 
no spare or stock 2 5 5 1 1 1 
single source  3 5 5 1 1 1 
performance measure motivated issue 1 1 1 1 5 5 
market related issue 4 1 5 5 4 1 
forecast error 1 1 5 5 4 4 
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Firm 9 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 
Sudden change in outlook 1 1 5 1 5 4 5 5 3 
Trading desk overrides all decision 1 1 5 1 5 3 5 5 3 
Beneficial delay and que up of vessels 1 1 5 1 4 2 3 4 3 
Opportunistic behaviour of suppliers 1 1 3 1 4 5 4 5 5 
Availability of higher margin elsewhere 1 1 4 2 5 4 5 5 5 
Have no control over it 5 5 2 5 3 5 5 1 5 
 
Firm 10 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
competitors pressure 1 1 1 5 5 3 
forecasting error by customer 4 1 1 5 5 5 
customer changing plans at the last moment 3 1 1 4 5 5 
Save money on logistics 5 3 1 3 2 1 
transporters are careless 5 5 5 1 1 1 
careless truck driver 1 4 4 1 1 1 
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Firm 11 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 
Alignment of Forecasting, sales and production 3 4 5 4 5 5 1 
Production related issues 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 
Dynamic pricing and market forces 5 3 2 4 5 5 5 
Low volumes with high demand fluctuation 1 1 5 3 5 3 1 
Profitability forced us to change product or grade mix which lead to a loss of few grades 4 2 3 3 5 5 1 
Lack of skill resulted in disruption 1 5 3 3 4 4 1 
Additional warehouse setup to support variation in demand 1 5 4 2 1 5 1 
Top management strategy to delay 5 4 3 1 5 5 1 
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Firm 12 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
Government Rules regulation and processes 5 5 1 3 1 
Machinery issues 4 1 5 4 4 
irresponsible and uncaring attitude 5 3 1 5 3 
unskilled and temporary workers 1 1 3 4 5 
 
Firm 13 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event  10 
internal alignment 4 5 3 1 1 5 5 1 2 1 
lack of trust on others 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 
unscientific forecast methods 4 1 1 4 1 3 5 1 4 1 
mischief by transport or logistics firms 3 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 
change in circumstances or market 1 1 5 4 4 1 4 1 4 5 
forecast granularity error 5 1 3 1 4 4 5 1 1 3 
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Firm 14 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
change in technical specification 5 5 5 3 5 
internal routines were not followed 4 4 1 4 5 
fabrication related issues 5 3 5 5 3 
late involvement of other functions 4 1 5 5 1 
careless mistake 3 3 2 1 5 
 
Firm 15 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Vendor apathy 5 4 5 5 5 5 
Attitude issues 5 1 5 5 3 5 
Financial stability of vendor 1 5 1 1 2 5 
over commitment 1 3 1 5 5 5 
higher management intervention 5 4 5 4 1 1 
opportunistic behaviour 1 1 4 5 4 5 
ego issues 4 1 5 4 4 3 
False information about capacity 1 4 4 5 4 5 
careless handling 5 2 2 5 4 1 
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Firm 16 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event  10 Event 11 Event 12 
Blindly trust the system 3 1 5 5 3 3 5 2 1 5 1 1 
Considered themselves to be right and others wrong 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 5 5 5 5 4 
faulty supply chain strategy 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 2 2 2 2 5 
Product proliferation 5 5 1 1 4 4 4 2 3 1 4 2 
interventional conflicts 5 5 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 2 4 5 
SKU level planning (granularity) is a issue 5 5 5 2 5 4 3 5 5 1 1 1 
Lack of trust on others 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 5 5 4 5 1 
Wrong data on system or local files 2 2 4 4 3 1 5 2 5 5 2 1 
Ego or personality issues 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 
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Firm 17 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
Had Competency 5 3 5 2 3 
Loss making deal / low profitability 5 1 5 3 2 
Reallocation of resource due to delay 5 1 5 5 1 
Need for a top management intervention  5 5 5 1 5 
Material + labour contract 1 5 1 5 2 
High motivation due to high stake 1 5 1 1 3 
Required persisting external motivation to complete the job 5 4 5 2 4 
 
Firm 18 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 
Least care attitude 5 5 1 5 3 4 4 5 
Ego 5 5 1 1 1 1 2 3 
Redirect the consignment 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 
Was not in our hand 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 1 
Over optimization of cost  5 2 2 5 1 1 5 5 
Greedy for profitability 3 2 2 5 3 3 3 5 
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Firm 20 
 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event1 Event2 Event3 Event4 Event5 Event6 Event7 Event8 Event9 Event10 
           
Stock Out 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 4 
Collaboration Error 3 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 
Transport Miss Handelling 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 
Wrong Supplier Selection 5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 
Complex Product Design 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CiloWorking Design And Procurement 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Work Culture And Personality Conflicts 3 1 4 1 3 3 4 3 2 2 
Quick  fix Solution 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4 4 
New Product Development Failure 3 4 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 
Lack Of Clarity Of Network Lead  time 3 4 3 1 1 4 2 4 3 3 
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Firm 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm 22 
Construct (Likert Scale Ranking 5) Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Finance rotation and management 5 5 5 5 1 1 
short product lifespan 1 1 3 4 5 5 
Custom issues 3 5 3 1 4 1 
Stiff competition in segment 1 5 5 4 5 5 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 
          
Vendor assessment/ competence 3 1 1 1 1 5 3 1 4 
Single tier 5 1 5 2 5 5 1 5 5 
No internal competency 5 4 5 1 5 3 1 5 5 
Single part  4 4 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 
(Complex procedure  job 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 4 5 
Always outsourced 5 1 5 1 5 5 1 5 5 
Contract Breach 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 
Technical knowledge was not adequately shared 1 3 4 5 1 3 4 1 4 
Low quotation 
 
Penalty clauses of contract were not clearly  understood 
5 1 5 2 1 4 2 3 1 
